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Abstract
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 
reducing corruption in the extractive industries sector, based on a case study of Azerbaijan.
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part considers the vast literature on corruption in the 
past twenty years and ascertains the characteristics of this phenomenon. The research identifies 
transparency as one of possible solutions to corruption.
The second part is based on the examination of the EITI, which adopts transparency as a measure to 
combat corruption in the extractive industries sector through revenue disclosure. The study is based 
on an empirical survey of participants to the EITI in Azerbaijan. The survey identifies the
limitations of the EITI, and suggests possible solutions.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Background to research
This thesis focuses on the problem of corruption in the extractive industries sector, and looks 
at the extent to which the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)*, an initiative 
to reduce corruption, contributes to reducing levels of corruption in countries rich in natural 
resources. It is widely believed that levels of corruption can be reduced through transparency, 
a principle which the EITI has as its main objective. In order to establish whether the EITI 
has the potential to reduce corruption, this thesis uses Azerbaijan’s oil sector as a case study. 
The hypothesis of this thesis aims to identify if the EITI in its current form is an effective 
mechanism for reducing corruption in extractive industries and examine whether the fact that 
a country has been declared EITI compliant can be associated with a reduction in the levels of 
corruption in its extractive industries sector.
Several reasons contributed to the decision to use Azerbaijan’s EITI experience in 
accomplishing the aim of this research. One of these reasons is the fact that Azerbaijan was 
one of the first countries to express its willingness to participate in the EITI.^ Further to 
Azerbaijan’s commitment to the EITI, the country has been disclosing audited reports from 
the extractive industries sector and has been made a compliant country in 2009. According to 
Azerbaijan’s EITI schedule and in compliance with EITI guidelines, the next validation 
should take place in July 2015.^ As a result, Azerbaijan presents a good opportunity to 
conduct a case study of the EITI, by looking into the implementation process from its start 
and through to the post-validation period. In addition, knowledge of Russian, a language 
which is still widely used in Azerbaijan, gave greater access to the materials and officials.
As new sources of hydrocarbons become increasingly important to the world, the Caspian 
Sea region has the potential to become one of the major oil and gas producing areas."*
'Throughout the thesis, this will also be referred to as the “Initiative” .
h^ttp://eiti.org/Azerbaijan (On 17 June 2003, Azerbaijan made a formal commitment to support the Initiative. 
On 16 February 2009 the EITI Board designated Azerbaijan as EITI compliant. In accordance with previously 
agreed Validation guidelines, Azerbaijan must be revalidated within 5 years. In reaching the decision, the Board 
acknowledged the prompt corrective measures that the Azerbaijan Government has adopted in relation to the 
formalisation o f a multi stakeholder group (MSG) and the establishment o f  a work plan. The Board confirmed 
Azerbaijan's achievement o f these conditions at its meeting in Oslo on 9 February 2010.)
<^http://eiti.org/node/6I/implementation> accessed 12 December 2013.
ftulia Naray, “The Industry’s Race for Caspian Oil Reserves” in Caspian Energy Resources -  Implications fo r  
the Arab G ulf {first edn, UAE: The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research 2000) 111 -  126,1 II.
1
Although most of the Caspian discoveries are in Kazakhstan, since 2010 oil has begun to 
come to the West from Azerbaijan/ Until Azerbaijan received its independence, it was 
Russia that controlled oil exports from the area, with the main export pipelines for Caspian
oil passing through its territory/ The geopolitics associated with the region has been a major 
influence on the Caspian petroleum industry/
Like other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan struggled to overcome challenges of economic 
distortion and contraction as well as rising poverty following independence in 1991. Since 
2000, Azerbaijan has experienced fast economic growth mainly driven by foreign direct 
investment in the oil sector/ Since 2005, Azerbaijan has been experiencing an oil production 
boom which has resulted in remarkable high growth and a strengthening of its external 
position/ Moreover, earnings from oil are likely to build rapidly even further in the coming 
years. At current levels of oil prices, the government will realise enormous inflows/^ 
However, to seize the opportunity, the government needs to address, amongst many others, 
the weaknesses in the business climate and governance to promote diversification of the 
economy. * * As for the world economy, the relevance of A z e r i o i l  is that it contributes to a 
global supply base that will keep oil relatively inexpensive.
In general, Azerbaijan’s reserves of natural resources have been a major factor in attracting 
foreign investment. Azerbaijan has the third highest cumulative inflow of foreign direct
^Maureen S Crandall, Energy, Economics and Politics in the Caspian Region (Praeger Security Int 2006) 56. 
^Ibid.
^Sarah A Emerson, "The Relevance o f  Caspian Oil to the World Market" in Cajpmn Energy Re.yoMrce.9 -  
ybr fAe v4ra6 (n 3), 169 -  186, 170. The transportation o f  Caspian oil and gas involves not
only Russia. Conflicts over land ownership and the poor relationship between the USA and Iran have played 
important roles in establishing potential pipeline routes. An example o f hostility that surrounds this issue is what 
happened to BP in 2001. While a BP research vessel was in a presumable Azerbaijani sector o f  the Caspian Sea 
disputed by Iran, and Iranian gunboat chased it out o f  those waters. This event prompted BP to suspend its work 
in that Caspian oil field for a period o f time.
''ibid. Thus, in 2005 real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) registered a growth o f 24.3%, up from 10.4% in 2004, 
as the Baku -  Tbilisi -  Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline began pumping Caspian Sea oil in May 2005.
^Ibid. The oil boom also enabled the government to initiate urgently needed investments in infrastructure and the 
social sectors, with encouraging progress in reducing poverty. However, as with many countries who suffer an 
economic boom based on natural resources exports, the massive expansion in the context o f  a slowly 
appreciating exchange rate, contributed to the rising inflation.
In addition to the expected inflows, the government o f  Azerbaijan has already received $300 million from 
bonus fees on the ACG project, and more than $500 million in profit oil from Early Oil Production. An 
additional bonus payment o f  $75 million is due when ACG production rises above 300 000 barrels now that 
BTC has become fully operational. The Shah Deniz bonus fee amounted to $37 million at the time o f  signing 
the agreement, and acreage fees o f  $1,200 per square kilometre per year during the exploration period have been 
paid. Moreover, an additional payment o f  $50 million is due when Shah Deniz production stabilises either at 12 
000 barrels o f  oil equivalent per day or output from two production wells is sustained at a stable production rate. 
"  Azerbaijan Review 2007, Economic Overview, 75.
'^Azerbaijani and Azeri are used interchangeably, where both terms refer to something that derives from
Azerbaijan.
'^Maureen S Crandall (n 5), 100, Industry experts suggest that Caspian oil and gas reserves as a whole may
approach those o f the North Sea.
investment (FDI) in value terms amongst all the countries of the Commonwealth of the 
Independent Stales (CIS)*"* after the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.*  ^ FDI remains 
concentrated in the oil and gas sector, which accounted for 65 per cent of the cumulative total 
of US $8.7 billion over 1993-2003.*^ The government of Azerbaijan welcomes foreign direct 
investment, realising that it plays a vital role in the development of the country’s economy.*^ 
Despite the country’s attempts to improve its investment climate, some obstacles nevertheless 
still exist and need to be addressed for Azerbaijan to make a smoother transition towards 
higher levels of development.*^
Amongst others, one of the challenges facing Azerbaijan is the tackling of corruption.*  ^The 
government recognises that this area needs urgent attention and has initiated various 
measures in an attempt to address this concern.^ ** Although there are positive developments in 
the government’s challenge to curb corruption, corruption nevertheless remains entrenched 
throughout Azeri society. According to a business anti-corruption portal, Azerbaijan is a 
challenging market for doing business, not least of all because of the systemic level of 
corruption which has deterred many potential investors from entering the market. Citizens as
'^The CIS was created in December 1991, where the participants committed to interaction on the basis o f 
sovereign equality. For current membership visit < httn://www.cisstat.com/enu/cis.htm > accessed 12 December 
2013
Azerbaijan: In depth review o f the investment climate and market structure in the energy sector', Energy 
Charter Secretariat (20011), pg 11
< http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Azerbaijan_lCMS_201 l_ENG.pdP> accessed 
13 January 2015 (In 2010, share o f oil sector in gross domestic product (GDP) was recorded at 48.5 per cent.) 
'^Ibid.
' ibid. 13. US companies are the main investors in the country, comprising 28.2% o f the total cumulative 
investment during 1994 -  2001. While at the last years UK became largest foreign investor with now about 39% 
o f total investment. Other important investors in the country come from Norway, Japan, France, Germany and 
Italy. The most significant foreign investors in the hydrocarbon sector include the AlOC consortium, Unocal 
Khazar Ltd (USA), Exxon Azerbaijan Ltd (USA), TPAO (Turkey), Pennzoil Caspian Corp (US, acquired by 
Devon), Statoil Apsheron (Norway), Lukoil overseas (BVl) Ltd (Russia), Itochu Oil Exploration (Japan), Total 
(France) and Agip (Italy).
Foreign investors are, in principle, allowed to invest in any sector o f the economy (except restrictions related to 
national security and defence). The Law on Protection o f  Foreign Investment provides that foreign investors be
treated not less favourably than domestic investors. The Law also includes guarantees concerning the 
repatriation o f profits, and other revenues, and protects in case o f  expropriation and nationalisation.
Ibid. The government continues its efforts to improve the investment climate. For example, the government 
has substantially reduced licensing requirements, streamlined licensing procedures, simplified the tax regime, 
curtailed excessive powers o f  law enforcement agencies, improved public procurement rules and established a 
Chamber o f  Accounts. For more information on Azerbaijan’s investment climate and related regulations see 
Afkan R. Isazade, “Azerbaijan: foreign investment and company incorporation” (2008) 19(1) International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 4.
'''ibid. Currently Azerbaijan needs to work on upgrading its laws, implement regulations to standards that are 
generally acceptable internationally and to make those laws and regulations fully effective, particularly through 
completion o f the court system reform, and other measures to strengthen the rule o f  law.
^transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures the perceived levels o f public sector 
corruption in a given country and is a composite index, drawing on 13 different expert and business surveys (the 
CPI scale ranges from 0 -  perceived to be highly corrupt, to 1 0 0 -  perceived to have low levels o f corruption). 
According to the 2013 statistics Azerbaijan is ranked 28th
(<http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_risks_azerbaijan_moldova>)
well as companies frequently face bureaucrats who are not subject to oversight during the 
course of their duties, which offers significant leverage for bureaucrats to demand bribes/* 
And since Azerbaijan’s most lucrative sector is that of natural resources, it is understandable
that this area is precisely the one that needs particular attention.
Corruption can affect any sector within a country, and at times due to its endemic nature, it is
to be found in major sectors. It would therefore be impractical for this thesis to cover all of 
the possible areas. This thesis concentrates only on one highly vulnerable sector in terms of 
its susceptibility to corruption -  that of the extractive industries. In particular, this study 
focuses on an examination of corruption and the various forms it takes in the oil extraction 
sector.
There are two main reasons for limiting this research to the oil sector only. One main reason 
is the fact that Azerbaijan’s main extractive industry sector is oil. Secondly, it would be 
impractical to concentrate on other extractive industries such as gas, for example, as each 
sector has its peculiarities and differs in terms of the players involved in transactions 
associated with extraction and production. This means that types and origins of corruption, as 
well as schemes upon which they operate also vary.
1.2 Azerbaijan: a country overview
The Caspian region has been at the forefront of energy activities from the late nineteenth 
century, when a commercial oil industry developed around Baku.^^ The region’s energy 
sector has been developing since Soviet times, and even before then, in the 1 9 2 0 s . T h e  
region is divided among eight states; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Among these states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have a substantial amount of oil and gas wealth, while Georgia 
is an important transit country.^"* During the Soviet Era, however, the actual production of oil
^‘The Azerbaijani system has few institutional checks on graft and the rapid growth in the energy sector has 
offered considerable opportunities for the institutionalisation o f  corruption. http;//www.business-anti- 
corruption.com/country-profiles/europe-central-asia/azerbaijan/snapshot/
Moreover, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are not carried 
out in a uniform and even-handed manner. Usually inspectors and businesspeople negotiate monthly or quarterly 
bribes for favourable treatment. 11% o f  companies state that bribery is frequent when dealing with 
environmental inspections. See <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/europe-central- 
asia/azerbaijan/corruption-levels/environment-natural-resources-and-extractive-industry/>
^^Ishrak Ahmed Siddiky, ‘The Caspian Energy Scenario and its Pipelines: Amalgamation o f  Interests?’ (2009) 2
International Energy Review 35
^hbid.
^''ibid.
from this region was rather low because of the distance of the oilfields from Russia itself/^ 
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the interest in the region due to its vast oil 
and gas wealth was recapitulated, with many Western companies wanting to invest in the 
newly independent states in the Caspian/^ The initial focus was on Azerbaijan because of its 
vast oil reserves. In 1994, the consortium of several Western firms signed agreements with 
the Government of Azerbaijan in what was then known as the “deal of the century”, to 
develop the Azeri, Chirag and Gunershi fields.Together, all these fields harboured as much 
as 6.5 billion barrels of oil, which makes the project one of the largest in the world.
Despite the wealthy natural resource reserves, the Caspian region is one of the most volatile 
regions in the world. There have been ongoing wars between various countries since the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union. However, the biggest threat to the existence of some of 
these states is Russia, which is not willing to let go of its dominance, and is highly sceptical 
of countries in the region which want to align themselves to the West.^* Similarly, the USA 
also has in its main interests to have a presence in the Caspian region due to its strategic 
importance. It wants to lower its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, and sees this as a perfect 
opportunity to diversify its energy supplies. The United States wanted the newly 
independent states of the Caspian to be self-reliant and more aligned to the West, to lower the 
Russian hegemony in the region.
Since the Caspian region is landlocked, most of the countries have to rely on the Soviet-era 
pipelines to supply their oil and gas to other parts of the world. Many cross-border pipelines
^Tbid.
^^Guner Ozken, ‘Economic and Security Values o f Caspian Energy in Azerbaijan’ (2006) 58(2) Review o f
International Law and Politics 58
^Tbid.
'^'ibid.
^^ R. Forsythe, o f  Of/ m Ce/zfro/ Tjza (Routledge 2006)
^"One o f the confliets is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly ethnic Armenian region within 
Azerbaijan. The current conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh began in 1988, when ethnic Armenian demonstrations 
against Azerbaijani rule broke out in both Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Supreme Soviet voted to secede from Azerbaijan. In 1990, after violent episodes in Nagomo- Karabakh, Baku, 
and Sumgait, the Soviet Union’s government in Moscow declared a state o f  emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
sent troops to the region and forcibly occupied Baku. In April 1991, Azerbaijan militia and Soviet forces 
targeted Armenian paramilitaries operating in Nagorno-Karabakh; M oscow also deployed troops to Yerevan. In 
September 1991, after Azerbaijan’s declaration o f  independence from the USSR, Moscow declared that it would 
no longer support Azerbaijani military action in Nagorno-Karabakh. Negotiations to resolve the conflict 
peacefully have been ongoing since 1992 under the aegis o f  the Minsk Group o f  the OSCE. The Minsk Group is 
currently co-chaired by Russia, France, and the USA and has representation from Turkey, several European 
nations, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Despite the 1994 cease-fire, a consequence o f the UN Security Council 
resolution calling for cessation o f  hostilities, sporadic violations, sniper fire, and landmine incidents continue to 
claim many lives each year.
^'ishrak Ahmed Siddiky (n 22) 37 
^^ R. Forsythe ( n 29) 38 
" Ibid.
pass through Russian territory, for which Russia tends to charge a high transit fee from the 
producing countries/"* The United States was thus keen to build new pipelines in the region, 
which would allow the Caspian countries to have greater freedom with regard to their
resources/^ Although it was initially thought to exclude Russia from the two pipeline 
projects,the situation was reassessed because it became clear that without Russia’s co-
operation in the area it would be hard to build any pipeline/^ This is especially the case with 
the CPC pipeline, which passes through Southern Russia to the Black Sea/^ It seems to be in 
the interest of many countries, those producing as well as those consuming oil or gas, to 
diversify the suppliers of these goods. This especially applies to areas which often face 
political or other instabilities, thus jeopardizing the supply of energy resources. Thus for the 
reasons of diversifying and ensuring energy security, natural resources in the Caspian region 
have become even more attractive, particularly to the West. A perfect example is Azerbaijan, 
which is considered one of the most important spots in the world for oil exploitation and 
development. Proven oil reserves in the Caspian Basin, which Azerbaijan shares with Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran, are comparable in size to North Sea reserves several 
decades ago. ^ ^
Azerbaijan, or officially, the Republic of Azerbaijan, lies in the South Caucasus and is 
bordered by Russia to the north, the Caspian Sea to the east, Iran to the south, Georgia and 
Armenia to the west. Due its location astride the trade routes connecting Europe to Central 
Asia and the Near East and on the shore of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan was fought over by 
Russia, Persia, and the Ottomans for several centuries."*** Finally, the Russians split 
Azerbaijan’s territory with Persia in 1828 by the Treaty of Turkmenchay, thus establishing 
the present frontiers and extinguishing the last native dynasties of local Azerbaijani khans."** 
At the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, an independent republic was proclaimed in 
1918 following an abortive attempt to establish a Transcaucasian Republic with Armenia and
34 Ibid.
Collum R Jr., Economides M.J, Gregorek A.J.,Sodhi A., "An in depth analysis shows Caspian oil’s potential’’ 
(2004) 225(3) World Oil 69
^^Information on Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
<http://www.cpc.ru/nortal/aliaslpress/lanulen-us/tablD13357/DesktopDefault.aspx> accessed 13 October 2011; 
Information on Baku -  Tbilisi -  Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) can more found at
<http://www.bn.com/sectionuencricarticle.do?cateuorvld^9006669&contentld=7015093> (accessed 14 May 
2013)
^^Ishrak Ahmed Siddiky (n 22)
^^For a map o f  the CPC pipeline visit
<http://www.cpc.ru/nortal/aliaslpress/lanulcn-us/tablD13357/DesktopDefault.asnx> (accessed 5 September 
2010)
^^Ishrak Ahmed Siddiky (n 22)
"'^Charles Van der Leeuw, Azerbaijan: A Quest fo r  Identity, a Short History (Culzon 1998)
""ibid.
Georgia/^ Azerbaijan received de facto recognition by the Allies as an independent nation in 
January 1920. However, this independence was terminated by the arrival of the Red Army in 
April of the same year."*^  Consequently, Azerbaijan became a republic of the USSR, 
something that was terminated when the country proclaimed its independence on August 30, 
1991."*"*
Although the government of Azerbaijan consists of three branches, Azerbaijan has a strong
presidential system in which the president dominates the legislative and judicial branches."*^  
Elections in 1992 resulted in the selection of Popular Front Party leader Abulfez Elchibey as
the country’s second President. His government, however, proved incapable of either credibly 
prosecuting the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or managing the economy. Also, many officials 
came to be perceived as corrupt and incompetent.'*^ Growing discontent culminated in June 
1993 in an armed insurrection, resulting in President Elchibey fleeing to his hometown -  the 
Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. This resulted in National Council conferring presidential 
powers upon its new Speaker, Heydar Aliyev, who was formally elected to a 5-year term as 
President in October 1993 following Elchibey’s formal dismissal by a national referendum in 
August 1993."*^  On October 15, 2008, Ilham Aliyev won re-election, taking 88.7% of the vote 
in an election boycotted by the major opposition parties, while in December 2008 the 
Azerbaijani parliament approved a measure calling for abolition of presidential term limits."*^  
The present 125-member unicameral parliament was elected in November 2005 in an election 
that showed some improvements, but did not meet international standards."*^  The Parliament 
includes only 10 opposition members and a sizeable number of independents, many of whom 
are believed to have close ties to government, while as many as 20 others are business leaders 
whose political affiliations are unclear.^ **
Azerbaijan is an economy in transition in which the state continues to play a dominant role.^' 
Azerbaijan is rich in natural resources, mainly oil and gas, but also possesses a significant 
agronomic potential based on a wide variety of climatic zones. During 1990s, in co-
42
43
''^Ibid.
45.
flbid.
hbid.
46
Background Note: Azerbaijan'(U.S. Department o f  State) 
<http://www.state.uov/r/pa/ci/b(zn/2909.htm> accessed 14 May 2013 
Ibid. 
hbid.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
''ibid.
Guner Ozken (n 26)
Ibid.52
operation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Azerbaijan pursued a successful 
economic stabilisation programme, with the annual growth exceeding 10% since 2000/^ 
Increases in oil production have largely driven this rapid growth/"* However, due to a slow 
monetary response, inflation officially reached nearly 17% and is likely to exceed 20%, and 
thus remains a major risk/^ In addition. Transparency International recent statistics on CPI 
(Corruption Perception Index) have rated Azerbaijan at 29 in year 2014/^
Industrial oil production began in Azerbaijan in the middle of the nineteenth century and the 
country experienced the first oil boom in the last quarter of the 19**" century, when production 
equalled half of world production/^ The oil industry has therefore been the leading sphere of 
the economy for more than a century/^ After the Azerbaijan Republic restored its state 
independence in 1991, it started to realize its sovereign rights and conduct an independent 
policy in economic field/^ M^or directions of this policy were transition to an economic 
system, created on the basis of different forms of property, market economy and integration 
into the world economy/**
Economic strategy since independence can be divided in two main stages. One of the 
priorities of economic policy of the Azerbaijan Republic was the preparation of an oil 
strategy. The implementation of this strategy, authored by President Heydar Aliyev, started 
in September of 1994 by signing the earlier mentioned 30-year contract between the 
Azerbaijan Republic State Oil Company and 13 foreign oil companies (Amoco, BP, 
McDermott, Unocal, SOCAR, LUKoil, Statoil, Exxon, Turkiye Pétrolier!, Pennzoil, Itochu, 
Ramco, Delta) from several countries (USA, Great Britain, Russia, Turkey, Norway, Japan 
and Saudi Arabia) on the joint exploitation of 'Azeri', 'Chirag' wells and the deep part of
^^'Background Note: Azerbaijan’ (n 45)
'^'ibid.
''Tbid.
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 
<https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results > accessed 15 May 2014. Since 1995, Transparency 
International has published an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ordering the countries o f  the world 
according to "the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians". The 
organisation defines corruption as "the abuse o f  entrusted power for private gain". A score o f  0 means highly 
corrupt, while the score o f  100 means a country is very clean.
Validation o f  the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in the Republic o f  Azerbaijan’fEITI Secretariat 
2009)
<http://eitransnarencv.oru/files/AzerbaiianElTlvalidationrenort.ndf> acce.s.sed 21 October 2012  
'*Ibid.
‘^'General Information on the Azerbaijani Economy
<http://www.azerbaiian.az/nortal/Economv/General/ucneral e.html> accessed 14 May 2013 
^Ibid.
'Guneshli' well in the Azerbaijan sector of Caspian Sea and the share division of oil
production/*
Since 2005, Azerbaÿan has been experiencing an oil production boom which has resulted in 
remarkably high growth and a strengthening of its external position. The oil boom also
enabled the government to initiate urgently needed investments in infrastructure and the 
social sectors, with encouraging progress in reducing poverty. This was followed by the 
signing of a Presidential Decree 'On Establishment of State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan 
Republic'(SOFAZ) in December 1999.^^ The major goal of the creation of the Oil Fund was 
"to ensure the fair division of oil wealth gifted to Azerbaijani people by God among 
generations". "^* One of main targets of the Fund is to collect and increase oil revenues for 
future generations and to use these revenues for present generations by taking into 
consideration current social needs of country, economic progress and development 
requirements. The State Oil Fund plays a critical role in promoting macroeconomic stability 
and in dampening the impact of massive energy revenues upon the economy. SOFAZ 
currently has assets in excess of $34 billion.
Negotiations of production-sharing arrangements (PSA) with foreign firms, which have 
committed $60 billion to long-term oilfield development, will continue to contribute to 
significant economic growth. Western oil companies began pumping oil from a large offshore 
field in early 2006, through a pipeline built from Baku to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of 
Ceyhan.Azerbai jan has made efforts to modernise and reform its economy, and the 
government has undertaken regulatory reforms in some areas, such as a substantial opening 
of trade policy. The authorities’ recent campaign to target public sector corruption needs to 
be pursued in a comprehensive manner to remove economic distortions and public sector 
inefficiencies.^^
^hbid.
^Tbid.
^Ibid.
'’^ ‘Background Note; Azerbaijan’ (n 45)
^ ‘SOFAZ assets to keep previous year level’ (7b(/qy.az, 23 April 2013)
< http://www.todav.az/news/business/121743.html> accessed 15 May 2013
67See Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Caspian Pipeline 
<http://www.hvdrocarbons-technolouv.com/nroiects/bn > accessed 15 May 2013
'’"statement by the IMF Staff Visit to the Republic o f Azerbaijan (February 15, 2011)
<httD://www.imf.oru/extemal/nD/sec/nr/2011/nrl 144.htm> accessed 15 May 2013. The work to upgrade
legislation in line with World Trade Organization (W TO) accession requirements is under way.
69Ibid.
1.3 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Support for greater transparency, especially in the energy sector is growing. Provoked by a 
number of high-profile corruption scandals, many NGOs around the world have launched an 
international campaign calling for all natural resource companies to disclose their payments
to governments of host countries where they operate.
Transparency has emerged as the most broadly recommended policy response to the poor 
governance records, and various initiatives have promoted the more open management of the 
revenues that natural resources produce.^ **
It is said that a large number of resource-dependent countries fail to provide basic 
information regarding their extractive sector.^* This reflects the centralisation of power and 
control of the petroleum and mineral sectors that commonly occurs in such countries. 
Resources provide leaders with an independent source of income, especially that oil industry 
can exist as an enclave largely apart from the broader economy and society. Thus, it is 
commonly the head of the state who exercises active and exclusionary control over sector 
governance and the distribution of natural resource rents. Since the concentration of 
information is related to the concentration of power, information asymmetries facilitate rent- 
seeking behaviour. Under such circumstances, the gains from opacity are high and the costs 
of avoiding transparency are low. In such a context, transparency is both difficult and a 
potential agent of change.^ "* Demystifying the extractive sector and financial flows dilutes 
some of the centre’s power by enabling other actors to participate more fully and eliminates 
informational enclaves where incentives favour self-interested behaviour.
The “Publish What You Pay” Campaign, launched officially in 2002, was joined a year later 
by a broad group of governments and many major players in the oil industry in the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Their aim is to develop a voluntary framework 
which promotes the transparency of payments and revenues in the extractive industries 
sector. The EITI is being strongly promoted in international development dialogues as the 
instrument that can enable resource-rich countries to obtain the benefits from their 
endowments.
Alexandra Gillies and Antoine Heuty, ‘Does Transparency Work? The Challenges o f  Measurement and 
Effectiveness in Resource -  Rich Countries’ (2011) Spring/Summer Yale Journal o f  International Affairs 25. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative <http://www.eiti.oru/> accessed 14 May 2013.
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The revenues published by the government are then compared to the payments, such as taxes, 
duties, royalties, bonuses and other, that extractive corporations, be it private or state owned, 
foreign or local, have made to the government. Once both sides have disclosed their 
payments, an independent administrator reconciles and reports the disclosed figures with a 
commentary. The report, along with the discrepancies, is then made publicly available in 
order to generate a debate within the country and ideally make the government accountable 
for any discrepancies found.
The EITI rules lay down criteria that need to be fulfilled for a country to join the initiative. 
According to the rules, four steps need to be followed during a sign-up procedure. These 
steps include the govemmenf s requirement to issue an unequivocal public statement of its 
intention to implement the EITI; the government’s commitment to work with civil society 
and companies on the implementation of the EITI; the government’s requirement to appoint a 
senior individual to lead on the implementation of the initiative; and the government’s 
requirement to establish a multi-stakeholder group (MSG) to oversee the implementation of 
the EITI. According to Requirement 4(h) of the EITI rules, in establishing the MSG group the 
government should ensure that senior government officials are represented on the MSG, 
ensure that the invitation to participate is open and transparent. Moreover, the government 
needs to ensure that stakeholders are adequately represented; however, this does not mean 
that they need to be equally represented.^^ Interestingly, the EITI rules do not specify what 
aspects should be taken into account when choosing the MSG and on what grounds 
successful candidates are chosen over the rest of those willing to participate.
Once the MSG has been formed, the final step is for the MSG to agree and publish a work 
plan, containing measurable targets, and a timetable for its implementation, including the 
assessment of capacity constraints. *^*
It should be mentioned that when referring to the disclosure of payments, EITI criteria 
require “regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining payments by companies to 
governments and all material revenues received by governments from oil, gas and mining 
companies to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible
77 Ibid.
EITI Rules 2 0 1 1 Edition {EITI International Secretariat Oslo, 1 November 2011) 
httn://eiti.orc/document/ruIes > accessed 14 May 2013.
Ibid., Requirement 4.
"''ibid. 13.
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manner"/* Following from this, the rules further state that it is the MSG that needs to agree 
on the definition of what payments would be considered material/^
Overall, the criteria listed in the EITI rules require a lot of work, which requires decisions to 
be made by the government and the MSG alone. Considering that these are just the sign-up 
steps that a country needs to follow in order to become a candidate for the EITI 
implementation, it requires a substantial amount of independent work from the countries 
themselves; a requirement that may be overwhelming for some countries.
Once the five sign-up criteria have been fulfilled, the country can apply to the EITI Board to 
be admitted as a Candidate. Once the country has been accepted as a Candidate, it has 
eighteen months to publish its first EITI report and two and a half years to submit the final 
Validation report. To assist the government and the MSG in their EITI implementation, the 
Secretariat has compiled a set of 21 requirements, which include tasks that need to be 
fulfilled in order to prepare the country for the validation process.^"* One of the important 
requirements is that the MSG agrees on a publicly available Terms of Reference, which 
should include provisions on the endorsement of the Country Work Plan, as well as 
procedures for choosing and organisation that will undertake the reconciliation.^^ The Work 
Plan represents an important requirement of the EITI implementation; it includes deadlines 
and expectations of the signatories to it. It is also used by the Validator during the validation 
process when evaluating the implementing country's progress. The work plan also includes 
financial considerations with regards to sources of funding required for timely 
implementation of the ini t ia t ive. I t  is at this stage that the government needs to formulate 
strategies for obtaining technical and financial assistance donors and international partners. 
Moreover, the government is required to eliminate any existing legal or regulatory obstacles 
which could weaken EITI implementation. Common obstacles include confidentiality clauses 
in government and company contracts. The rules, in Requirement 8, provide a list of possible 
steps that can assist in eliminating such obstacles. Some of them include issuance of waiver 
of confidentiality clauses, enactment of regulatory and legal changes and so on.^ ^
Ibid. II.
Ibid. 13.
Ibid 34. In some circumstances, Candidate status can be extended for an additional 12 months. 
"^Ibid 15-30.
Ibid 16 Requirement 4(g).
Ibid 17 Requirement 5.
Ibid 20 Requirement 8 i-vii.
1 2
Reporting templates, as the name suggests, lay down instructions and requirements with 
regard to the information that the reporting parties need to disclose. Taking into account the 
fact that disclosure of information is the foundation and the heart of the initiative, reporting 
templates are therefore central to the EITI process.
Following from this, the MSG needs to agree on the reporting templates and ensure that they 
meet the requirements of disclosure such as the revenue streams that companies and the 
government must disclose, the time period covered by the report, and whether the reporting 
will be done in aggregated or disaggregated form.*^ This means that the MSG in each 
country-participant ends up creating its own reporting template. This kind of approach 
resulted in a situation where every country's report looks different, in terms of information 
that it contains. Some countries chose to opt for the disaggregated method of showing 
payments, while others preferred to leave it as aggregated. Although the initiative requires 
that payments from all companies in the extractive industries should be included in the report, 
in reality, everything depends on how the terms material payment has been defined. This 
threshold could be based on company's production capacity or a percentage of oil each 
company contributes towards the total revenues earned by the country.^ Because EITI rules 
give countries the freedom to define, the countries use the definition in different ways.
For example, in Guinea's 2005 report materiality was defined as including payments from the 
six largest mining companies, whilst in Gabon, the definition failed to include the 
government's profit from oil revenues, which is an important omission when defining 
material payments.^* In general, the countries that have published reports, including 
Azerbaijan, have not been transparent in their process for defining what would constitute 
material payments. This means that the governments may have revenues from the extractive 
industries that are not included in the EITI reports.
According to requirement 18 of the EITI rules, the EITI is ultimately implemented when the 
EITI Report is made public, and it is widely implemented and openly discussed by a broad 
range of stakeholders. It is important that the Report is publicly available in a way that is 
publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible.^^ Implementing countries are 
required to submit a Validation report in accordance with the deadlines established by the
Ibid 21 Requirement 9. 
"Hbid.
Dilan Olcer, 'Extracting the Maximum from the EITI' (2009) OECD Development Centre W orking Paper 
No.276, < www.oecd.oru/dataoecdy56/60/42342311 .ndf > accessed 13 May 2013.
^'ibid.
Ibid.
EITI Rules (n 78).
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Board. The validation process is successftilly completed once an independent validator has 
conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the EITI by meeting with the 
stakeholders and reviewing the reports, and has been satisfied that the country has followed
all the requirements - the country is made a Compliant country. Countries that do not 
complete the Validation by the agreed deadlines may be delisted from the EITI.
There are circumstances, where countries unable to complete the validation process on time 
can be eligible for a further extension of their Candidate status. Such decisions can be made 
by the EITI Board upon its examination of each country and “in reviewing applications for 
renewal of Candidate status, ...the Board is only likely to grant an application in exceptional 
cases where a Candidate Country’s efforts to reach Compliant status within two years have 
been hindered by unforeseen difficulties or by constraints beyond its control”.^ "* That said, 
many of the countries currently listed as Candidates have had their candidatures extended and 
their Validation dates moved to a later date.
At this stage it is worth mentioning that EITI rules are directed mainly at countries, which is 
odd, since the initiative is open for company participation as well. From the EITI rules it is 
not clear what rules companies need to follow and how the fulfilment of their obligations is 
being tested.
1.4 Research methodology
This case study is conducted through doctrinal research of academic and scholarly works in 
the field of corruption and transparency, as well as those looking into the interrelation 
between transparency and accountability. When deciding on the choice of methodology to be 
applied to this study, it became apparent that although the doctrinal method would provide a 
valuable source of information in relation to the area of corruption in the extractive 
industries, the use of this method alone would be insufficient for giving a comprehensive 
understanding of the current anti-corruption regime, particularly when examining the 
mechanisms used by the EITI in tackling corruption in the extractive industries sector.
The examination of the application of the EITI and the mechanisms that it employs is 
conducted through a case study based on Azerbaqan’s oil industry. A case study is usually 
used to intensively study a single case, in order to shed light on a larger class of cases. In 
this thesis, the study of a case of Azerbaijan’s implementation of the EITI intends to identify
EITI Secretariat, Policy Note 3 (27 May 2008)
< http:/eiti.org/fiIes/document/PoIicyNoteNo03.pdf> accessed 15 May 2013.
^Tohn Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge University Press 2007).
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practical areas of the application and its effectiveness, which would be useful to other 
countries and companies which choose to participate in the initiative. Case studies are 
believed to be particularly important in areas where no in-depth studies have taken place 
Case studies are used in many situations to contribute to the knowledge of various 
organisational, social and other related phenomena.
In relation to the EITI, the information covered through doctrinal research extends to 
studying various documents that list EITI requirements and rules published by the Secretariat. 
This information is essential to understand the concepts of the initiative and its operation. In 
addition, official publications in relation to country implementation provide an insight into 
the implementation process in Azerbaijan. The conducted doctrinal research is based on 
theoretical and academic writings that have been done in relation to the area so far. These 
public documents mainly refer to and list procedural aspects related to the implementation of 
the initiative. Information collected from this type of research is used in chapter three and 
some parts of chapter four, where documents supplied by the EITI are examined.
Doctrinal research is supplemented with the use of qualitative methodology. The qualitative 
research technique is applied in order to adopt an insider perspective^^ into the area of 
research and to identify the effectiveness of the Initiative in reducing corruption in the 
extractive industries sector. According to a recent inquiry on empirical legal research by the 
Nuffield Foundation, empirical research is very important in the area of law, and is now 
recognised as having a central position in legal scholarship. Empirical legal research helps to 
understand the law better and has the ability to influence the development of substantive law, 
the administration of justice and the practice of law. Empirical work provides various insights 
into how the law works in the real world.
It was initially decided to conduct a visit to Azerbaijan, with the scope of interviewing all 
those taking part in the initiative. However, after assessing the security implications of such a
visit, it was decided to conduct a survey by using a structured questionnaire that would be
^ I^bid. 62.
^^Robert K. Yin, EejearcA. (Applied Social Research Methods Series, Volume
5, Fourth Edition, SAGE 2009).
'’"According to Carl Brun, by adopting an insider perspective, the researcher gains direct interaction with the 
topic which is being researched and with the participants. This in turn helps in understanding the complexities o f 
the issues that are being investigated. See Carl Brun, “The Process and Implications o f Doing Qualitative 
Research: An Analysis o f 54 Doctoral Dissertations” (1997) 4 Journal o f  Sociology and Social Welfare 95. 
'’^ Dame Hazel Germ, Martin Partington, Sally Wheeler, Law in the Real World: Improving Our Understanding 
o f  How Law Works (The Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research, 2008) <
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Iaws/socio-IeuaI/emDiricaI/ > accessed 20 May 2013.
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administered remotely/^ This was also the reason why Azerbaijani government officials,
who also take part in the initiative, were not included in the group of people to whom a 
questionnaire was sent. This decision was taken based on the information available which 
relates to the treatment of journalists who publish information that is not favoured by the 
government .Taking  into account the nature of this research and the risks involved, it was 
decided not to involve government officials. To this end, it was decided to question the civil 
society participants due to their neutral position. As for companies, the risk implications did 
not pose any problem, as the companies that participated in the survey were foreign 
companies with no links to the Azeri government. In the majority of these cases, the 
questionnaires were sent to the companies' headquarters, outside of Azerbaijan.
Questionnaires are seen as important tools for data collection in r e s e a r c h . T h e  aim of a 
standardised questionnaire survey is that every participant is presented with the same 
questions in the same way. This means that any variety in the answers represents the true 
reflection of variety of views and circumstances among participants. Initially it was 
thought to use the method of interviewer-completed questionnaires, where the researcher 
would complete the questionnaire by talking to the respondent over the phone. However, 
considering the sensitive nature of the topic, the self-completion method was given 
preference. This type of questionnaire completion provides privacy for the respondent as well 
as cuts down the costs of the survey process. Use of this type of questionnaires in research
has several advantages. Firstly, they allow the efficient use of time, since the questionnaires 
can be completed by the respondents in their own time.'^^ In addition, questionnaires offer
'"^Although foreigners are generally welcomed in Azerbaijan, there have been serious incidents o f  muggings,
assaults and burglary committed against foreigners as well as local residents. In addition, Western women tend 
to receive unwanted male attention, including offensive behaviour, while walking on the streets alone. For more 
information see ‘Azerbaijan Country Specific Information’
< httn://travel.state.uov/travel/cis na tw/eis/cis 97S.html > accessed 10 September 2013.
According to the recent statistics, for the third year, more than 200 journalists were jailed in Azerbaijan for 
publishing information that was not favoured by the government, <https://cpj.org/europe/azerbaijan/> accessed 
10 November 2014.
‘°^The term questionnaire is defined by Oppenheim in Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude 
as broad terms, which has been used by practitioners in different ways. Some practitioners prefer
to reserve the term exclusively for self-administered and postal questionnaires, while others include interviews 
into the definition. See A.N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement 
(Continuum 1992).
'^hbid. 100.
'°^ Ibid.
' “^Pamela Munn and Eric Drever, Using Questionnaires in Small -  Scale Research (The SCRE Centre, 
University o f  Glasgow 2004) 35.
'°^Ibid.
Ibid. 2.
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the respondents anonymity that few other research techniques can offerT^ The issue of 
anonymity was of particular importance in this survey, as it dealt with issues related to 
corruption. Thus, it was important to ensure that the participants felt comfortable in providing 
the information. In addition, the use of questionnaires distributed by electronic mail ensured 
that the data collection involved very low costs, as opposed to the use of telephone calls. In 
addition, through the use of questionnaires no extra staff or facilities were needed.
The survey of those involved in the EITI in Azerbaijan reflects on difficulties in 
implementing the EITI, by identifying aspects of the initiative which are perceived as 
obstacles. As a result, two types of questionnaires were used during the research. Since civil 
society is perceived as an important link in a fight against corruption one questionnaire was 
created in order to gain information from the civil society organisationsin Azerbaijan, to 
see the extent of their involvement in the initiative and gain their views on its implementation 
in the country. The other questionnaire was designed for gaining information from the oil 
extracting companies operating in Azerbaqan in relation to their experience in fulfilling EITI 
requirements. Each questionnaire is structured in such a way as to address issues specific to 
each group, although some questions were included in both questionnaire. ' ' ^
As for ethical clearance, all necessary steps were taken to ensure compliance with ethical 
rules, as set by the University of Surrey Ethics Committee, by obtaining consent from the 
participants, and ensuring that participants were fully informed of the nature of the research 
and that confidentiality''^ and anonymity"^ were preserved at all times."'' Informed consent 
was acquired from each participant thereby a consent form would be filled in, thus satisfying 
the informed consent requirements. ' Signed consent forms are kept by the researcher in a 
secure location.
I^ I^bid. 4.
Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., (Lenard Bickman and Debra J. Rog, eds., 4*^  edition, SAGE
Publications 2009) 82.
"^According to the World Bank definition, Civil Society Organisations include non-govemmental organisations 
(NGOs), trade unions, faith-based organisations, indigenous peoples movements, foundations and many other. ( 
Visit
<http://web.worldbank.oru/W BSlTE/EXTERNAL/TOPlCS/CSO/0..contentM DK:20127718-m cnuPK :288622-  
pagePK:220503-piPK:220476-theSitePK:228717,00.htm l ) For the purposes o f  this thesis terms c/v// joc/efy 
and NGO  are used interchangeably.
"T he types o f  questions included in the questionnaire are analysed in detail in Chapter 6, section 6.2.
Confidentiality is an active attempt to remove from the research records any elements that might indicate the 
subjects’ identity.
"^Anonymity means that the subjects remain nameless.
'"For Ethics Committee documents see Appendix A.
"^Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences ( Pearson International Edition, Allyn & 
Bacon 2009) According to Berg, "informed consent means the knowing consent o f  individuals to participate as 
an exercise o f  their choice, free from any element o f fraud, deceit, duress, or similar unfair inducement or
manipulation” . In most institutional research, consent must be obtained in writing, which is done through
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The questionnaires, in their structure and content, aim to contain some important elements 
which are entailed in qualitative research, such as the aim of the questions and the
information sought to be gained from the answers received."^ Thus, it is ensured that each 
questionnaire is thorough in terms of issues that it needs to address, yet concise in length.'" 
In addition, when planning the questionnaires the issue of flexibility was taken into 
account."^ As a result, adequate space aAer questions was leA to allow the participants to 
include their comments. At the end of each questionnaire, enough space is provided to allow 
participants to add any additional comments they may wish to share. Although the research 
method employed is qualitative in nature, some of the questions in the questionnaires are of a 
quantitative nature. It is important, even when using empirical research, to ensure that 
sufficient methods are used to quantify the legal concepts and are sufficient to capture the 
concept at issue. This way, some of the data represented through the Likert scale is of a 
quantitative nature.'^"
Clarification was sought from the EITI on implementation issues.'^' In addition, some emails 
were sent to the respondents to seek certain clarifications in relation to their responses. In this 
case, the knowledge of Russian, still widely used in Azerbaijan was useful.
1.5 Thesis structure
This thesis is divided into seven chapters including the introduction (chapter one). Chapter 
two is introductory in nature, and provides a general background against which the basis for 
understanding the concept of corruption in the extractive industries was drafted. Based purely 
on a doctrinal analysis of corruption, it provides various definitions of corruption as provided 
for by various legal instruments and scholarly writings. It also identifies various forms of 
corruption and possible causes of their occurrence.
informed consent slips or consent forms. There are two rationales for obtaining written consent forms. Firstly, 
they ensure that participants participate in the survey knowingly. Secondly, signed consent forms allow 
monitoring o f  voluntary participation o f subjects.
" '’David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research (Second Edition, SAGE Publications 2005).
" Catherine Marshall & Gretchen B Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (S"^** edition, SAGE Publications 
1999).
"^Ibid.
"^Jennifer K. Robbennolt, ‘Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical Research in Law and 
Policy’ (2002-2003) 81 Nebraska Law Review 777, 777; Bernadette Dierckx de Casterle, Chris Gastmans, Els 
Bryon, Yvonne Denier, ‘QUAGOL: A Guide for Qualitative Data Analysis’ (2012) 49 International Journal o f  
Nursing Studies 360.
’^ °The use o f  the Likert scale is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.2.
‘^‘clarifications are mentioned in Chapter 6.
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Chapter three focuses on the examination of corruption endemic to the sector of extractive 
industries, particularly concentrating on the oil extraction sector. The discussion revolves 
around an in-depth study of the conditions prevailing in the sector of natural resources in 
general, and then moving onto the commercial transactions and their methods of operation.
An analysis of current and past agreements in Azerbaijan is conducted through doctrinal 
research of current academic literature but also of those agreements and contracts available in 
English."^ Examples of cases in relation to disputes involving natural resources in 
Azerbaijan, which arise in light of alleged bribery, embezzlement, or some other forms of 
alleged corruption, are also given. As a result, this chapter enables us to understand the 
vulnerable aspects of commerce in scarce commodities, and thus distinguish specific areas of 
this trade most susceptible to corruption. Furthermore, the aim of examining concession 
agreements and other contracts conducted between foreign companies and the host state for 
the extraction of resources was to identify any clauses that stipulate or refer to any form of 
confidentiality, thus seeing an impediment to transparency such clauses generate.
Since transparency is seen as an important concept in the reduction of corruption and 
constitutes the main principle of the EITI, chapter four addresses this issue in detail. The 
objective of this chapter is an in-depth analysis of the meaning of transparency through a 
study of the relevant literature. One of the scopes is to identify what the concept of 
transparency entails and in what ways it contributes to the eradication of corruption. The 
chapter looks at the “Publish What You Pay” scheme and the means by which it advances 
disclosure. Moreover, the chapter looks into how this disclosure can be practically 
implemented and in turn contribute to the reduction of corruption. Looking into the concept 
of disclosure in general, attention is drawn to the EITI. Prior to examination of the Initiative 
itself, some analysis is made in relation to self-regulatory method of governance. The 
discussion precedes a thorough analysis of the Initiative’s aims and objectives along with its 
scheme of operation. This is done through a detailed examination of documents offered by 
the EITI on its website and which intend to explain the initiative’s functions and 
recommendations as to its implementation.
Following an examination of the concept of disclosure and the EITI, this chapter considers 
the EITI validation process. The review is based on the data collected from a case study of
M any agreements and contracts will be searched for in relevant libraries, sites, but also international centres 
for dispute resolutions such as the ICSID (International Centre for Settlement o f  Investment Disputes see 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSlD/Index.jsp>). Some terms o f  the production-sharing agreements and 
concession agreements in Azerbaijan were found on the relevant Azeri sites, where an English translation was 
made available.
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Azerbaijan, firstly introducing the country’s economic and political profile and then moving 
onto its support of the Initiative. The chapter demonstrates how a country adjusts to being
EITI-compliant, and how practical it is. One of the important issues that this chapter 
identifies is whether it is possible to comply with all the requirements that the EITI sets out 
and how clear these requirements are.
After completion of the review of the structure and functioning of the EITI, and following the 
examination of its application through the case study of Azerbaijan, this chapter of the thesis 
evaluates the EITI’s effectiveness. This part therefore is dedicated to discussion of points 
which were identified in the course of the research reported in earlier chapters as well as data 
gathered from the survey of companies and civil society organisations that operate in 
Azerbaijan. The results gathered from the EITI’s implementation and validation in 
Azerbaijan are assessed in the light of the interrelation between written theory and its 
practical application and enable a clear identification and evaluation of possible setbacks and 
problems identified. Accordingly, suggestions of possible solutions as to the resolution and 
elimination of the classified setbacks are formulated.
The last chapter (chapter seven) addresses the final conclusions with regard to all the issues 
raised throughout the work. It also raises some ideas that arose as a result of the research, but 
had to be set aside due to the limits of the research parameters. As a result, based on these 
points, new areas and issues for further research are suggested.
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Chapter 2 
Corruption: a general overview
2.1 Introduction
As stated in the introduction, corruption is a problem, and not only in the extractive industries 
sector but in other sectors as well. This chapter provides a background to the understanding of 
the phenomenon of corruption based on the doctrinal research. It also looks into the definition of 
corruption as identified by various international conventions, NGOs and instruments on 
corruption adopted by various international organisations. This chapter also examines different 
types of corruption as well as its effects. It then looks at various legislative anti-corruption 
measures that currently exist. Following from this, the chapter identifies transparency as a 
possible way of reducing corruption and introduces the EITI, the aim of which is to reduce 
corruption in the extractive industries sector through disclosure of payments between extractive 
industries companies and governments.
2.2 Background to corruption
Corruption is not a recent phenomenon. ' Policymakers, economists and politicians from both the 
developed and developing countries have been aware of high levels of corruption in many 
countries, including the former colonies.^ According to Carr, when referring to Tanzania, 
“lucrative contracts abroad were important for generating growth at home, especially at a time 
when former colonisers such as France and UK were slowly finding their feet by rebuilding their 
tattered economies after the Second World War”.^  Most corruption took place in developing 
countries in Africa and the Middle East, where US corporations were eager to get access to the 
countries’ natural resources, the scarcity of which along with cheap local labour, guaranteed high 
levels of return on their investment.''
'A generally adopted definition o f corruption is ‘abuse of power for personal gain’. However, a more detailed 
analysis o f its definition is given in section 2.2 o f this chapter.
 ^ Indira Carr, “Corruption, the Southern African Development Community Anti-corruption Protocol and the 
Principal-Agent-Client Model”, (2009) 5(2) International Journal o f Law in Context 147, 149 
 ^ Ibid.
Indira Carr (n 2)
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However, it was only in the 1970s that attention was openly drawn to the high levels of 
corruption. The Watergate scandal associated with the US President Nixon and his 
administration, generated a high degree of interest from the media and the society overall, in 
relation to corruption and corrupt practices of officials.^
In addition, a survey conducted by the US Securities Exchange Committee revealed that many 
US corporations engaged overseas were associated with bribing foreign officials in order to gain 
access to lucrative resources.^ Following this revelation, the US government passed the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 1977, in order to clear its reputation.^ At the time the USA expected that 
other developed countries with substantial overseas business ventures, such as the UK, would 
follow suit.^ However it took two decades since the introduction of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act for the issue of fighting corruption to reach an international plane.
The ICC Commission on Anti-Corruption during one of its surveys of Western companies 
conducting business abroad have noted that many companies do not see bribery as a negative 
phenomenon. In fact they tend to believe that corrupt practices help negotiations and make them 
run smoother. In fact, during much of the twentieth century corruption was a taboo subject and it 
was a general perception that corruption was a normal practice in conducting business.^ Also, 
legal practitioners who have been involved in various ventures abroad, as part of government 
initiatives or business ventures, note that in many countries companies and governments do not 
accept the fact that corruption in perceived as a negative phenomenon and more so recognised as
 ^Michael A Genovese, IFatergafe CrMiy (Greenwood Press 1999).
 ^ US Securities and Exchange Commission, Repo/f on ///ego/ Corporote Pqy/nents  ^onf/ Proct/cef
(Committee on Banking, housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 94*'’ Congress, 2"** Session, May 1976). 
The revelation took place as a result o f a survey by the US Securities Exchange Commission.
’ The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, ("FCPA") was enacted for the purpose of making it unlawful for 
certain classes o f persons and entities to make payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or 
retaining business. Specifically, the anti-bribery provisions o f the FCPA prohibit the wilful use o f the mails or any 
means o f instrumentality o f interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance o f any offer, payment, promise to pay, or 
authorization o f the payment o f money or anything of value to any person, while knowing that all or a portion o f 
such money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to 
influence the foreign official in his or her official capacity, induce the foreign official to do or omit to do an act in 
violation o f his or her lawful duty, or to secure any improper advantage in order to assist in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.
The only other nation to adopt extraterritorial prohibition was Sweden, which followed suit, in limited fashion, in 
1978. In direct contrast some 14 European countries (such as UK and France) continued to acknowledge corruption 
overseas as an acceptable practice and permitted deduction o f foreign bribe payments on business tax obligations in 
some form.
 ^ US Securities and Exchange Commission, Reporf o/z ^wg.yAoMa6/e u/n/ ///ega/ Co/yorafe f  aymea/j: aa(/ FracAcg.; 
(n5).
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a criminal offence. To them it is rather a part of business dealings which should not be seen as 
contradictory to business regulations.
The leadership in setting a new course in the fight against corruption on an international level 
came first within the Northern Hemisphere. According to an article by Salbu, since 1994, the 
Clinton Administration has made fighting corruption a top foreign policy objective." Until then, 
there had been little support, rather an outright resistance, within governments, international 
institutions, and the private sector to even admit to the problem of corruption, let alone to 
become involved in finding solutions." The main reasons behind such reluctance was, among 
other, fear of impinging on sovereignty, concern for overriding geopolitical or commercial 
objectives and reluctance to place blame." This means that from the point of view of 
international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) for example, dominated by the 
strong powers such as the United States, bringing up the issue of fighting corruption would never 
be approved.
Besides state sovereignty, geopolitical and commercial objectives also pose obstacles to fighting 
corruption. In today’s world of globalisation and interdependence between the states and 
transnational companies, commercial interests play far more important roles than the desire to 
fight injustice. Over many centuries, human societies across the globe have established 
progressively closer contacts.
Recently, the pace of global integration has dramatically increased. Unprecedented changes in 
communications, transportation, and computer technology have given the process new impetus 
and made the world more interdependent than ever. Multinational corporations manufacture 
products in many countries and sell to consumers around the world. Money, technology and raw 
materials move ever more swiftly across national borders. Along with products and finances, 
ideas and cultures circulate more freely. As a result, laws, economies, and social movements are 
forming at the international level. The process has been business driven, by business strategies 
and tactics, for business ends. Governments have helped, by incremental policy actions, and by 
larger actions that were often taken in secret, without national debate and discussion of where the
'"Ibid.
"Stephen R. Salbu, "A delicate balance: Legislation, Institutional Change and Transnational Bribery” (2000) 33 
Cornell International Law Journal 658, 659.
'^Ibid.
Ibid 140.
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entire process was taking the community. In the case of some major actions advancing the 
globalisation process, like passing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or 
joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), the public has been subjected to massive 
propaganda campaigns by the interested business-media elites. In the United States, public 
opinion polls showed the general public against NAFTA even after incessant propaganda, but the 
mass media supported it, and it was passed.
In Europe as well, polls have shown persistent majorities opposed to the introduction of the 
Euro, but a powerful elite supported it, so that it moved forward. By enlarging business profits 
and weakening labour it has shifted the balance of power further toward business, so that 
political parties have been even more decisively influenced by business money in elections. The 
globalising corporate media have added their growing strength to the advance of neoliberal 
ideology and opposition to any vestiges of social democracy, making social democratic policies 
difficult to implement.
The business community has pushed for international agreements and policy actions by the IMF 
and World Bank that further encroach on the ability of democratic policies to act on behalf of 
their constituencies. These agreements and the demands of the international financial institutions 
invariably call for precisely the policies desired by the TNC community. The EMU conditions 
give primacy to budget constraints and inflation control, in accord with the neoliberal and 
corporate agenda. GATT, the WTO, and the NAFTA agreement also give top priority to 
corporate investor and intellectual property rights, to which all other considerations must give
14way.
Incidents of Western governments being aware of their companies bribing foreign officials 
abroad in order to secure new contracts are frequent." Nevertheless, a wave of corruption 
scandals and economic crises took corruption out of the purely political realm and focused 
attention on its economic and social impact. Such impacts come in form of distortion of market 
forces, weakening of the rule of law, eradication of public trust and endangering political
'''‘Globalisation’ < http://www.Klobalpolicv.oni/g:loba]ization.html> accessed 16 May 2013.
The USA is one of the countries whose politicians are well aware o f the deals made by American companies 
overseas, particularly when deals involve lucrative contracts for the extraction and sale of minerals, oil and gas. One 
such example is the case with an American banker, who was involved in bribing the Kazakh President Nazarbayev 
on behalf o f some extracting companies. For more information see Ron Stedghill Oil, cash and corruption’ {New 
ybrt November 5 2006) <httD://www.ulobalDolicv.oru/component/content/article/221/46985.html> accessed
16 May 2013.
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stability. "According to the World Bank, improved governance and reduced corruption are 
essential in reducing poverty and encouraging economic growth." Corruption also undermines 
the provision of public services." Similarly, the UN Global Compact 10* Principle recognises 
corruption as one of the world’s greatest challenges." The principle also states that it is not only 
the states but also the business community that should play its part in making corruption 
unacceptable.^*' It stresses the importance of recognising that corruption diverts resources from 
their proper use.
Moreover, the destructive impact of corruption is not confined within territorial borders. Failures 
of governance in one country tend to reach beyond national boundaries to capital markets, 
international institutions, and the individual consumer halfway around the world. Due to the 
aforementioned spread of interdependence through globalisation, with rich countries and their 
transnational corporations dominating the market, the impact on poorer communities struggling 
to improve their lives has been devastating, in many cases undermining the very fabric of 
society. It has led to environmental mismanagement, undermining of labour standards and has 
restricted access to basic human rights.
It is now the case that corruption is being actively pursued through anti-corruption and 
governance programmes around the w orld .R aising  the issue at the highest political level had
’^Edwards F. Ampratwum, ‘Fight Against Corruption and its Implication for Development in Developing and 
Transition Economies’ (2008) Journal o f Money Laundering Control 11(1) 76, 77.
'^<httn://web.worldbank.org/WBSlTE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRlES/ECAEXT/EXTECAREGTOPANTCORy0..conte 
ntMDK:20607160-menuPK:1525184-DasePK:34004173-DiPK:34003707-theSitePK:704666.00.html>. 
"^ ‘Overview o f anti -  corruption continued’.
<httD://web.worldbank.oru/WBSlTE/EXTERNAL/TOPlCS/EXTPUBLlCSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTAN
TICORRUPTION/0..contentMDK:21540659-menuPK:38446NDaeePK:148956-DiPK.:216618-thcSitePK:384455. 
OO.html> accessed 16 May 2013.
'"‘Transparency and Anti-corruption’.
<http://www.un2lobalcompact.or2/aboutthegc/thetenprinciplcs/anti-corruption.html> (The UN Global Compact is a
strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten 
universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. By doing so, 
business, as a primary agent driving globalization, can help ensure that markets, commerce, technology and finance 
advance in ways that benefit economies and societies everywhere.)
"^ibid.
^'Edwards F Ampratwum (n 16) 78; Corruption therefore creates a vicious circle, which expands the negative 
impact far beyond its starting point.
^^ Ibid.
^^Such programmes came in from of suggestions and directives initiated and addressed towards the countries and 
corporations, in particular transnational corporations through initiatives organised by the United Nations and the 
World Bank.
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set the stage for reaching agreement on regional anti-corruption standards/'' associated and 
encouraged through the civil society organisation Transparency International (TI)/^ The success
of TI is represented through approximately 180 representatives from TI national chapters, 
international organisations, academic institutions and the private sector in over 60 countries. 
Such numbers show a growing concern and the desire to fight corruption, in comparison with 
sixteen years ago, when only few governments or institutions were willing to openly confront the 
issue of corruption.^*’
2.3 Definition of corruption
Corruption is a complex concept. Attempts have been made to provide a generic definition of 
corruption but they are not satisfactory.^^ Despite the lack of a clear definition most of the recent 
attempts to define the concept revolve around “economic or other gains made by an individual in 
a position of power as a result of that individual’s role within an organisation or institution”.^ ^
It is not easy to define corruption, as it exists in diverse forms and places. Academics, 
economists and lawyers have so far provided several definitions for corruption, but because it 
extends across a wide spectrum of an economy, it is thus sub-divided into different types of 
criminal activities. Corruption, is a general term, which when broken down into smaller 
components can be found in forms of bribery, embezzlement, money laundering and many
^''The Organisation of American States (GAS), in 1996, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), in 1997, adopted different multilateral anti -  corruption conventions reflecting varying 
membership -  specific concerns and circumstances.
^^Transparency International, the global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption, brings people
together in a powerful worldwide coalition to end the devastating impact o f corruption on men, women and children 
around the world. TTs mission is to create change towards a world free of corruption. Transparency International 
challenges the inevitability of corruption, and offers hope to its victims. Since its founding in 1993, TI has played a 
lead role in improving the lives of millions around the world by building momentum for the anti-corruption 
movement. TI raises awareness and diminishes apathy and tolerance o f corruption, and devises and implements 
practical actions to address it.
Transparency International is a global network including more than 90 locally established national chapters and 
chapters-in-formation. These bodies fight corruption in the national arena in a number o f ways. They bring together 
relevant players from government, civil society, business and the media to promote transparency in elections, in 
public administration, in procurement and in business. T fs  global network o f chapters and contacts also use 
advocacy campaigns to lobby governments to implement anti-corruption reforms (for more information on TI and its 
work visit
< http://www.transDarency.or2>).
^^ <http://www.transparency.or2/about us > accessed 1 March 2013.
^^Stephen Gentile, "Power Against Corruption" (2008)10(5) Legal Week 25; See also Heba Shams, "Globalisation
and the Definition o f Corruption: Implications for Criminal Law” (1999) 4 Yearbook of International and Economic 
Law 369.
^^Heba Shams, "Globalisation and the Definition o f Corruption: Implications for Criminal Law", Yearbook of 
International and Economic Law (1999) 336.
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more/^ So, when closely examined, it becomes apparent that all these smaller components of
one, larger event have a common trend -  which is an abuse of power of an individual or a group 
of individuals as a result of their role or superiority within a country or an organisation, for 
financial gain/*' The inclusion of bribes within the definition of corruption is obvious and, had 
the definition stopped there, then defining corruption perhaps would not pose such a difficult a 
task.
Although the broad definition given above refers to private gain being the main concept of 
corruption, in instances of bribery, both sides benefit from the corrupt act. The essence of bribery 
is giving something of value to an official or agent in exchange for the official or agent 
exercising his or her authority in a manner favourable to the party giving the payment.^' 
Although most of corrupt activities have some sort of financial gain as their main objective, it 
does not necessarily need to be the case. Sometimes a person chooses to abuse the power of their 
position, in search of other, non-financial rewards, such as an attainment of something that, 
under usual conditions is difficult to get. For instance, sometimes persons in authority tend to use 
their power in an organisation or within a country to help a relative to achieve a professional 
goal, or get a job that otherwise he or she would be unable to get, due to the lack of required 
qualifications, for example.
Consequently, six broad and sometimes overlapping categories capture the most important 
situations where corruption determines who obtains the benefits and bears the costs of political, 
judicial, and bureaucratic actions. The most common existing bribes are those which are
^"indeed, the problem with corruption is that it goes beyond bribery and encompasses other dishonest acts. For 
example in an article in New York Times by Greg Myre, “Palestinian Prosecutor Cites Progress Against Corruption” 
(NY Times, Mar. 9 2006), it explains that in Palestine, for example, bribery was not the central problem in efforts to 
curb corruption. Rather, it explains that the predominant corruption problem was the misuse of funds.
"^For the purposes o f this thesis financial gain refers to gain o f  monetary value.
It can be found extremely difficult to define “abuse of power” . A Middle Eastern potentate, who builds a lavish 
personal palace with the state funds, would not be acting corruptly since in such countries all property o f the state 
may be considered property o f the monarch.
^'Robert C Brooks in his “The Nature o f Political Corruption” found in Arnold J Heidenheimer and Michael 
Johnston (ed) Fo/frzcaZ Corrwptzon (Third Edition, Transaction Publishers 2001) 57 states that “Even when it is 
distinctly qualified as political or business or social cormption, the suggestion is subtly conveyed o f organic 
corruption and o f everything vile and repugnant to the physical senses which the latter implies. Escape from such 
general conception can hardly come from the accepted formulas o f the dictionaries. Their descriptions or periphrases 
of corruption are in general too broad for use in exact discussion. Bribery is indeed defined with sufficient sharpness 
as “a gift or gratuity bestowed for the purpose o f influencing the action or conduct o f the receiver”. Corruption, 
however, is by no means synonymous with bribery. The latter is narrower, more direct, and less subtle. There can be 
no briber taker without a bribe giver, but corruption can and frequently does exist even when there are no personal 
tempers or guilty confederates”.
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intended to clear the market; bribes which act as incentive bonuses; those that lower costs for 
those who pay them;^ '' bribes which divide monopoly rents between private investors and public 
officials; bribery of politicians that buys influence and bribery by politicians that buys votes; 
and bribes that can override legal norms."
As a result of the above examples of corruption, application of the earlier mentioned definition of 
bribery, which can eventually lead to other forms of corruption, often entails difficult line- 
drawing questions to separate gifts, campaign contributions and similar items of value that are 
not bribes because there presumably was no quid pro quo agreed for their receip t.C hina, for 
example, is always used as a good example of a country where gift giving constitutes an 
important cultural phenomenon, and is present in all areas of life." It is thus considered an 
offence not to provide a business partner or an official conducting a certain work task, with an 
appropriate gift as a form of one’s expression of gratitude.^*' Corruption therefore is normative in 
character. To judge a certain conduct as corrupt necessarily implies reference to a set of values 
which are perceived to be breached by that conduct.'" This immediately imposes the question of 
the source of these norms and justifiability. As can be seen from paradigms in China, it also 
renders the definition of what is corrupt culturally relative, which poses difficulties for both 
historical and comparative research.''^
^^Such situations are those where a government may be eharged with allocating a scarce benefit to many individuals 
and firms using legal criteria.
^^Officials in the public sector may have little incentive to do their jobs well, given official pay and the level o f 
international monitoring.
Private firms and individuals seek to reduce the costs imposed on them by government in the form of taxes, 
customs duties, regulations.
^^Governments frequently transfer large financial benefits to private firms through procurement contracts, 
privatisations, and the award o f concessions.
'^’Bribes can substitute for legal forms of political influence.
^^The judiciary has the power to impose costs and transfer resources between litigants.
^"See 506 F. 2"*" 62, D.C. Cir 1974, 71 - 72.
^"jenny Li, CAma. ybwr focAef fo CAme.se ^Msmess, Cwjfomj one/ Efigwe^fe (World Trade Press
2001) For Chinese, gift giving is a natural dynamic o f any relationship: it shows a relationship is valued and is a 
means of expressing respect and honour for the other person. Gifts express good will and gratitude. The predominant 
social structures o f Chinese society are found in the web o f significant relationships (guanxi), based upon family, 
geographic origin, school mates and so forth. A person's guanxi outlines who matters and how much they matter and 
provides the primary basis o f moral claims for one person upon another. Thus, when dealing with Chinese 
delegation, the leader should receive a better gift than subordinates.
''"For a more detailed explanation on the culture o f gift giving in China read Jenny Li (n 38). Similarly, for general 
background on business customs around the world see Mitchell, Charles, /MtgrMufiorzu/ E/A;c.s (World
Trade Press, 2003).
"'Heba Shams (n 28).
"^Susan Rose-Ackerman, CorrM/zfto/z azz(/ Cover/zme/zf Cuz/.ye.y, Co/z.yg^ z/g/zce.y, azz(/ R^rzzz (1999) 42.
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An accepted definition of corruption is the World Bank’s, which defines corruption as “the abuse 
of public office for private gain”/^ According to Heba Shams, in choosing this definition the 
Bank’s report “emphasises the difficulty inherent in attempting to define a term that covers a 
broad range of human actions”/''According to the World Bank, the idea behind such a broad 
definition is to ensure that it includes most forms of corruption/^ However, according to Shams, 
while the Bank’s definition succeeds in giving a hint as to what the problem of corruption is 
about, its apparent simplicity is deceiving/^ One of the examples that Shams provides when 
arguing the simplicity of the definition is the “normative nature of the word abuse, which 
involves value-judgement”/^ Moreover, what seems to be of even more concern is the centrality 
of public office in the definition; an element which narrows the definition significantly by 
excluding private corruption except inasmuch as it enters in a corrupt transaction with a public 
officer/^
Similarly, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (OECD Convention), which was adopted in 1997, directs its 
attention to the public officials, thus making it an offence to bribe a foreign public official." 
Article 1(1) of the Convention states the following:
"EacA party  j^Aa// toAg .yucA 7Mea.yMrg.y a f  may Ag /zgcg.y.ya/y to g.ytaAA.;A tAat tt a crtm;»a/ c ^ n c g  a/zf/gr zt.y taw /o r  
a/zy pgr.yo/z z/ztg/ztzozzaZ/y to ( ^ r ,  prozzzz.yg or gzvg azzy zzzzz/zzg pgczzzzzazy or otAgr az/va/ztagg, wAgtAgr z/zrgct/y or 
tArozzgA zzztgrzzzgz/zarzg.y, to a yôrgzgzz pzzA/zc q/^ zczaZ, yôr tAat c^cza / o ryôr a tAW party, zzz orz/gr tAat tAg c^cza / act 
o r r^azzz ^ o m  actzzzg zzz rg/atzozz to tAg pgz/orzzzazzcg o f  q/^czaZ z/zztzgf, zzz orz/gr to oAtazzz or rgtazzz Azz.yzzzgj.y or otAgr 
zzzzpropgr az/vazztagg zzz tAg cozzz/z/ct zzztgrzzatzozzaZ Azza^ zzzg.y.y. '
World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Roles of the World Bank (1997) 33.
""Heba Shams (n 28).
"^ Ibid
" I^bid
"frbid
"^Such situation occurs where private business is a briber o f a public servant.
Despite the Bank’s general definition o f corruption as a public sector phenomenon, it is important to note that it 
acknowledges the existence o f corruption in the private sector. Its report on the problem of corruption states that 
fraud and bribery can and do take place in the private sector, often with costly results. Although acknowledging the 
existence o f  private sector corruption and its negative externalities, the Bank nevertheless indicates that despite this 
fact the main concern is with public sector corruption. The basis o f this policy, according to the World Bank, is that 
corruption in the public sector is a more serious problem, particularly in developing countries. Thus, the recognition 
o f private sector corruption by the World Bank and its exclusion from the scope o f the Bank’s activities indicates 
that the definition as provided by the Bank is a working definition or policy-based definition, rather than a general 
one, thus covering only those areas which are related to the Bank’s own objectives.
""OECD Convention Article 1(1).
29
The prime mover for the OECD to take steps to combat cormption of foreign public officials was 
pressure applied by the United States, following the passing of the domestic legislation tackling 
the issue of bribery of foreign public officials, which came in the form of the earlier mentioned 
Foreign Cormpt Practices Act (FCPA) 1977.
The United Nations Convention against Cormption (UN Convention) includes bribery in the 
private sector. "Article 21 of the UN Convention states:
“E a c A  5 'l a / g  P a r z y  sA a /Z  coMsZzZez- a z Z p p A /z g  .ywcA ZggZsZaA'vg a/zzZ o lA g r  m g a .y a r g s  a s  m a y  A e z z e c g s s a z y  f o  esZaAZZsA a s  
cn m Z m a Z  q ^ z z c a s ,  wAazz c o m m z rie z Z  zzzZezzAozzaZZy zzz zAe cozzz-sg  g c o z z o m z c , TzzzazzczaZ oz" c o m m g z -c z a Z  acZ zvzA gs.'
TTzg /zz"o m zsg , z ^ z - z z z g  oz" g zv z zz g  zZzz-gcZZy zzz- zzzzZzz-gcfZy, z :^ a zz  zzzzzZz/g a z Z v a zz m g g  fzz azzy  /zgz"sozz wAzz zZzz-gg/s zzz" wzzz-As, zzz 
azzy  c a p a c z z y ,  /A z- a  p z -z v a /g  sgglzzz- gzzAYy, fAz" fA g /zgz-sozz A z m sg ^ z z z"  Agz"sgZfzzz-fAz- azzzzZAgz- pgz-szzzz, zzz zzz-zZgz- z A a l A g zzz- 
sA g , zzz A z-gacA  z ^ A z s  zzz- Agz- zZzzAgs, a c f  zzz- z -g /z-azzz^zzm  a c A z z g ,
TTzg szzZzczZaAzzzz zzz- a c c g p f a z z c g ,  zZzz-gcZZy zzz- zzzzZzz-gclZy, z ^ a z z  zzzzzZzzg a z Z v a zz fa g g  A y azzy  pgz-szzzz wAzz zZzz-gcZs zzz- wzzz-As, zzz 
azzy  ca /z ac z Y y , /A z- a  p z -z v a lg  sgcfzzz- gzzAZy, fA z- fA g /zgz-szzzz A zm sg^^zzz- Agz-sgZfzzz-fAz- azzzzfAgz- pgz-szzzz, zzz zzz-zZgz- z A a f  A g zzz- 
sA g , zzz A z-gacA  z z f  Azs zzz- Agz- zZzzAgs, a c f  zzz- z -g f -a z z z ^ z z m  a c A zz g . "
Indeed, it would be unacceptable not to include private sector cormption, since multinational 
corporations nowadays are as powerful in economic terms as some of the small nation states. 
Moreover, many developing countries, in particular those which have undergone decentralisation 
have privatised provision of utilities such as electricity and water which were normally provided 
by the public sector. The UN Convention was adopted in December 2003 and came into force in 
December 2005, and currently has over 60 ratifications.^' In addition to the fact that the UN 
Convention includes private sector bribery, it also goes wider on its definition of cormption, by 
including other offences such as embezzlement,^^ misappropriation,^^ illicit enrichment" and 
abuse of functions/^
Furthermore, the Commission on Anti-Cormption of the International Chamber of Commerce, in 
its ICC mles of Conduct and Recommendations (ICC Rules) also refers to bribery when referring 
to cormption/^ It states that
50 UN Convention Article 21.
For a full list o f countries signatories and the status o f their ratification o f the Convention visit 
<http://www.unodc.or2/unodc/en/treatics/CAC/si2natories.html> accessed 16 May 2013.52Article 17.
Article 17.
Article 21.
Article 19.
Article 1(a) of the Rules.
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“ A n A e z y  z.y fA g z ^ z V z z g ,  /zz-ozzzz.yzz;g, g /W z z g  oz" a c c g p A z z g  q f  azzy  zzzzAz/g /zggz/zzzazy  oz- oZAgz" a A v azz Z ag g  to  oz- A y 
a  /zzzA/z'g z ^ c z a / ,  a /  zzaA ozza/, / o c a /  oz- zzztgz-zzaA ozza/ /g v g / ,  a  / z o /z A c a /  /zaz-zy, /z a z - y  q ^ ^ c z a /  oz- cazzA zA afg , azzA  
a  Azz-gcZoz- q ^^ cg z -, gzzz/z/oygg oz- a g g z z t q f  a  /z z iv a Z g  g zz /gzp rz .sg  zzz oz-Agz- t o  oA /azzz oz- z-gtazzz a  Azz.yzzzg.;.y oz- otA gz-
zzzz/zz-opgz- a A v a z z ta g g  '
The ICC Rules also state that bribery includes “kicking back a portion of a contract payment to 
government or party officials or to employees of the other contracting party, their close relatives, 
friends or Business Partners or using intermediaries such as agents, subcontractors, consultants 
or other Third Parties, to channel payments to government or party officials, or to employees of 
the other contracting party, their relatives, friends or business partners”/^
Although it also refers to extortion and solicitation, thus giving attention not only on the supply 
side of the phenomenon, as the earlier mentioned instruments do, but also concentrating on the 
demand side of the problem. Article 1(b) concentrates on the criminalising demand-side 
corruption, by stating that:
Exfoz-A ozz zzz- .yzz/zcz/aAzzzz z.y zAg AgzzzazzAzzzg q f  a  AzAAg, wAgZAgz- zzz- zzzzZ czzzzq/gA  wzZA a  zAz-gaZ z f  zAg z/gzzzazzA zj  ^
z-g/zzi^gz/.
At this point one must include a definition commonly applied nowadays, one provided by 
Transparency International (TI) and which tends to include corruption in both public as well as 
private sector. TTs definition states that “corruption is operationally defined as the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”.^  ^Here, a wider nature of definition simply requires an abuse 
of entrusted power for private gain, and thus does not restrict its application strictly to public 
office holders. Similarly, it can be applied both to the supply side as well as the demand side of 
corruption.
It therefore becomes extremely difficult to define such phenomenon within the remits of a piece 
of legislation. Governments, as upon directions from international institutions, prefer to give a 
wider definition to this phenomenon, hoping that it would that way cover most of the acts that
I^bid.
^"Article 1(b) concentrates on the criminalising demand-side corruption, by stating that:
ExZzzz-Zzzzzz zzz- .yzz/zczZaZzzzzz w  ZAg z/gzzzazzz/zzzg zz f a  Az-zAg, wAgZAgz- zzz- zzzzZ czzzzq/gz/ wzZA a  zAz-gaZ z f  zAg z/gzzzazzA y  z-gy .ÿgz/.
{Bribery as used in these Rules shall include extortion)
<http://www.transparencv.0r2/news room/faq/corruption faq> accessed 4 November 2010.
31
may become possible acts of corruption. Attempts have been made to define the concept of the 
crime of corruption in such a way as to cover any possible activity to defraud.
This eventually leads to an assumption that perhaps corruption is a symptom of poor 
governance.^*' The Commission on Global Governance^' defines governance as “the sum of the 
many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”. It is 
a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and 
action may be t a k e n .It thus includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce 
compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to 
or perceived to be in their interest. Any definition of corruption must therefore start from the 
understanding of governance and who exercises it. Thus, whenever governance is approached as 
a state role, corruption is defined as a public sector problem, and whenever corruption is 
perceived as general problem, governance is defined as a decentralised function." One must 
realise that although in today’s world it is difficult to identify who is in charge of governance, 
and thus is becomes difficult to define those who abuse it and how they do it. It is therefore 
imperative, when trying to define corruption, to take into consideration all the players in today’s 
society, thus including not only governance agencies, but other equally significant rival and 
complementary agencies, including private agencies. Any policy that is directed at state 
corruption and ignores corruption in other agencies, such as the market, cannot be effective. 
Subsequently, this leads us to the discussion on the causes of corruption.
^"Paul F Diehl, The Politics o f  Global Governance: International Organisations in an Independent World (Third 
Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc 2005).
^'The Commission on Global Governance was an organisation co-chaired by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar 
Carlsson and Shridath Ramphal o f Guyana that produced a controversial report, Our Global Neighborhood^ in 1995. 
The report was attacked by pro-sovereignty groups for calling for United Nations reforms that would increase its 
power. It also was criticised by world federalists who disliked the terminology o f "global governance", which 
seemed clunkier than "world federalism." The Commission was established in 1992 with the full support o f United 
Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The Commission made a standard definition o f global 
governance stating that "Governance is the sum o f many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be 
accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce 
compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in 
their interest." To see the report o f the Commission visit 
<httn://soverei2ntv.net/p/2ov/22analvsis.htm> accessed 03 November 2010.
^^Paul F. Diehl (n 60).
^^ Ibid.
^Ibid.
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2.4 Types of corruption
Although this thesis concentrates on corruption in the business sector, particularly in the 
extractive industries, it would not be possible to discuss business corruption without making 
reference to political corruption. Corruption in itself is a very wide concept, which entails 
various political, legal, administrative, social and economic factors. Different authors choose to 
talk about different types of this phenomenon, looking at it from various endemic perspectives.^^ 
This work concentrates on the study of the phenomenon of corruption based on its wider 
definition as provided by Transparency International, that of the abuse of power for private 
benefit. It must be noted at this point that for the purposes of this work corruption is not 
discussed only as an act of abuse of power of those in public office. In present day society, and 
particularly in the field of natural resources, much of the power lies in the hands of private 
entities, i.e. companies, and it would therefore be inaccurate to overlook the private parties 
involved.^^Corruption is, therefore, generally divided into several types: patronage,bribery 
and misappropriation.^*'
Corruption is also viewed from a perspective of supply side and demand side. '^ Extractive 
industries sector companies, as many other MNCs, is generally considered to be on the supply 
side of corruption, that is those who give bribes while bureaucrats or politicians on the demand 
side, i.e. those who take bribes. A positive feasibility report, showing a clear and reasonable 
expectation of a satisfactory return on investment, is the basis on which the financing is usually
^^ ‘FAQs on Corruption’ < httD://w w w .tran sD aren cv .or2 /w h o w ea re /o r 2 an isa tio n /fa q s on corru p tion /2 />  accessed 1 
March 2013.
many countries o f the former Soviet bloc, many state-owned companies were privatised in the 1990s. Moreover, 
recent reports from Russia show that following budget deficits, the government has decided to sell off more shares 
o f its state-owned companies. For more information read ‘Russia Unveils Privatisation Plan as Largest US Investor 
Divests’ (The Sofia Echo, 30 July 2010)
<http://sofiaecho.eom/2010/07/30/9400l3 russia-unveils-privatisation-plan-as-lar2cst-us-investor-divests> accessed 
16 May 2013). With such tendency in privatisation, it is therefore important to look at corruption as an abuse o f 
private power as well as public.
'’’^ Bestowal of a benefit to an individual or a group o f individuals based on the relationship between the involved. 
Patronage does not require existence o f a merit. It occurs when a relative provides a benefit to a relative or a friend
to a friend.
^^Bribery involves a mutual exchange of a benefit in return for a benefit. The exchange does not need to be 
necessarily o f a monetary value, although in most cases it does.
^"Misappropriation also known as embezzlement as the name itself suggests involved illegal appropriation o f funds 
for private use.
’’Frank Vogl, ‘The Supply Side of Global Bribery’ (1998) 35(2) Finance & Development 
< http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/fi/fandd/1998/06/vo2l.htm > accessed 12 March 2013.
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obtained by companies for undertaking new business ventures. Such financing is often obtained 
in form of a loan and often requires the giving of guarantees to the lenders that the project will be 
completed by a certain date.^^ Consequently, for such ventures speed becomes a crucial factor. 
As a result, such need for speed makes investing companies susceptible to get involved into bribe 
giving to bureaucrats who have the power to prevent delay or halt the approval. This explains 
why companies tend to be involved in acts of corruption where employees are eager to accept 
extra cash to speed up a certain administrative process. Such acts are particularly common to 
countries where the administrative system is weak and chaotic due to lack of control and legal 
enforcement. Moreover, in corporations bidding in public procurement contracts process, 
corruption of high ranked officials can guarantee that a company which paid the most would get 
the approval.
The types of corruption are strictly linked to the theoretical view on corruption. Economic theory 
has developed two basic views of corruption. One view is set within the framework of the 
principal-agent-client theory (the PAC model). This approach is based on the assumption that 
there is an asymmetry of information between principals, who are represented by politicians or 
decision makers, and agents, who are the civil servants.Accordingly, benevolent politicians are 
not informed about the misdemeanours of their subordinates. This widely accepted model 
presents a situation where the principal who is in a powerful position has given his agent an 
element of discretion in administering certain types of services. Provided that there is a lack of 
accountability between the two, and how to conduct the business is left solely at the agent’s 
discretion, the situation leads to corruption." Moreover, the theoretical models of corruption 
based on this approach are analytically rich, as they can explain a wide range of behaviour of 
civil servants, thus including administrative corruption as well.
’ l^an E Marshall "A survey o f corruption issues in the mining and mineral sector", Mining, Minerals and Sustainable
Development Project, International Institute for Environment and Development 1, 9
<http://www.10iacc.or2/download/workshons/cs49d.ndf > If the venture is financed by loans, interest costs begin to 
grow immediately as soon as the first money is drawn from the lender and will continue through the venture 
duration until the loan is repaid. Even in cases where funds come from shareholders or joint venture partners, there
is a need to bring the investment to the point where a cash flow is established and dividends are commenced as 
rapidly as possible.
’^Indira Carr, “Corruption, the Southern African Development Community Anti -  corruption Protocol and the 
Principal -  Agent -  Client Model" (2009) 5(2) International Journal o f Law in Context 147.
’"ibid 151.
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However, Begovic claims that according to this main assumption, the state is benevolent and as a 
result there is no possibility for political corruption/^ He thus suggests that the fact that the list 
of corrupted politicians and associated political scandals is lengthy in virtually all countries of 
the world means that, not only are the assumptions of the model unrealistic, but also its 
predictions regarding political corruption are wrong/** Hence, political corruption simply cannot 
be explained within this methodological framework/'" The crucial feature of this approach is that 
corruption is exogenous to the political process; hence principal-agent relations, and the scale 
and scope of asymmetry of information, are not as influenced by the political process and 
political constellations as by the outcomes of that process." In other words, corruption is not 
institutionalised. Nonetheless, if corruption is considered endogenous to the political process, 
corruption is institutionalised and its level and pattern depend on the political constellation. 
Begovic believes that corruption is nothing but a consequence of the political process. Within 
such a framework, corruption is considered as a form of rent appropriation by the ruler. 
Begovic states;
“Corruption is the answer to the problem of internal cohesion of predatory teams. Corrupt civil 
servants are created to satisfy ruler desire to foster loyalty through patronage. Corrupt civil 
service is nothing but the extension of efficient rent appropriation by the ruler. The rent is 
extracted through sales of a limited number of permits and licenses for economic activity. 
Furthermore, endowing only a few civil servants with the power to grant licenses enables the 
diversion of the licensing proceeds from the budget towards private gain”/ '
As a result, Begovic claims, civil servants are cooperative because they have their share in the 
spoils. Such an approach provides grounds for understanding and explaining the relationship 
between corruption and the political process. Nonetheless, this methodological approach does 
not provide a clear analytical framework for consideration, given the level and structure of
’^Boris Begovic, ‘Corruption: Concepts, Types, Causes and Consequences’ (2005) 111(26) CADAL 
< http://www.cadal.or2/documcnts/nota.aspYid nota= 1742> accessed 14 March 2013.
’^Ibid.
” lbid.
’ I^bid.
’"Referring to a political regime in the country.
^"Begovic (n 75), The words governzMg/zZ and poAZzczazzs^  are used in the same context, where politicians are part of 
government. In his analysis, Begovic uses the theory in relation to political economy of dictatorship and refers to 
politicians as rw/gz-.; (politicians with ultimate power, who were not elected through a fair democratic process).
""ibid.
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corruption. The main problem is that the structure of incentives to the political decision makers 
and the change of that structure are not explained, hence we have no information on the driving 
force of the change, although the model provides information on the structure of incentives for 
rent appropriation.^^ Moreover, one should not look at civil servants as an independent entity. 
Since civil servants are employed by the government, and as far as the PAC model is concerned, 
they should not be seen as an entity independent of that government.
Although Begovic provides valid ideas to support his proposition against the applicability of the 
principal-agent-client model to political corruption, one still can argue otherwise. Precisely, one 
should look at politicians as the agent part of the model, where the principal is represented by 
the people of the country, to whom politicians must be accountable. In this case, the agent, that is 
the government with its corrupt politicians and the civil servants, due to lack of accountability or 
lack of clear and accessible procedures and checks in the administrative and decision making 
process betrays the principal, who for the purposes of the PAC model is represented by the 
people of the country.
Thus, while Begovic’s theory of political corruption is relevant and acceptable, one can still see 
that the PAC model can still be applicable to defying political corruption. While Begovic sees 
politicians as rulers, the PAC model is applied to governments which are, at least theoretically, 
democratically elected. In these cases, one would not look at politicians as rulers, in the sense 
that the people have ultimate power.
Everything considered, within one or the other theoretical views, three basic types of corruption 
are identified. The first one is corruption for achieving or speeding up materialisation of some 
specific right that the citizen or legal entity is entitled to, is known as facilitation payments.^^ 
The frequency of this type of corruption is a good indicator of the capacity and effectiveness of a 
country’s administration, i.e. its poor administrative capacities or poor supply of administrative 
services. One should bear in mind that the shortage of supply of administrative services can be 
deliberately produced, aimed at creating the rent and its redistribution via corruption.
"ftbid.
a person bribes a civil servant in charge o f issuing a passport that a briber/corruptor is entitled to, i.e. there is no 
legal barrier for his passport to be issued, that is exactly the first type o f corruption. Its specific and more aggressive 
version is bribing officials to jump the queue for providing the service that is thoroughly legal. In other words, civil 
servants are corrupted to do their job or to do it more quickly than they usually do, instead o f not doing it.
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For instance, one simple example of this point can be seen by examining the levels of
bureaucracy with levels of corruption. The figures demonstrate that in most cases countries with 
the highest levels of bureaucracy are linked to highest levels of corruption. For example, the 
2009 Corruption Perception Index ranks New Zealand as the least corrupt." At the same time, 
the Doing Business in 2010 publication by the World Bank shows that it takes only one day to 
start up a business in New Zealand with only one step.^^ On the contrary, Venezuela is ranked 
162"  ^ on the Corruption Perception Index and 177* in the Doing Business in 2010 with 16 
procedures to be followed to set up a business, which on average takes approximately 141 days. 
The second type of corruption is administrative corruption and is the most modelled type of 
corruption. This type of corruption corresponds to the principal-agent model of corruption 
described above, as the total supply of corruption demand for the bribe for violating the rules is 
provided by the civil servants. The most significant direct consequence of this type of corruption 
is that legislation and public policies are not justly enforced. A cynical approach to the issue 
within countries with widespread corruption is that some public policies are so bad, it is actually 
better for the society that they are not enforced. Accordingly, corruption is considered to be the 
second best solution. It would be better if these policies were not enforced at all. Nonetheless, 
since the political process resulted in bad policies, corruption is seen as a solution for bad public 
policies, whatever the source of these bad public policies." Nonetheless, one should take into 
account the costs of corruption as such, particularly the costs of corruption as a method for 
circumventing bad public policies.
Finally, there is state capture -  corruption that is aimed at changing the rules and regulations into 
rules and regulations that favour the interests of the corruptor.^ According to Begovic, the 
concept of state capture was developed by the World Bank primarily for explaining the reality of
""'Corruption Perceptions Index’
<http://www.transnarcncv.0r2/p0 licv rescarch/survcvs indiccs/cni/2009/cni 2009 tablc> accessed 16 May 2013, 
"^'Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times’ 
<httn://www.doin2busincss.or2/documents/fullrenort/2010/DB10-full-report.ndf> last accessed 16 May 2013, 
"^Thc vast majority o f theoretical contributions in the field are about administrative corruption. This is due to very 
clear motives and incentives for each economic agent and very clear relations between them.
"’Arnold J Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (ed) (n 31) 187,
""ibid.
"" Ibid.
"("Ibid.
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political life in transitional economies/' The underlying assumption is that legislation and public 
policies are decisively influenced by the bribing of legislators by a few oligarchs/^ In other 
words, public policies are inevitably formulated to favour the oligarchs, not the public. The main 
problem is that interest groups influence legislators’ decision making in all countries where 
strong lobbying is an entirely legal and legitimate activity in mature democracies.
The issue of political lobbying has long been a controversial one. For example, political 
lobbying, the act of attempting to influence government leaders to create legislation or conduct 
an activity that will help a particular organisation, is extensively used in the USA. In fact, the act 
of lobbying is considered so essential that it is legally protected by the First Amendment of the 
US constitution. Lobbyists, therefore, act to influence politicians, and are often used by 
businesses and corporations to lobby for their interests and influence the policy-makers to 
legislate in their favour. Although political lobbying is legitimate per se, it very often represents 
a cause for scandals. Indeed, realistically lobbying is rarely done without any kind of reciprocity. 
Very often politicians help businesses by alleviating administrative or legal obstacles through 
legitimate means, thus making it easier for the latter to conduct business. In return the former 
receive financial contributions of a substantial nature. In this case, the act of lobbying becomes 
an act of a corrupt nature. It is therefore very important that any kind of political lobbying is 
done in a transparent manner, to ensure that politicians do not abuse their power and act in the 
interests of a small group, at a sacrifice of the majority of the population.
Nevertheless, it is a faet that the USA is also a good example of state capture corruption. The American ease is o f 
universal interest precisely because the USA has, on the one hand, tolerated a much greater prevalence of 
administrative corruption than has Europe, and on the other, is so widely admired as a model by policy makers in 
developing countries. Advisers who argue that the new countries should give top priority to eradicating official 
corruption have difficulty fitting the American experience into their argument. For more on state capture see J. 
Heilman, G. Jones and D. Kaufinann, 'Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and 
Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies' (2000) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 2312; J. Heilman, G. Jones and D. Kaufinann, ' Seize the State, Seize the Day' State Capture, 
Corruption, and Influence in Transition (2000) World Bank Policy Research Paper 2444; J. Heilman and D. 
Kaufmann, 'Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition, Economies, Finance and Development' 
(2001) Volume 38(3) A magazine o f the IMF quarterly
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm> ; F. Boehm, 'Regulatory Capture Revisited - 
Lessons from Economics of Corruption' (2007) Working Paper o f the Anti-Corruption Training & Consulting 
(ACTC), and Research Center in Political Economy (ClEP, Universidad Extemado de Colombia).
GAgarcA.; are very powerful and rich business people.
"^Arnold J Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (ed) (n 31 ),
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It is nevertheless apparent that new states are more likely to have far more acts of behaviour that
fall within a general perception as being corrupt." The reason behind such a notion is the point 
that attitudes within these newly formed nations are not focused on the support of a single 
concept of the national interest or of the official purpose of state and local officers and 
institutions which would promote that interest. The idea of the national interest is weak because 
the idea of a nation is new. The institutions and offices of the state are, for most people, remote 
and perplexing. Even to the civil servants and politicians directly involved in them they are new. 
They are aware of the official purposes which are attached to them by importation, but they 
scarcely regard them as “hallowed” and hence they do not necessarily regard them as sacrosanct. 
To many people the ‘State’ and its organs were identified with alien rule and were proper objects 
of plunder. These factors have not yet been transformed fully into instruments for the promotion 
of common interests. Meanwhile to the illiterate peasant the ‘State’ and its organs continue to be 
the source of a web of largely unknown and complicated regulations, and hence of a permanent 
threat of punishment; against this threat it is very reasonable to take any available precaution, 
such as offering bribes. Moreover, corruption is generally simple to conceal in the new states, 
since people are generally not too clear about what the official rules are, or what constitutes
breaking them. 96
On the whole, a climate of corruption is in itself an important factor. According to McMullan, 
there is a continuous interaction between the willingness of people to pay bribes and the 
willingness of officials to receive them.^  ^ Consequently, this creates a degree of acceptance of 
corruption resulted from peer pressure. This creates an environment where hardly any citizen 
can carry out his business or avoid trouble with the government without complying to some
""Collin Leys " What is the Problem of Corruption?", in Robert Williams CozTw/zZzon, (Volume 1, An
Elgar Reference Collection) p 94
"^ Ibid.
"^ Ibid. "Partly it is because the law is ineffectively enforced and the police themselves may not be immune from 
corruption. And while traditional gift -  giving can be distinguished from a bribe of money, it is quite obvious that 
form the point o f view o f the giver the one has shaded into the other, so that although the practice has taken a new
significance, it is nevertheless an established fact o f life, in which the precise nature o f the rule -  infringement is
partially concealed by continuity with an older custom”.
"’M.McMullan, 'A theory of corruption based on consideration o f corruption in the Public Services and 
Governments o f British Colonies and ex-Colonies in West Africa' (1961) 9(2) The Sociological Review 181 
""Collin Leys (n 94).
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extent with the prevailing corruption." Corruption, therefore, has a social function, of softening 
conflicts and reducing friction, amongst many others.
Ultimately, corruption disturbs society and the individuals within it. Corruption not only affects 
man in his economic and political life but also in his psychological and philosophical growth.'*" 
Moreover, corruption creates composite problems such as the exodus of educated people from 
the developing societies. Administrative inefficiency and parasitism are other examples of a 
composite problem.'**  ^The most obvious effects of corruption are many forms of injustice which 
affect a vast number of individuals. '*'^
2.5 Possible causes of corruption
The question of causes of corruption has been widely discussed by the academia. Some 
academics say that corruption is culturally linked.'*''' They argue that in some countries it has 
always been culturally appropriate to, for example, provide gifts for someone at a superior 
position, in return for a favour.'*'^ It is argued that some cultures are more tolerant than others 
when it comes to corruption, particularly in relation to bribes and favouritism.'*'^ Those 
supporting this statement stipulate that in those societies where favouritism is pervasive, 
declining to favour friends or relatives is criticised as being unhelpful and unkind.'*'^ In these 
societies, bribes, especially petty bribes, are also seen as a charity, an advance incentive, or an 
acceptable substitute for low wages, rather than extortion as it is recognised to be in other
Tbid.99
’" I^bid 16. 101
102
Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions (Averbury 1990) 56. 
Ibid.
’“ ibid. Some examples o f such injustices is the death of famine victims resulting from the theft o f relief supplies; 
the adulteration o f essential medications for emergency cases; Alatas sites cases o f where patients need to pay nurses
to bring them bedpans, and where doctors too have to be bribed. On a larger scale, a government plagued by 
systematic corruption neglects various duties essential to an efficient administration, because the corrupt always 
neglect their obligations in their exclusive attention to corruption. This neglect may reach a point where it becomes 
callous and disastrous to the people. For example in July 1978, Accra, in Ghana, was hit by a petrol shortage and 
transport came to a standstill. The financial resources of the government were depleted and they had problems in 
paying for the crude oil for refinery. Government funds were recklessly used for wasteful and corrupt purposes, one 
o f which was the granting of loans to a number o f women not because o f the viability of their proposals or their 
entrepreneurial skills and experience, but for other, baser consideration. One o f merchants, with collusion of top 
people, managed to defraud Ghana o f £20 million and escaped prosecution.
“  Charles Mitchell, International Business Ethics (World Trade Press, 2003).
See example on China in Jenny Li, CAma. Tour focAeZ GwzAe Zo CAzngs^ g 5zz.9zzzg.9.9, Czzs^ Zo/M.9 azzA
Etiquette (World Trade Press, 2001).
Ibrahim F.l. Shihata, “Corruption -  a general view with an emphasis on the role o f the World Bank”, (1996- 
1997) 15 Dickenson Journal o f International Law 451,460.
Ibid.
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countries.'®^ On the contrary, those academics that come from those countries which have been 
associated with the latter claims contend this view, and argue that bribe giving has never been a 
part of any culture. In those instances where gift giving is admitted as a culturally accepted 
practice, it is not perceived as an act of bribery, but is indeed believed to be a genuine gift. Such 
explanation yet again brings to surface the difficulty of defining corruption, and doing it in such 
a way as to distinguish it from culturally acceptable gift taking. Yet, many academic works of 
sociologists and psychologists address the concept of gift giving, and thus make it possible to 
make a distinction between an innocent act of gift giving and an act of bribery. Indeed, such 
work shows that for an act to be perceived as a gift, it must be made without expectation or 
certainty of return. ’ One general definition of a gift states that:
“A gift may be roughly defined as an action or allowance made without expectation, guarantee or 
certainty of return, and which therefore implies a dimension of gratuity and abundance. The 
purest type gift is one that is given without motive, without reason, without any intention other 
than the genuine desire to freely give”. ’ * '
The above definition suggests that once a gift giver provides the gift in return for something, 
such as a special favour, then the gift cannot be considered being “without motive” and therefore 
should not be classified as an innocent gift. Nevertheless, the anthropologist and sociologist 
Marcel Mauss assumes that gift functions are in the social nature of humans and that 
expectations of a return be it consciously or unconsciously underlie every gift.”  ^ Thus, 
according to Mauss, gifts without reciprocity rarely exist, as he believes that gift exchanges that 
are completely voluntary do not e x i s t . A  gift therefore sets in motion a process of reciprocal
Ibid.
Silvia Fazio, "Corporate governance, accountability and emerging economies" (2008)29(4) Company Lawyer
105; Rodmell, Graham, “Corruption -  Economic Crime or Economic Reality” (2007) Company Lawyer, Gould, 
David J, corrwptfon tAe Zd/re (Pergamon Press
1980); Korani, J. and Rose-Ackerman, S., a rrw.yrwortAy .ytate m -  .yocm/wr (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004) 79 -  82.
Peter Verhezen, E'Af/aMtArq;?y.' 7%e T/nAigMirr o f  froctzce m 5w.ymg.yf (Peter Lang AG,
International Academic Publishers 2009).
Ibid.
Ibid 6.
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acknowledgement, and counts on the responsibility of each of the parties to commit and this way 
to avoid any possible damage to the newly established social alliance. ’
Despite these observations, a distinction between a bribe and a gift can still be made, no matter 
how difficult it may be, considering the aforementioned. A bribe can be identified where a briber 
expects a special consideration in return for a gift or a payment; one that is incompatible with the 
duties of the bribee's role. In contrast to a gift, which is an act made without expectation; a bribe 
is a promise of secretive or non-disclosed payment for a service.'”^  This is why payment of a 
bribe usually occurs to someone with power or to a public official ready to violate some official 
duties or responsibilities of his office. ’
Overall, gift giving can be seen as an instrument and a symbol which represents and signifies 
social relations and bonds. In traditional societies gifts generate mutual interests, with a reward 
of mutual satisfaction which in turn reduces conflict. When a gift inaugurates a social 
relationship, it is very hard to turn it into a bribe. Only when an initial unilateral gift becomes 
more strictly reciprocal in nature can the possibility of shifting from gift to a bribe take place. 
Similarly, the already mentioned ICC rules make a reference to gift giving. Article 5 lists steps 
that enterprises need to follow to ensure that gifts do not constitute bribes. Thus, Article 5(c) 
mentions that gifts must not improperly affect the recipient’s independence of judgment towards 
the giver. In addition, section (e) of the same Article states that gifts must not be offered too 
frequently.
It is important to note that not all illegal transactions are corrupt and not all non-disclosed gifts 
are bribes. Corruption, and in its specific case, bribery, depend upon a specific form of 
reciprocity because the exchange remains exclusive. '
There is some consensus that many of the countries where bribe taking exists are those which 
had been affected by colonialist rule or other sort of foreign dominance.*’  ^While contemporary 
manifestations of corruption in countries which had been colonised cannot be explained by 
colonialism as such, it is worth emphasising the form and extent of corrupt practices, where
Ibid 9. 
Ibid 121. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 124. 
Ibid.
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foreign benefactors demanded bribes from the locals, who they considered inferior.”  ^ Thus 
during decolonisation, when leaving their former colonies, the foreign patrons had left behind a 
well-established practice of bribe taking, which had turned into being almost a tradition. 
However, it must be mentioned that at the time of colonisation, the colonial powers tried to 
establish a higher civil service, which was honest, well paid, and manned by both colonial and 
indigenous personnel.'^’ Nonetheless, the colonisers still found it difficult to enforce strict rules, 
especially at the lower levels of administration.'^^
In such instances, where one assumes the theory of decolonisation as linked to corruption, it may 
become difficult to find suitable approaches to curb corruption. As with the case of gift giving, 
one finds it extremely difficult to fight something that is considered acceptable by the society.
If, as the theory suggests, bribe taking after decolonisation has been implanted into a society, it 
thus becomes an acceptable norm, rather than a crime worth fighting. Moreover, the difficulty of 
defining corrupt acts becomes even more apparent than elsewhere in the world, as it can be very 
possible that in a culture where bribe giving has been accepted for decades, it may well be that it 
may not be easy to extinguish. Even through the employment of international legislative norms, 
culturally linked practices may not be easily e r a s e d .Even more so, taking into account state 
sovereignty, one is faced with even further series of obstacles of convincing the states to curb 
corrupt practices, notwithstanding that corruption is a morally unacceptable occurrence.
In pre-colonial times officials had to collect their remuneration themselves, usually without much regulation or 
control from above. According to Funnivall in “Colonial Policy and Practice” (extracted from Gunnar Myrdal 
“Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernization in South Asia” in Arnold J Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (n 31) 
78,
ùfrew .ya/ary. were Ay a//oAMeMt o f /Ae reve/twe a parAcw/ar (/wAicf, Aaffor fAe
mojt parf fAe/r e/Mo/a/Me/?f.y were (/envef/fr^^^ o» reveaae eo5eete(/, or _f"om fee.; paicf ^  fAe parfiej^
fo a ca.;e. Oae great j^oaree ofreveaae waffonM /oca/ to//f o/z /Ae /ramjport or .ya/e goo(/y '.
When the colonial powers came in later, they took over the practice of demanding extra payment, only this time they 
roles were altered.
By /ra(////oa is meant something that over the years o f existence has become a common practice o f the nation.
Gunnar Myrdal “Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernization in South Asia” in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and 
Michael Johnston (n 31) 238.
Ibid.
Perhaps this is a rather philosophical statement, but then law touches upon moral o f the society. Consequently, 
an act needs to be found immoral within the society before it is made illegal through legislation.
As it has been described earlier, it is very difficult to define corruption. At times ambiguous definitions, or those 
that are too broad in an attempt to cover as many activities as possible, make it especially difficult to capture gift 
making within their sphere. Thus, although it is difficult to define corruption in general, it becomes even more 
difficult to fight corruption without prejudicing what can be seen as well intended acts within a society (i.e. the gift 
giving).
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Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee distinguish between rights, which are universally 
acceptable as natural rights of human beings, and other integrative social contracts, in which 
norms within voluntary moral communities are determined by mutual consent.A ccording  to 
these authors, local custom may be wrong, and whenever right or wrong, it is nevertheless wrong 
to impose local custom on fo re ig n e rs .T h e  authors however do not mention the fact that the 
foreigners would lose out on the competition by not following local practices; hence situations 
where Western companies doing business in countries with acceptable bribe taking, need to 
resolve to bribe giving in order to be able to win access to the local m arket.M oreover, even if 
the Donaldson and Dunfee theory is acceptable, it may only apply to situations such as in China, 
where it is difficult to distinguish between corrupt acts of bribe taking and socially acceptable 
gift giving. But then again, as it has been mentioned earlier, it is not easy to make a clear 
distinction between the two concepts. Perhaps one would need to agree with Amartya Sen, who 
affirms that the nature of corruption is that it is secret and self-interested and hence unlikely to be 
shared with people.
Corruption therefore, whether by public officials or others, is socially impermissible deviance 
from some public duty or more generally some ideal standard of conduct.N evertheless, 
culture should not be seen as a deterministic cause, because culture can be managed.'^'' Quoting 
Rose-Ackerman, where she refers to Rupert Hodder’s suggestion that if certain kinds of 
behaviour (such as gift giving) which might be regarded by outsiders as corrupt are accepted as 
normal practice within a certain culture, then that behaviour should be practised openly and
T Donaldson and TW Dunfee, “Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts 
Theory” (1994) 19 Academic Management Review 252.
Ibid.
That said, the importance o f distinguishing between gift giving and bribing must be made clearer. If  a certain act 
can be identified as a bribe demand, then surely it must be capable of falling within the remit o f the appropriate 
legislation and thus prosecuted. On the other hand, if  the act is only that which falls within a culture o f gift taking, 
and thus can be identified as such, then there is nothing wrong with foreign companies adapting to local culture. On 
contrary adopting local ways o f handling matters should be used a sign o f good management in an attempt to please 
the foreign partners and can only positively affect a business venture.
Thus it becomes apparent, yet again, the importance o f clear definition o f bribery is imperative in curbing the 
problem. Perhaps a clear study o f gift taking is needed to ensure that vital differences are identified between an 
innocent act o f gift giving and bribery.
Amartya Sen, Deve/opme/zf a/zz/ Freez/o/zz, (Oxford University Press 2001), 267. Sen argues that the so-called 
Asian values that are invoked to justify authoritarianism are not especially Asian in any significant sense. The case 
for liberty and political rights turns ultimately on their basic importance and on their instrumental role. And 
according to him, this case is as strong in Asia as it is elsewhere.
Ibid.
Rupert Hodder, How Corruption Affects Social and Economic Development (The Edwin Mellen Press 2007) 
102.
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potential hidden costs should be allowed to come to light. In this way, according to the authors 
the problem becomes manageable, as relationships are made more efficient, and bribery 
evaporates.
One other possible cause of corruption is represented by political order represented by weak 
governance. The structural approach to corruption, particularly to political corruption, places 
emphasis on the nature of state development.'”  Thus, administrative organisation and efficiency 
are key variables, alongside the manner in which the political order becomes institutionalised. 
Ergo, if the processes of social and political exchange are clearly separated from those of 
political and economic exchange, the penetration of politicians into bureaucratic structures 
becomes more difficult.'”
Research on corruption shows that there is a strong relation between the quality of legal and 
governmental institutions and levels of corruption, where the quality of a country’s legal system 
is, of course, a major f ac t o r . Thus ,  countries with strong institutions are associated with low 
levels of corruption, and vice v e r s a . In such situations, where the levels of institutional
Ibid.
Ibid 55.
Paul Heywood “Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives” in Robert Williams (ed), Explaining 
Corruption (Edward Elgar Publications 2000) 347.
Ibid 347. In Britain for example, where endemic political corruption has been relatively low, one possible 
contributory factor may be the early institutionalisation o f its political parties and party system, separate from the 
administrative structure. In other European countries, notably those in the south, particularistic and personalised 
social structures remained in place as financially poor and administratively inefficient central states were forced to 
rely on regional brokers at local level. Strong patron-client networks ensured that the flow of favours and benefits 
was anchored in personal relations between individuals, a system which the deficiencies of the state administration 
ensured was largely self-perpetuating.
Ian E Marshall (n 72), 26 According to the author, there are at least five necessary elements that must be present 
to have an effective legal system:
The laws prohibiting the corrupt activity have to be in place.
There has to be an effective police force to investigate and recommend that charges be laid against corrupt 
offenders. In less developed countries, even if the police have adequate manpower, they often do not have adequate 
training or equipment to perform their duties satisfactorily. They also may be grossly underpaid which makes them 
particularly susceptible to corruption. Once they succumb to corruption, the police quickly lose respect and 
credibility within their community.
There must be an effective prosecuting arm of law. It must take the tough choices on when to prosecute and when 
not to prosecute. Again, any hint of corruption will destroy the public confidence in the justice system’s ability to 
ensure that the guilty are punished.
The judiciary must be seen to act in a fair and impartial manner. If there is any hint o f favouritism in the judges’
decisions or sentences, corruption may be suspected. Once the judiciary lose the respect o f the population, 
corruption will flourish.
An example must come from the top. The Attorney General or Minister o f Justice should be a respected person who 
is recognised as having principles.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, “The Role of the World Bank on Controlling Corruption” (1997-1998) 29 Law and 
Policy in International Business 93, 95.
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inefficiency are high, bribes can be incentive payments for quality service.”  ^ Paying bribes to
reduce high levels of bureaucratic obstacles in running a business or in fulfilment of any other 
day to day chores, give the officials involved incentives to favour those who value their time 
highly and to work quickly.
Moreover, corruption tends to be widespread in those countries where administrative
mechanisms enjoy discretionary powers and where as a result of that, laws and processes are not 
followed and imposed as they should.”  ^ It is thus argued that the problem of corruption results 
because of a lack in properly constructed and enforced administrative law, public governance 
and economic management. Such a lack of proper governance severely undermines a state’s 
capacity to implement any necessary legislation. This explains why high levels of corruption are 
often found in newly modernised countries. Confusion between the old norms and new 
standards, particularly in newly created states, brings more reasons for corruption. In new states, 
new wealth and power, the relation of which to politics is undefined by the dominant traditional 
norms of the society and on which the modem norms of the society are not yet accepted by the 
dominant groups within the society.” ' Cormption in this sense is a direct product of the rise of 
new groups with new resources and the efforts of these groups to make themselves effective 
within the political sphere. Cormption may be the means of assimilating new concepts into the 
political system by irregular means because the system has been unable to adapt with sufficient 
speed.'”  Even where governments impose regulations, levy taxes and there is an existence of 
criminal laws, individuals and firms may find ways around them by paying to be relieved from
Ibid 98.
Ibid.
Edward F Ampratwum (n 16) At the root o f this problem, one can find excessive discretionary powers.
Richard Sannerholm, ‘Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies’, (2007) 12 Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law 65,65( It stands to reason that the higher the professional levels in civil service, the 
lower the perceived levels o f corruption).
Samuel P Huntington "Modernisation and Corruption" in Robert Williams, Exp/zzmmg Co/TM/ztzon (n 94) 483.
Ibid.
This explains high levels o f corruption after the collapse of the Soviet Union. High levels o f corruption at all 
levels were associated with the community not being able to adapt to the new order. At the time, it would be highly 
important to have a proper system of governance. However, taking into account that the collapse was a rather 
spontaneous occurrence, it is understandable that there was no time to prepare and implement proper regulations 
with regard to governance. People thus suddenly became in possession o f new powers, which they chose to utilise 
based on the old principles, and where the lack o f properly construed new methods o f governance, administration 
and law enforcement made a substantial contribution to the rise of corruption.
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these costs.'”  Tn addition, when legislation is not clear and applicable, thus creating a social 
climate where bribes are used to make the legislation work in favour of bribe giver.
A fertile ground for growth of a thoroughly corrupt system emerges in a country which has a 
large number of laws, rules, regulations, and administrative orders to restrict business and 
economic activities thereby creates huge opportunities for generating economic rent, and 
especially if these restrictive measures are complex and opaque and applied in a selective, 
secretive, inconsistent and non-transparent manner. At the same time, administrators are granted 
large discretionary powers with respect to interpreting rules, are given a lot of freedom to decide 
on how rules are to be applied, to whom and in what manner they are to be applied, are vested 
with powers to amend, alter, and rescind the rules, and even to supplement the rules by invoking 
new restrictive administrative measures and procedures. Such stipulations support the 
assumption that it is not sufficient to merely have certain laws and regulations in place, if they 
are not properly enforced.'”  This in turn illustrates that poor governance and administration has 
a substantial impact on high levels of corruption by providing incentives and means for the 
existence of corrupt acts. The existence of good governance and public administration does not 
allow them to flourish, thus creating an environment where corrupt acts are easily detected and 
consequently stopped.
It is not only the presence of poor governance itself that creates a positive environment for the 
presence of high levels of corruption. In many situations it is not only the lack of proper 
legislation enforcement, but the actual nonexistence of legislation in place. Again, this 
occurrence is often associated with newly formed states, or states that underwent drastic political 
and administrative changes. Moreover, certain newly formed states, in an attempt to create
Susan Rose-Ackerman (n 136) 99.
U Myint “Corruption; Causes, consequences and curses”, (2000) 7(2) Asia -  Pacific Development Journal 33.
Richard Sannerholm, “Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post -  Conflict Societies” (n 140).
One o f such examples can be illustrated through the concept of Conflict o f Interest as enshrined in English 
common law, especially through the rules o f trust, which is the original source of conflict -  o f interest provisions 
governing the behaviour of public officers and employees. And although similar provisions exist in other countries, 
they corruption in the latter still thrives and this is due to the fact that poor governance does not make is possible to 
implement the respectful provisions. Nevertheless the corruption in those countries is still thriving, because the 
administrative legal framework tends to be unclear, thus leaving room for discretion or creating administrative 
inertia. For more information see Richard Sannerholm, "Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post -  
Conflict Societies” (n 140) and Joseph Zimmerman’s Curbing Unethical Behaviour in Government (Greenwood 
Press 1994).
This refers to newly formed states which were created during and after the decolonisation period. Similarly it 
involves states such as those which gained their independence following the collapse o f the Soviet Union and had 
newly rewritten constitutions and other pieces o f legislation. In such cases, because o f the relatively short time that
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legislation, while drafting it fail to make it practical. Thus, many newly developed states have the 
problem associated with existence of non-practical legislation, which does not take into 
consideration the nonexistence of properly administered institutions which would enable its 
enforcement.
Furthermore, in some states due to the type of existing political structures, certain types of 
legislation are not welcomed and not perceived as necessary.” '' For example, a governmental 
policy of nondisclosure of information on important policy issues and bureaucratic operations 
denies the interested citizen the knowledge needed to form and express intelligent opinions 
designed to influence the decision-making process and may facilitate, as well as hide, corrupt 
behaviour by elected officers and the bureaucrats.
Overall, it is apparent that the lack of clear administrative functions linked to better governance 
is very much associated as contributors to a corrupt environment. Those in turn are also 
supported by lack of proper legislation; or in cases where relevant legislation seems to exist, the 
lack of proper administration disables its effective implementation, or makes the application of it 
rather difficult or at times even impossible.
Another theory of causes of corruption is the one that revolves around poverty itself. In those 
countries where people’s salaries are extremely low, individuals use bribe taking at a work place
has passed since their creation, most of these countries have not had sufficient time to pass and implement all the 
necessary legislative pieces to deal with areas such as freedom of information, disclosure etc. Moreover, those 
countries which in their attempt to advance their legal systems to the same level as their counterparts (more 
advanced developed countries) have passed the necessary legislation are now experiencing difficulties in enforcing 
it. In most cases this is due to the lack o f proper enforcement agencies, and trained staff.
Irina Olympieva, ‘The Changing Contours o f Corruption in Russia: Informal Intermediaries in State -  Business 
Relations’
<httn://www.uooEle.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=i&q=&esrc=s&source^wcb&cd=9&ved=OCFOOFiAI&urMhttn%3A%2F%
2Fwww.idcc.2r%2Fiicr%2Fnew%2FCORRUPT10N%2520CONFERENCE%2FThe%2520Chamiinu%2520Contou
rs%2520of%2520CorruDtion%2520in%2520Russia-
%25201RINA%25200LIMPIEVA.Ddf&ei=6ElYUb6KB7Lv02WUIlH4BA&usu=AF0iCNF evYKNaOanBKaZU 
U9zaJHwoX9LO&bvm=bv.44442042.d.d2k&cad=ria > accessed 16 May 2013. According to Dr Irina Olympieva,
Social Studies of Economy Program Director in the Centre o f Independent Social Research in St Petersburg, Russia, 
the newly created legislation in the post-Soviet Russian Federation has created highly bureaucratic procedures, 
which are very difficult for business and people to follow. In many instances those responsible for the enforcement 
o f the legislation are not well familiar with the necessary steps themselves. This has resulted in existence of 
unnecessary delays, which are consequently overcome through the use o f bribes.
According to Joseph Zimmerman, Curbing Unethical Behaviour in Government (1994), Greenwood Press 
1994), it is pursuant to democratic governments to be based upon informed and widespread citizen participation. 
Thus, purposeful withholding o f information by governments on their activities, with the exception o f certain 
sensitive matters, frustrates the operation of a democratic system and raises important ethical questions.
Ibid.
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as a method to earn some money. Examples of such acts can be seen everywhere in countries 
with low income.
The excuse of low wages is often used as a justification for bribe taking. Essentially, there is an 
indication that the source of systematic corruption lies in certain patterns on inequality.”  ^ In a 
limited sense the corruption within a state, results from the consequences of individual human 
nature interacting with systematic and enduring inequality in wealth, power and status.'”  
Poverty thus is both, a structural cause of bribery and a structural effect. Poor servants are more 
tempted to seek bribes and to view the practice as morally justifiable.'^^ Public-choice theorists 
point to the fact that government officials with low wages and thus unmotivated might be 
propelled to expedite tardy bureaucratic mat ters .According to Steven R. Salbu, corruption 
based on need reflects a socio-structural problem, which needs to be fixed at its heart, rather than 
by criminalising its effects.'”  Because the motives such as food, shelter or survival are basic and 
compelling, problems of need will most likely not be resolved through legal solutions which tend 
to criminalise the wrong doer, while ignoring the very underlying existence of such problems. 
Paying public officials better wages, as difficult as this may sound, especially when dealing with 
less developed or developing countries, can be seen as an optimal solution to bribe taking.'”  
Singapore is a good example of country which managed to drastically reduce levels of corruption 
by increasing wages of public officials.'^" However, such an assumption although perfectly 
sensible, is difficult to implement. It must not be forgotten that in those countries where public 
officials take bribes due to low wages in an attempt to supplement them and thus secure a decent 
living, are countries where government expenditure is very limited due to the fact that money 
which could be used to go towards the salaries of the public officials has already been
For examples and reasons o f resource curse read Michael Ross, 7%e poAAca/ o f  /Ae res^ oMrce eMr.ye
(World Politics 1999); also see Governance -  Transparency -  Corruption -  The Resource Curse 
<http://www.africanpr02ress.net/20vemance resources.htm> accessed 16 May 2013.
J Patrick Dobel “The Corruption of a State” in Robert Williams Explaining Corruption, 145.
Ibid.
Stephen R. Salbu (n il) .
Edward F. Ampratwum (n l6).
Salbu (n il) .
Ibid.
Ibid. The author provides an example of Singapore, and Asian country where the levels of corruption and in 
bribe taking in particular, are relatively low. At the heart o f such developments is the government’s approach to pay 
public officials adequate wages.
For some examples o f Singapore’s experience see Jon S T Quah “Preventing police corruption in Singapore: the
role of recruitment, training and socialisation” (June 2006) 28(1) The Asia Pacific Journal o f Public Administration 
59.
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misappropriated by the bureaucrats in the higher ranks.” ' This in turn creates a vicious circle, 
where low ranked public officials have no other choice but to demand bribes in order to 
supplement their low wages the existence of which is due to the corrupt acts of the public 
officials on the top of the hierarchy scale.
The above statements on low levels of income being a reason for corruption do not necessarily 
assume that all inequality creates an unjust and corrupted society. The practical requirements of a 
society necessitate some inequality in the economic and political realms.”  ^ Nevertheless, the 
non-corrupt state guarantees certain basic forms of substantive economic, juridical and political 
equality, even though absolute equality is not present.”  ^ It must however be ensured that 
economic inequality never develops to the extent where it threatens the integrity of law or 
government,'”  in order to avoid the process which reinforces itself where poverty causes 
bribery, which exacerbates existing structural problems, including increased poverty, that lead to 
more bribery.
So far, some of the main causes for corruption have been presented in light of poor governance 
and administration as well as poverty. All these reasons, although different in their nature, are 
closely interwoven. In most cases, the abovementioned causes for corruption are associated with 
the lack of proper administration, legislation and its proper enforcement. This in turn allows 
those concerned to abuse their public office for personal gain. However, it has been mentioned at 
the beginning that corruption, although found on a larger scale in economically less developed 
countries, or newly formed and thus still economically and politically vulnerable states, does not 
make the phenomenon endemic only to these parts of the world. Corruption can also be found in 
countries with well-established administration and governance, law enforcement and well 
remunerated public officials. In such cases, simply greed, associated with any human nature is 
seen as the cause. In developed countries, tax incentives, standards of conduct and general
'^'Salbu (n il) .
J Patrick Dobel “The Corruption of a State” in Robert Williams, Fxp/ammg Co/Twp/zon, 146. The author states
that theories on corruption distinguish just and reasonable inequality such as that which originates from the nature of 
political hierarchy. It is not unreasonable for a director to earn more than his employees due to the nature o f his 
position and the responsibilities that it entails.
Ibid. According to the author any reasonable inequality can be justified as long as it contributes to the
substantive commonweal or at least does not endanger citizens’ substantive freedoms.
Ibid 147, the author then expands by stating that all citizens must have their economic integrity guaranteed.
Redistributing state’s property efficiently so to provide all citizens with a decent livelihood.
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attitudes often lend themselves for providing resources for corruption.'”  In such instances 
corruption takes place for one’s need to satisfy his desires of achieving more that he already has, 
and while being in a position of power, doing it makes it easier. According to Salbu, “a public 
official who seeks a bribe of millions of dollars is not motivated by the need to feed, clothe, and 
house a family”, since even in the poorest nations, high-level officials receive pay above 
subsistence levels.Nevertheless, what makes the effects of such acts less damaging is proper 
legislation and its implementation and enforcement. Greater transparency makes it more difficult 
for those in higher positions to abuse their power, and even when it is done, accountability is 
demanded by the public.
In every case when the abuse of power for private gain takes place, regardless of its extent the 
scale on which it happens, it prevents the public revenue from being used to improve 
infrastructure or living conditions of people. Instead, the money is being fraudulently embezzled, 
by government authorities, or used for their own benefit in various other ways. Corruption, as 
the above examples illustrate, starts at higher levels of governance, and unless prevented through 
properly enforced legislation, expands downwards, and extends to all ranks of people. “A fish 
rots from its head” is a famous expression among those fighting corruption. Unless corruption is 
tackled at its heart -  that is at the top of administrative hierarchy -  it will continue to thrive, and 
continuously worsen the economic and social conditions of the affected countries.
2.6 Effects of corruption
The growing concern to develop effective anti-corruption strategies is partly because corruption 
has profoundly unequal effects. It damages the interests of the poor most, whether the corruption 
comes in petty bribes or grand expropriation of country’s finances. The losers of corruption are 
likely to be exceptionally poor and marginalised, while the winners are already wealthy.'”  
Corruption skews expenditure away from health and education, presumably because they are 
more difficult to manipulate for bribe purposes than are other projects.
Miguel Schloss, ‘Symposium: Fighting International Corruption and Bribery in the 21st Century: Luncheon 
Address’ (2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal 469.
Salbu (n il) .
Recent UK cases o f MPs unreasonably claiming reimbursement for their expenditure related to them being 
Members of Parliament (renting unreasonably expensive flats in London, taking out mortgages, etc.), was revealed
based on the Freedom of Information Act. These revelations resulted in many resignations o f those involved. 
Ampratwum (n 16).
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According to Edward F. Ampratwum’s research, corrupt politicians might be more inclined to 
spend money on fighter aircraft and large-scale investment projects than on textbooks and 
teachers’ salaries, even though the latter may promote economic growth to a greater extent than 
the former.'”  The same research attests to the fact that payment of bribes to get an investment 
license clearly reduces the incentive to invest, in view of the considerations of secrecy and 
uncertainty. Moreover, empirical evidence on cross-country comparisons suggest that the most 
important channel through which corruption reduces economic growth is by lowering private 
investment, which accounts for at least one third of corruption’s overall negative effects. Such 
actions pose serious impediments to foreign direct investment since the efficiency of a nation’s 
bureaucracy significantly influences the business environment. If the government bureaucracy is 
stable and predictable, both local and international traders and investors feel secure and thus 
carry and expand their bu s i ne s s . Th us  in countries with high levels of corruption linked to 
bureaucracy, the risk to the businesses increases on a number of levels, including the cost of 
doing business and the long-term viability and stability of the business or investment.
On the contrary, another view supports the fact that corruption should not always be perceived as 
an impediment to development. Also, at times, corruption may in fact foster development.'^'* 
According to this theory, corruption may in fact, induce an element of competition into what is 
otherwise a comfortably monopolistic industry, and payment of the highest bribe becomes one of 
the principal criteria for a l locat ion.Thus  although foreign investment may be discouraged by 
instability created through high levels of corruption, such statements may be contested on
’‘’^ Ibid 78. Indeed, large-scale investments revolve around contracts o f high monetary value. They thus present high 
incentives for bribe giving by the companies, in return for share in government resources. At times, such projects are 
not even economically viable, and are perceived as unnecessary expenditure o f country’s money. However, 
substantial bribes persuade politicians in charge, to allow such investment projects to go ahead. As a result, many 
highly corrupt countries have abandoned roads, factories, and other projects that were constructed primarily because 
they provided opportunity for corruption.
'^°lbid 80.
Robinson, Co/TM/zAon unz/ Deve/zzpzMe»/. T/zzf //z/rzzz/wcAzzn (Routledge 1999) 121.
’^^Bryan Mercurio, “Growth and development: economic and legal conditions” (2007) 30(2) University o f New 
South Wales Law Journal 437, 451.
'^hbid.
^^ ''See Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnson (eds), Fzz/zAczz/ CzzmzpAzzn. Czzncep/y zmz/ CzzM/ex/.s (Third 
Edition, Transaction Publishers 2009) 200; also mentioned by Susan Rose-Ackerman, CzzrnzpAzzn zz/zz/ Gzzverzzzzze/z/. 
Czzzz.ygs^ , Czz7z.segzze/zcg.y zz/zz/ 5e/zznzz (Cambridge University Press 1999).
'^ I^bid.
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grounds that some of the East Asian economies have been characterised by impeccable growth 
and investment despite the fact that they are fraught with corruption.'”
Rose-Ackerman, following the functionalist t heory ,d i spu tes  these findings by stating that 
those countries with high levels of corruption would have attracted more foreign investment if 
corruption had been lower, and if their industrial policies would have been more effective.'”  For 
example, in Hong Kong the businessmen acknowledged that it would not be possible to make it 
into the international metropolis it is now, had the corruption of the 1950s and 1960s 
continued.'”  In support of this theory, Miguel Schloss, Director of Transparency International 
also states that “corruption can distort entire decision-making processes on investment projects 
and other commercial transactions”.'*" As a result, corruption distorts the market by promoting 
competition for bribes, rather than competition in the quality or price of goods and services.'*' 
Although everyone, apart from those at the heart of the corrupt ventures, is adversely affected by 
the negative impact of corruption as explained earlier, corruption nevertheless is particularly 
harmful to the poor as they are the most adversely affected by the economic decline.'*^ 
Moreover, corruption generates an environment where institutions, especially public institutions, 
become weak and powerless.'*^ Ergo, corruption works against national consolidation, and it 
does so by undermining government control. '*"'
'^^Developing countries such as China, Brazil, Thailand and Mexico attract large flows o f foreign investment despite 
their perceived corruption.
For more information on functionalist theory see Colin Leys, Politics and Change in Developing Countries 
(Cambridge University Press 1969). Functionalism emphasizes the consensus and order that exist in society, 
focusing on social stability and shared public values. From this perspective, disorganization in the system, such as 
deviant behaviour, leads to change because societal components must adjust to achieve stability. When one part of 
the system is not working or is dysfunctional, it affects all other parts and creates social problems, which leads to 
social change.
'^^Susan Rose-Ackerman (n 45).
Bertrand de Speville, Overcoming Corruption: The Essentials (De Speville & Associates 2010).
’^ ^Miguel Schloss (Executive Director o f Transparency International) Luncheon Address, (2000)33 Cornell 
International Law Journal 469, according to Miguel Schloss, statistical evidence show illustrate that higher 
corruption is associated with "(i) higher and more costly public investment; (ii) lower government revenues; (iii) 
lower expenditures on operations and maintenance; and (iv) lower quality o f public infrastructure. The evidence also 
shows that corruption increases public investment by making it more expensive while reducing its productivity -  
without mentioning the loss o f resources to the countries resulting from uneconomic transactions” .
'^'Shiloh Hoggard, “Preventing Corruption in Colombia: The Need for an Enhanced State -  Level Approach” (2007) 
21 Arizona Journal o f International and Comparative Law 577, 581 (A company that wins a contract for supply o f  
certain goods or services by the means of bribe giving, is not acting fairly and in distorting competition, thus 
depriving the end user from the choice which would be available if  proper competition rules were followed).
''^ I^bid. Lack of competition tends to result in higher prices for goods o f lower quality, and the poor are usually the 
least capable of paying the additional prices connected with such corrupt practices.
'^ I^bid. The authors give the example of Colombia, where drug trafficking money progressively spread throughout
the different branches o f public power, dashing values, sacrificing principles, buying political leaders, judges,
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Additionally, corruption distorts government priorities, policies and planning by reducing public 
revenues while at the same time, increasing the burden of government procurement.'*^ Similarly, 
corruption tends to shift public expenditure towards those items that tend to attract larger bribes 
and away from items that will not.'*" Direction is also lost as bureaucrats either slow down, or 
create more labyrinths, in order to attract bribes. This way misdirection of public finances may 
damage not just the occasional project or sector, but an entire economy.'*^
The above references show that although corruption may and does in fact increase the wealth of 
those participating and practising it, it on the other hand almost certainly reduces the revenue of 
the state and the welfare of society as a whole.
The World Bank'** figures of an ongoing research at the World Bank Institute, suggest that 
“more than $1 trillion dollars is paid in bribes a year”.'*" As has been stated earlier in his work, 
corruption is perceived as one of the main causes that act as a major impediment to economic 
development. Research on corruption and on the quality of government institutions indicates
policemen, soldiers, reporters, and academics, from the municipal to national level. For more information on 
corruption and its effect on public institutions see Policy Research Working Paper December 2009 by the World 
Bank Development Research Group “ Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions” by Bianca Clausen, Aart 
Kraay and Asolt Nyiri which can be accessed at:
<httD://www.worldbank.or2/cxternal/default/WDSContcntServcr/l W3P/1B/2010/01/27/000158349 2010012713442 
9/Rendcred/PDF/WPS5157.pdf> accessed 1 February 2010.
'^"'Rupert Hodder, How Corruption Affects Social and Economic Development (The Edwin Mellen Press 2007) 23. 
According to the author in countries where corruption is prevalent, authority cannot be effectively delegated and the 
efficiency of government and other agencies is weakened, faith in public services is eroded. Once it is believed that 
corruption is endemic, there is little incentive or reason to remain uncorrupted oneself. Thus, as distrust within 
government deepens, factions throughout society multiply, producing intense cleavages that may lead to violent 
conflict.
'^^Ibid. The author gives an example o f Thailand and Indonesia, where procurement costs are somewhere between 
20% and 100% higher than they would otherwise have been.
'*^ I^bid. Thus in most cases corruption tends to shift investment towards areas such as defence rather than education, 
where the nature o f the industry is less lucrative and therefore lacks the investment attraction and hence high bribes. 
'^ I^bid. In Philippines, for example, corrupt bureaucrats managed to misappropriate nearly $48 billion through such
means, thus surpassing the country’s entire foreign debt.
’^ ^Since its inception in 1944, the World Bank has expanded from a single institution to a closely associated group 
o f five development institutions. Its mission evolved from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) as facilitator of post-war reconstruction and development to the present day mandate of 
worldwide poverty alleviation in close coordination with its affiliate, the International Development Association, 
and other members o f the World Bank Group, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for the Settlement o f Investment Disputes (ICSID). For 
more information on World Bank and its work visit <httn://wcb.worldbank.or2>.
''^ ‘^The Costs o f Corruption’
<httD://web.worldbank.or2/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0..contentMDK:20l90187-menuPK:34457-na2cPK:343 
70-piPK:34424-thcSitePK:4607.00.html> accessed 16 May 2013.
’^ °Jaunita Olaya, “Promoting revenue transparency project: from resource curse to resource blessing?” 
< http://transnarcncv.or2/Dublications/ucr/download.uer#8> 321 accessed 16 May 2013; Susan Rose - Ackerman,” 
The Role of World Bank in controlling corruption” (1997 -  1998) 29 Law and Policy in International Business 93;
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that strong legal and governmental institutions and low levels of corruption have beneficial 
effects on economic growth and other economic variables.'"' This is not to say that today’s 
developed countries do not suffer from corruption, as many recent cases indicate.
One of the examples is a case of bribery allegations involving United Kingdom’s BAE Systems 
Pic (BAE), resulting in the launch of investigation into allegations of corruption by the Director 
of Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in July 2004. The investigation concerned in particular an arms 
contract (Al-Yamamah) between the UK and Saudi Arabian governments for which BAE was 
the main contractor. The contract contained a confidentiality clause binding on both 
governments. The investigation into allegations of corrupt payments allegedly made by BAE in 
connection with this contract continued until late 2005 when BAE wrote to the UK Attorney 
General to the effect that the disclosure of certain matters required of BAE would adversely 
affect relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, and requested that the public 
interest be considered. UK Government ministers were consulted and some emphasis was placed 
on the importance of the UK’s relationship with Saudi Arabia in the context of national security, 
counter-terrorism, and the search for stability in the Middle East. The SFO maintained that it had 
it had a reasonable belief that crime had been committed and must investigate all reasonable 
lines of inquiry and do so in the light of the UK’s domestic and international obligations 
including Article 5 of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions 1997.
In January 2006 it was decided that it was in the public interest for the investigation to continue. 
In the autumn of 2006, when the SFO sought to investigate certain bank accounts in Switzerland 
to ascertain whether payments had been made to a Saudi agent or official, there was an explicit 
threat by the Saudi authorities that if the investigation were continued Saudi Arabia would 
withdraw the existing bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation arrangements with the United 
Kingdom, withdraw co-operation from the United Kingdom in relation to its strategic objectives 
in the Middle East, and end the negotiations for the procurement of the new order of Typhoon 
aircraft.
After consultations including representations by the Prime Minister, the Director of the SFO 
decided in December 2006 to discontinue the Al-Yamamah investigation in order to avoid
Franklin A Gevurtz,” Rethinking corruption: An introduction to a symposium and a few additional thoughts” (2007) 
29 Global Business and Development Law Journal 237.
'^'Susan Rose-Ackerman (n 45) 95.
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serious harm to the United Kingdom’s national and international security.”  ^ However, what 
makes the effect of the corrupted act different in their case is the presence of better governance, 
stronger administrative institutions and effective legislature.'"^
Another recent case is that concerning a sale of helicopters by an Italian company Finmeccanica 
and its British subsidiary AgustaWestland to the Indian military. It has alleged that the western 
companies have violated bribery and anti-corruption laws in seeking the €560 million helicopter 
sale deal with the Indian military.'"''
2.7 Legislative measures and general approaches to fighting corruption
2.7.1 International and regional legal Conventions and projects
When the fight against corruption became a global, rather than simply a local issue, the 
international community had put into place a legal framework, which came in the form of 
international anti- bribery conventions, which in turn were required to be implemented by all 
signatory countries. So far, several legal instruments have been adopted by the international 
community in an attempt to take measures for tackling corruption. '""
The first anti-corruption legislation was set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development with its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
'^^The Divisional Court suggested that the issue in the present cases was the effect o f the threat of the rule o f law. 
Moreover, it took the view that if  the threat was one which affected the criminal jurisdiction o f the country, the 
courts were bound to consider the steps that were needed to preserve the integrity o f the criminal justice system. 
Nevertheless this principle was rejected on the appeal to the House o f Lords on the grounds that it was not supported 
by authority. (For more information on the case see Andrew J. Roberts, “Prosecution: Director o f SFO -  lawfulness 
of decision to discontinue prosecution” Criminal Law Review, Case Comment (2009); Judgments on 5  (On the 
v4/zpAcaAon o f  Corner //owse Fe^eorcA onz/ C/Aerj;) v D/rec/or o f  /Ae 5er/oM.y Fronz/ C ^ ce  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk> accessed 16 May 2013).
’^^Mushtaq H. Khan, “Governance and Anti -  Corruption Reforms in Developing Countries: Policies, Evidence and 
Ways Forward” , United Nations: G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 42, November 2006, 3.
The author’s analysis o f the drivers o f corruption also suggests that different types o f corruption have different 
levels o f seventy, thus creating different effects. While all types o f corruption are damaging to some extent, some 
types of corruption are much more damaging than others. The evidence on which the specific paper was based 
supports such assumptions. Thus, it shows that while all developing countries suffer from corruption at early stages 
of development, high-growth countries suffered less form the most damaging types and because they also had 
governance strategies that allowed them to avoid the most damaging effects o f other types o f corruption.
' ’‘‘David Jolly, ‘Chief o f Italian Aerospace Company Held in Inquiry’ (The New York Times, 12 February 2013) 
< httn://www.nvtimcs.com/2013/02/13/business/2lobal/finmeccanica-chicf^is-arrested-in-bri bery-casc.html >
accessed 5 March 2013.
For a full list of anti-corruption conventions see Indira Carr “Corruption, Legal Solutions and Limits o f Law” 
(2007) 3(3) International Journal o f Law in Context 227.
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International Business Transactions (OECD), which was adopted in 1997.'"" Although these 
legal instruments can be seen as a major step in criminalising the offence of bribery, as in the 
OECD Convention, they mainly concentrate on the supply side of the offence, by concentrating 
on criminalisation of bribe givers.'"  ^ Of course, it is important to punish those who provide 
bribes, but one should not forget that those bribes would not be offered, if the offering side knew 
that the bribe would not be accepted. Nevertheless, such wording of the OECD Convention is 
understandable when it is remembered that the specific Convention is intended to address 
members of the OECD, which at large represent the developed economies, with large multi­
national corporations striving to conduct business abroad. The OECD Convention therefore is 
aimed to address the bribery of officials abroad. Even though the supply-side criminalisation can 
be justified, it has what may appear as a further discrepancy of the particular instrument, 
specifically, the fact that it unreservedly applies to bribery of a foreign public official. This 
indicates that bribery of non-public officials, even when used in an attempt to secure a certain 
business transaction, would not be criminalised under this legislation.
In any case, the OECD Convention makes it essential to ensure that necessary provisions are put 
in place, which would deter the officials in developing countries from accepting bribes, by 
tackling the supply side of the corrupt activity. However, it allows substantial freedom for 
signatory countries in addressing the matter in each jurisdiction. The OECD Convention 
presumes that the states affected are competent enough to ensure that proper domestic legal 
provisions are in place to tackle corrupt acts, and that domestic judicial system is competent 
enough to deal effectively with such crimes.'"*
Similarly, the United Nations Convention on Corruption (UN Convention) was adopted in 
2003,'"" and its structure is similar to the earlier discussed OECD Convention. The difference 
lies in the fact that the former can be identified as more thorough, judging by its more detailed
'^^The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was established in 1961 and has its 
headquarters in Paris. The organisation currently comprises o f 33 countries and has as its main mission to bring 
together from around the world, governments committed to democracy and open market economy.
Article 1 states that parties-signatories must establish "... that it is a criminal offence under its law for any 
person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through 
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain 
from acting in relation to the performance o f official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper 
advantage in the conduct of international business” .
For a more in-depth analysis o f the OECD Convention refer to Indira Carr and Dpi Outhwaite “ The OECD Anti 
-  Bribery Convention Ten Years On" (2008) 5(1) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 3.
United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 
<http://www.unodc.or2/pdfycorruption/publications unodc convention-e.pdf5» accessed 16 May 2013.
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structure. According to Carr the UN Convention allows flexibility to the States, where the 
language in which the Convention “varies from mandatory to the discretionary, from ‘shall 
adopt’ to ‘shall consider adopting’”.^ "" Nevertheless, as oppose to the OECD Convention, the 
UN Convention expands its applicability and thus covers wider aspects of corruption, including 
amongst others, active bribery of private officials, active bribery in private sector, illicit 
enrichment, and bribery of domestic and foreign jurors.” ' Moreover, the UN Convention apart 
from criminalising corruption, makes interesting suggestions as to the education of the public, 
and encourages the role of the civil society and non-governmental organisations.^"  ^Furthermore, 
the UN Convention encourages protection of witnesses and those reporting acts of corruption. 
Most importantly, the UN Convention in its Article 10 acknowledges the need for transparency 
by encouraging State Parties to enhance transparency in their public administration, by adopting 
necessary procedures or regulations.
Additionally, the UN Convention goes beyond just the criminalisation of corrupted acts by
taking into account and providing for the recovery of assets which were gained through corrupt 
means. The chapter of the UN Convention directed at asset recovery advises and encourages 
States Parties, apart from implementing the Convention on a domestic level, for further 
cooperation with each other on measures tackling the recovery of proceeds of crime.
Article 1(1) of the OECD Convention also extends to include facilitation payments within its 
definition of bribery. Facilitation payments, also known as grease payments are monies that are 
paid to government officials to encourage them to perform their usual d u t i e s . I n  those
Indira Carr, "The United Nations convention on corruption: Making a real difference to the quality o f the life o f
millions?” (2006) 3(3) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 1, but found on 
<http://www.surrey.ac.uk/corruption> accessed 19 August 2009.
For an extensive comparison between main international conventions related to corruption, including an in depth 
analysis o f the UN Convention see Indira Carr, "The United Nations convention on corruption: Making a real 
difference to the quality o f the life o f millions?” Ibid.
°^^ lbid.
United Nations Convention against Corruption, Chapter V, Article 51 states that "The return o f assets pursuant to 
this chapter is a fundamental principle o f this Convention, and States Parties shall afford one another the widest 
measure o f cooperation and assistance in this regard.”
Article 56 of the Convention states: "Without prejudice to its domestic law, each State Party shall endeavour to 
take measures to permit it to forward, without prejudice to its own investigations, prosecutions or judicial 
proceedings, information on proceeds o f offences established in accordance with this Convention to another State 
Party without prior request, when it considers that the disclosure o f such information might assist the receiving 
State Party in initiating or carrying out investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings or might lead to a request 
by that State Party under this Chapter of the Convention.”
TRACE is a non-profit membership association that pools resources to provide practical and cost-effective anti­
bribery compliance solutions for multinational companies and their commercial intermediaries (sales agents and 
representatives, consultants, distributors, suppliers, etc.). According to the definition provided by TRACE,
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jurisdictions where legal instruments have covered corruption, the legislative approach in 
relation to facilitation payments varies from country to country. Some states, such as the United 
Kingdom, consider facilitation payments as illegal and listed them under activities which are 
prohibited/"" On the other hand, jurisdictions such as the United States accept facilitation 
payments abroad and do not consider them illegal under their anti-bribery legislation, provided 
that the type of payment is not prohibited under the legal system of the foreign country in which 
a US company is conducting its business.
A survey conducted by TRACE International in October 2009 regarding companies paying 
facilitation payments indicates that 61.1% of the countries in which respondent companies 
operate permit facilitation payments.^"* Furthermore, 13% of those countries where facilitation 
payments are not permitted by law do not enforce the laws prohibiting such payments.^"" 
TRACE recommendations regarding facilitation payments suggest that the use of this practice 
brings many negative attributes to conducting business.^'" Some of the negative effects included 
involve loss of community confidence, and accounting dilemma as many companies do not know 
where to include such expenses on their accounting books especially in countries where 
facilitation payments are prohibited by legislation. Moreover, many businesses expressed their 
concerns that such payments despite initiating faster performance of officials' duties, 
nevertheless create uncertainty, unenforceable advantage, but also lead to greater demands.^" It 
is therefore essential that facilitation payments are criminalised in all jurisdictions, something 
that must be encouraged through international legal mechanisms and thus would need to be
facilitation payments, are "... bribes paid to induce foreign officials to perform routine functions they are otherwise 
obliged to perform". Examples o f such functions involved issuing o f licences or permits, installation o f phones lines 
and others.
The Bribery Act 2012 < http://www.legislation.2ov.ukyukp2a/2010/23/contcnts > accessed 16 May 2013. The 
Bribery Bill 2010 received Royal Assent in April 2010. On 14 September 2010 the Ministry o f Justice opened a 
consultation period, and as part o f the consultation period issued a draft guidance to the Act. The guidance 
confirmed the fact that small bribes which are paid in order to facilitate routine government action can constitute 
offences under Section 1 o f the Act.
Under §78dd -  1(b) o f the FCPA 1977 facilitation payments made for a routine government actions fall under 
exception to the provisions prohibited by the legislation by stating: “Subsections (a) and (g) o f this section shall not 
apply to any facilitating payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose o f which is to 
expedite or to secure the performance o f a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party 
official".
208 ' facilitation payments benchmarking survey” October 2009, can be obtained from
<https://www.traeeintemati0nal.0r2>.
209 Ibid.
Alexandra Wrage and Kerry Mandemach “ Facilitation payments”
<www.un2lobalcompaet.or2/docs/issues doe/7.../BAC 2A .4.pdf> accessed 10 October 2011.
Ibid.
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covered by the UN Convention. It must be deemed unacceptable to take money for tasks that
must be fulfilled by officials notwithstanding and which constitute a part of their duties. In fact, 
there should be no distinction made between acts committed by officials in return for additional 
remuneration, regardless of the fact whether the tasks performed are within or outside the remit 
of their position.
Apart from the legislative instruments mentioned above, various business bodies have issued 
recommendations and guidelines directed at businesses and other enterprises. These guidelines 
are of educational nature and have as their main scope the idea of advising companies on 
negative aspects of corruption and how to avoid being involved in corrupt activities, including 
those situations when business is being conducted abroad.
One of the sources is the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.^'^ The guidelines were 
drawn by the OECD and governments of the countries adhering to them in 1976 and recently 
revised in 2011, and are expected to be promoted by governments to their companies, which in 
most cases involve multinational enterprises. '^  ^The Guidelines represent standards of behaviour 
for companies at home as well as abroad and cover a wide range of topics, including human 
rights, employment rights as well as combating bribery. Section VI of the Guidelines directs 
companies not to take or give bribes as well as implement transparency mechanisms with regard 
to companies’ activities. Specifically, section VI states; “Enterprises should not, directly or 
indirectly, promise, give, or demand a bribe or undue advantage to obtain business or other 
improper advantage. Nor should enterprises be solicited or expected to render a bribe or other 
undue advantage.” '^'*
However, the weakness of the particular instrument is the fact that the Guidelines are not a 
regulatory mechanism, but rather a pure recommendation. They are not a substitute for, nor do 
they override applicable law. As a result, compliance with these rules voluntary and is not legally
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
<httD://www.oecd.or2/dafyintemationalin\'estment/2uidelincsfbrmu1tinationalenterDriscs/48004323.ndf> 
accessed 16 May 2013.
A large number o f countries - signatories to the OECD (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States) represent the main source o f foreign direct 
investment and are home for the most of world's multinational enterprises.
OECD Guidelines Part VI.
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enforceable/”  Moreover, the Guidelines do not have any international independent monitoring 
mechanisms/”  Although the Guidelines refer to the National Contact Points (NCP), these 
individuals intend to come from the country itself, usually comprising of high-ranked public 
officials, such as Ministers. It must be stated that the Guidelines state that the NCP can also 
include representatives from NGOs, worker organisations and other interested parties, as each 
country sees fit. This means that there are no strict rules as to the NCP and countries have the 
flexibility to decide on the NCP.^”
Following the introduction of the Guidelines, and civil society, pointing to their ineffectiveness 
has continued raising awareness on a global scale. As a result the UN Global Compact has 
published a series of Principles, directed at corporations and encouraging them to commit to 
corporate social responsibility.^” Principle 10 is particularly relevant as it addresses the issue of 
corruption.^”  Indeed, by promoting transparency in corporations, the initiative invites 
corporations to cooperate with the civil society and adhere to governments' regulations. 
Nevertheless, the initiative has the same weaknesses as those with the OECD Guidelines, as it is 
voluntary and is not legally enforceable. Rather, the initiative intends to resolve the problem 
from mere dialogue and learning.
Similar to the OECD Guidelines above, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has also 
published a manual for international business community.^”  As with the OECD Guidelines, the 
ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations to enterprises are intended to be used as a method 
of voluntary self-regulation by enterprises, and are to be used in conjunction with applicable 
national laws of their countries.” ' Under Article 1 of the Rules, enterprises are encouraged to
Evaritus Oshionebo “The UN Global Compact and accountability of transnational corporations: separating myth 
from realities” (2007) 19(1) Florida Journal o f International Law 1.
Ibid.
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (n 254) 71.
UN Global Compact is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations 
and strategies with ten universally accepted principles covering areas o f human rights, labour, environment and anti
-  corruption, (for more information on UN Global Compact visit 
<http://www.un2lobalcompact.or2/AboutTheGC/index.html> accessed 16 May 2013.
According to the UN Global Compact, the adoption o f the tenth principle commits UN Global Compact 
participants not only to avoid bribery, extortion and other forms o f corruption, but also to develop policies and 
concrete programs to address corruption. Companies are challenged to join governments, UN agencies and civil 
society to realize a more transparent global economy.
See <httD://www.un2lobalcompact.or2/AboutThcGC/TheTenPrinciples/princinlel0.html>).
ICC Rules o f Conduct and Recommendations <http://www.iccwbo.or2/Advocacv-Codcs-and-Rules/Documcnt- 
centre/2004/ICC-Rules-of-Conduct-and-Rccommcndations-to-Combat-Extortion-and-Briberv-t2005-Edition)/ f^
accessed 16 May 2013.
Ibid.
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prohibit bribery and extortion in any form. Moreover, it its definition the Article extends the act 
of bribery and makes it applicable in relation to bribing of employees and other representatives 
of private enterprises and does not limit it to public officials only.”  ^Moreover, in contrast to the 
two Conventions, the Rules include prohibition of facilitation payments, notwithstanding 
allowing the use of such in situations where their elimination is not possible. Recommendations 
leave it to be decided at the discretion of management of the enterprise to decide the extent to 
which facilitation payments can be a v o i d e d .Perhaps at this point it can be argued that ICC 
Rules in their Article 6 do not make the prohibition of facilitation payments as such, but rather 
suggest that those are kept to a low level, by advising that “their use is limited to small payments 
to low-level officials”.”  ^ Such differentiation is rather unclear, thus leaving loopholes with 
regard to its implementation.^^" All in all, the ICC Rules can be perceived as yet another 
voluntary initiative, adherence to which is based solely on companies’ voluntary intention and 
can therefore be implemented selectively rather than fully.
The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) was established in 1999 by the Council of 
Europe to monitor states’ compliance with the organisation’s anti-corruption standards. 
GRECO s objective is to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption by monitoring 
their compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption standards through a dynamic process of 
mutual evaluation and peer pressure.
GRECO provides a platform to allow the state to share their best practice in the prevention and 
detection of corru p tion .The GRECO project operates on a monitoring system, where all the 
members are monitored on an equal basis, through a thorough process of evaluation and peer 
p r e ssu r e .The GRECO project involves onsite visits by a group of experts sent to each member 
state for evaluation regarding implementation of relevant anti-corruption legislation and 
procedures as agreed by the Council. In cases where such procedures are not followed, the
Article 1(a), ICC Rules and Recommendations.
Article 6 (a) o f the Rules states: "Enterprises should not make facilitation payments. In the event that an 
enterprise determines, after appropriate managerial review, that facilitation payments cannot be eliminated entirely, 
it should establish controls and procedures to ensure that their use is limited to small payments to low-level officials
for routine actions which the enterprise is entitled” .
Ibid.
It might be difficult to define what is meant by "small payments" and on what basis the amounts are calculated to
determine whether they are big or small.
^^ <^httn://www.coe.int/t/d2hl/monitorin2/2reco/2eneral/3.%20What%20is%20GRECO en.asn> accessed 2 March 
2013.
<http://www.coe.int/t/d2hl/monitonn2/2rcco/2eneral/4.%20How%20does%20GRECO%20work cn.aso> 
accessed 2 March 2013.
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Member State is issued with or In case of recommendations, the
state is required to follow them within 18 months since issuance. The observations must be taken 
into account by the state and reported on at the time of the state’s next compliance procedure. 
The example of GRECO project demonstrates that initiatives, when come into force, must 
incorporate within their procedural and functioning context a clear monitoring mechanism. 
However, the above comments with regard to voluntary models of curbing corruption do not 
intend to claim that the main aim behind anti-corruption instruments should only be directed 
towards the criminalisation of corrupt individuals. According to Lager, for example, despite 
decades of efforts to reduce corruption, the phenomenon continues to flourish not only in 
developing countries. Lager refers to the existence of corruption also in developed, leading 
countries such as the USA, particularly referring to cases where US corporations bribe foreign 
public and private officials abroad. In his discussion Lager refers to the fact that despite current 
anti-corruption legislation in the USA, levels of corruption have not dropped.
For example, the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA) prohibits the 
bribery of foreign government officials by US persons and prescribe accounting and record­
keeping practices. The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA apply to any US person and make it 
illegal for US persons to bribe a foreign government official for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business. The wording of the FCPA makes its scope rather clear. The fact that the 
FCPA deals only with bribes made to foreign government officials acts to exclude from the 
FCPA’s ambit payments to foreign persons who are not governmental officials. Additionally, the 
fact that the FCPA deals only with bribes that are intended for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business acts to exclude grease or facilitating payments from the scope of the FCPA.
A facilitating payment, otherwise known as grease, is a payment made to expedite or secure the 
performance of a routine government action. Routine government actions include obtaining 
permits or licenses, processing official papers, clearing goods through customs, loading and 
unloading cargo and providing police protection. The quid pro quo requirement of the FCPA 
makes inadvertent violations of the FCPA unlikely.
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA are enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ). US 
persons who are accused of violating the FCPA can defend their actions by showing that the
<http://www.coc.int/t/dühl/monitorina/ürcco/ücncralM. How docs GRECO work cn.asn> accessed 2 March 
2013.
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payment they made is lawful in accordance with the written laws of the recipient’s country or 
that the payment they made is a reasonable expenditure directly related to the US person’s 
promotional activities in the recipient's country. The accounting and record-keeping provisions 
of the FCPA apply to companies which are publicly traded in the USA. These provisions make it 
a requirement for such companies to devise and maintain an accounting system which tightly 
controls and accurately records all dispositions of company assets. These provisions are intended 
to prohibit the existence of "slush funds", i.e. accounts that are frequently used to make illegal 
payments. They are also intended to prohibit the mislabelling of payments and the 
misrepresentation of expenses. The accounting and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA are 
essentially a re-enactment of established accounting procedures for publicly traded companies. 
As such the accounting and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA are enforced by the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Penalties for violating the accounting and record­
keeping provisions of the FCPA are the same penalties that apply to most other violations of the 
securities laws. These penalties include monetary fines but no criminal penalties.
Nevertheless, in February 2009 the Securities and Exchange Commission announced settlements 
with KBR, Inc. and Halliburton Co. to resolve SEC charges that KBR subsidiary Kellogg Brown 
& Root EEC bribed Nigerian government officials over a 10-year period, in violation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in order to obtain construction contracts. The SEC also 
charged that KBR and Halliburton, KBR's former parent company, engaged in books and records 
violations and internal controls violations related to the bribery.
However, it is not only for corrupt actions that take place abroad, as many cases of corrupt 
practices take place within the USA itself, especially in federal and state government. Lager 
provides astonishing examples of alleged sale of a Senate seat by a governor, and US 
Department of Interior employees accepting gifts and illegal drugs from representatives of the 
industries they regulate.^”  Apart from the FCPA, there are other pieces of legislation in the 
USA, which regulate internal incidence of occurrence of corruption.^"' One of the statutes is the
James M Lager "Overcoming cultures o f compliance to reduce corruption and achieve ethics in government"
(2009) 41 McGeorge Law Review 63(for more information see ‘SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA 
Violations’ (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) < httD://www.scc.2ov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm > 
accessed 16 May 2013).
Ibid.
While FCPA 1977 regulates corrupt practices outside the US territory, whereas numerous criminal statutes 
regulate and impose penalties for various types of corruption and conflict o f interest (18 U.S.C. §§ 201 -  211); 
statute prohibiting the acceptance o f gifts from contractors (5 U.S.C. § 7353).
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Ethics in Government Act, which requires the federal government’s senior executives to file 
publicly available financial disclosure reports on annual basis/”
Having looked at some of the major international and regional anti-corruption models, it is 
important to examine whether Azerbaijan has implemented as part of its national anti-corruption 
strategy, any of the above anti-corruption policies. This is important because it demonstrates the 
overall adopted framework against corruption in Azerbaijan.
As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, the country is a signatory to several international anti­
corruption conventions, particularly the abovementioned UN Convention against Corruption, as 
well as the Council of Europe Civil Convention on Corruption and Council of Europe Criminal 
Convention on Corruption. "^" Additionally, in January 2004 the Azerbaijani Parliament adopted 
the Law on Combating Corruption.^ "'* According to its preamble, the particular piece of 
legislation is aimed at the prevention and detection of offences related to corruption. Article 1 of 
this legislation outlines a general definition of corruption, which is:
“///left a» ma/ena/ o/Aer or
for that purpose his or her position, or the status o f the body he or she represents, or his or her 
/lowery, or /Ao qqpor/WMfrfOj^  (/onvmg^o/M /Ao.yo .y/o/wj or j^owerj, wg// oj q/^
OM ///zcfr q^rmg, p r o / M i o r  Af/M or Aer Ay or /ogo//lorj o^MJ q/^
/Ag mo/grio/ o/zzf o/Aor vo/woj, /zr/vi/gggj or
The above definition is then broken down in more detail in Article 9 of the Law, listing acts 
which shall be considered as corruption offences. Thus for example, a public official is deemed 
to have committed a crime of corruption if he or she accepted material or other values, privileges
Passed in 1978, the Ethics in Government Act affects many different aspects o f federal government employment. 
Its most famous provision was the Independent Counsel Law, which gave impetus to very public investigations of 
officials in three presidential administrations and resulted in the Impeachment trial o f President Bill Clinton in 1999. 
That provision has since been allowed to lapse, but many other provisions o f the act remained valid through 2003. 
The purpose o f the act was to increase public confidence in the level o f integrity o f federal government officials, to 
deter conflicts o f interest from arising, and to stop unethical person from entering public service. Generally, the act 
made provisions for the authority and functions o f the Office of Government Ethics, and set up administrative 
provisions, rules and regulations, and appropriations to enforce federal government ethics. It became law in 1978. 
^^Official translations o f the text o f these legal instruments can be found at <http://www.commission- 
anticorruDtion.2ov.az/view.php?lanE=en&menu=22> accessed 16 May 2013.
^^■‘Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Combating Corruption
< http://www.commission-anticorruntion.20v.az/upload/file/law 13.doc > accessed 16 May 2013.
Ibid, Article 1.
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or advantages ibr acting or retraining from acting in the exercise of his or her service duties of
p o w e r s . T h e  particular Article applies to both, those demanding money as well as those 
offering, thus covering both supply and demand sides. As can be seen from the above definition 
in section 9.2.1, the particular law refers to facilitating payments as well. Although it can be said 
that the particular legislation is relatively well structured and expands to cover a wide range of 
offences, it fails to clearly identify which of the listed acts fall under civil, administrative or 
criminal offence, even though the legislation states that those who commit the acts are subject to 
civil, administrative or criminal proceedings. Similarly, the legislation does not clearly stipulate 
the types of sanctions available for those prosecuted under this law. In fact. Article 10.2 states 
that “In cases, where commission by an official of offences referred to in Article 9 of this law 
entails civil, administrative or criminal responsibility, instituting of legal proceedings against that 
official shall be carried out in accordance with relevant legislation of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan.” Consequently, one can see that from the practical point of view, the particular piece 
of legislation must be rather weak when it comes to its implementation.
In addition to this piece of legislation. Article 311 of Azerbaijan’s penal code makes acceptance 
of a bribe illegal and punishable,^^^ while Article 312 makes punishable the act of giving of a 
bribe. Nevertheless, based on the above, one wonders whether the legislation when passed by 
the legislature was not intended for regular use, but rather for protocol only. In support of this 
point one may use the current corruption prosecution statistics. Thus, in 2011 the Office for 
Combating Corruption in Azerbaijan which operates under the Prosecutor General received 1084 
official complaints for alleged corruption activities. Out of those 128 reports were opened but 
until now none actually went to court.
Ibid, Article 9.2.1.
^^Under Article 311 of the Criminal Code, receiving a bribe (passive bribery) is illegal. The maximum punishment 
is 12 years imprisonment. Information taken from ‘Azerbaijan: Integrity Indicators Scorecard’ {Global Integrity 
2009 Assessment) < http://report.Klobalinteüritv.orK/Azcrbaiian/2009/scorccard/S6 > accessed 16 May 
2013. Azerbaijan’s penal code in Azeri can be accessed at < httn://www.e-qanun.az/ >.
Under Article 312 of the Criminal Code, offering a bribe (active bribery) is illegal. The maximum punishment is 
eight years imprisonment. The reservation of the Article states that the person giving a bribe shall not be held 
criminally liable if  the presentation of the bribe took place as a result o f threats by the official concerned or if  the 
person has voluntarily informed the appropriate state body about a presentation of a bribe.
K. Zarballiyeva “Statistics on Requests to Prosecutor General o f Azerbaijan on Corruption in 2011” {Trend, 27 
January 2011) < http://en.trend.az/news/socicty/] 9S4945.html#popuplnfo > accessed 16 May 2013.
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2.7.2 Hard law and soft law approaches
The above discussion looked at various anti-corruption policies, which aim at reducing levels of 
corruption, by adopting different methods. However, regulation does not always impede corrupt 
acts from taking place. In some instances, expert knowledge of the prohibiting rules is used as a 
useful guide to those who want to surpass it. One of the examples is that of Enron, an American 
energy company based in Texas, which went bankrupt after the revelations of it disclosing false 
information on its accounting reports and thus withholding billions of debt.^ "*®
The above-mentioned example demonstrates that the typical response to corruption through 
enactment of various legal measures does not suffice to tackle corruption, especially on its grand 
scale, as companies and public authorities in power tend to evolve ways to override them. As the 
earlier mentioned Lager suggests:
“no matter how smart the drafters, or how much care is taken to craft a rule that is neither too 
narrow nor too broad, any before -  the -  fact formulation of a rule will naturally run out of 
precision in its future applicability to new situations. Even new proscriptions that appear to be 
effective often fail to actually reduce the level of misconduct, as the new rules generate new
,,241evasions....
In fact, research shows that punishment is unproductive in achieving behavioural change, and in 
the case of corruption, achievement of behavioural change is what is really needed. This does
S. L. Gillan & J. D. Martin "Financial engineering, corporate governance, and the collapse o f Enron", Working
Papers Series, Centre for Corporate Governance, University o f Delaware.
<http://naDers.ssrn.com/sol3/napers.cfm7abstract id=354040> accessed 16 May 2013. On December 2, 2001 Enron 
Corp. was declared bankrupt. Enron's internal investigation and a US Senate investigation committee concluded that 
the Board o f Directors failed in its oversight duties. In particular, the Board approved the formation o f off-balance 
sheet partnerships run by Enron employees, failed to effectively monitor transaetions with these partnerships, and 
failed to react to warning signs those transactions as they came to light. Enron’s investments were sizeable, and 
often took years to deliver significant earnings or cash flow. Believing that exceptional returns would come with 
time, and concerned about possible dilution, Enron’s management eschewed raising equity in favour o f borrowing 
through off balance partnerships. These partnerships were known as Special Purpose Entities (SPEs). Enron's non 
transparent financial statements did not clearly detail its operations and finances with shareholders and analysts. In 
addition, its complex business model stretched the limits o f accountings requiring that the company use accounting 
limitations to manage earnings and modify the balance sheet to portray a favourable depiction o f its performance. 
Thus the use of accounting loopholes, special purpose entities, and poor financial reporting, were able to hide 
billions in debt from failed deals and projects.
James M Lager (n 229).
According to John A Siliciano, increasing the number o f laws and regulations can actually increase criminal 
activity, as people and organisations may try to achieve their goals regardless o f restrictions and, like the general
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not imply that properly constructed legislation is entirely woithless. What it does mean, however, 
is that in an attempt to fight corruption in a pure sense of its eradication by means of deterrence,
one must apply preventative measures. In such events external and internal controls that increase 
dramatically the perception by potential offenders that they would be caught is more likely to 
reduce incidents of corrupt activities than legislation that punishes such acts. Consequently, 
instead of seeking to prevent corruption through excessive legislation and increase in sanctions 
for misconduct, effective preventative measures should be put in place. The aim of such 
measures would be the creation of a working environment where authorities are put in a position 
where instances of corrupt acts are easily detected. Such knowledge by the employees or other 
persons in power will lead to reduction in levels of wrongdoing.
Much attention should be given to measures which could prevent corruption, by discouraging 
government officials as well as businesses from being involved in various corrupt activities.
At this stage of the thesis, the notions of hard law and soft law must be distinguished. The 
abovementioned international Conventions fall are hard law instruments, whereas the EITI, 
which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, in its current shape is considered a soft 
law.
Hard law is defined as a regime relying primarily on the authority and power of the State, in 
relation to construction, operation, and implementation, including enforcement, or arrangements 
at international or national l eve l .Accord i ng  to this, hard law refers to legally binding 
obligations that are precise in nature and that delegate authority for interpreting and 
implementing the law.^ '*^  Soft law, on the other hand, refers to regimes that rely primarily on the
participation and resources of non-govemmental actors in the construction, operation, and 
implementation of governance arrangements. In addition, under the soft law, the participation 
in the construction, operation, and continuation of the regime is voluntary. As a result, any
response by drivers to speed limits, ignore laws that lack legitimacy. See John A Siliciano "Corporate behaviour and 
the social efficiency o f Tort law" (1987)85 Michigan Law Review 1820.
Although punishing a particular individual may incapacitate him for a while and may deter others, as a general 
rule, the threat o f punishment is an unproductive method for achieving behavioural change. In fact, most 
criminologists have concluded that it is an individual’s perception o f the probability o f getting caught that serves as 
a greater deterrent than the severity o f the sanctions. For more information on psychology o f crime see Paul H 
Robinson & John M Darley, ‘Does criminal law deter? A behavioural science investigation’ (2004) 24 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 197.
John J Kirton and Michael J Trebilcock (eds), 5'c^Law (Ashgate 2004).
Ibid.
Ibid.
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participant is free to leave at any time, and to adhere to the regime or not, without invoking the 
sanctioning power of state authority. Moreover, soft law regime strongly relies on consensus- 
based decision making for action, as well as a source of institutional binding and legitimacy. 
Hence, there is an absence of the authoritative, material sanctioning power of the State as a way 
to induce consent and compliance. This does not mean that governments or their 
representatives are never present in the soft law regime. Soft law regimes can include 
governments, only in this case the government does not dominate the r e g i m e . T h u s  soft law 
comes in many forms, including private and voluntary codes, as well as transparency obligations 
on the part of companies and governments. Institutions with voluntary standards or commitments 
and compliance systems are thus hard core of soft law.^ ^® Hard law and soft law are each the 
conceptual antithesis of the other and each brings distinctive advantages and disadvantages. 
While in principle hard law offers strong surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, soft law 
arrangements can deliver standards less stringent than those required to meet the demands. 
Despite that, each type of law can have its own domain where it can flourish and does.
2.7.3 Transparency as a possible antidote to corruption
It has long been accepted that a possible antidote to corruption in general, as well as to that in the 
extractive industries sector, is transparency. Through transparency it can become possible to 
provide a clear overview of all the dealings that take place with regards to a particular matter -  
such as bidding negotiations for a concession agreement between a government and an extractive 
company. In simple terms, transparency is meant to amount to “openness”, and in 
consequence, promote disclosure. It is believed that transparency can promote accountability, 
particularly that of public authorities to their people, who themselves, although indirectly, are
Ibid.
Ibid.
247
248
'^''Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Although the term "transparency" seems ubiquitous, it is rarely defined. Part o f the looseness o f the term stems 
from the fact that it is being used in so many different issue areas. In politics, it equates to enabling citizens to learn 
what governments are up to through information provided by the government. In economics and finance, the 
Working Group on Transparency and Accountability defined the concept very broadly as a "process by which 
information about existing conditions, decisions and actions is made accessible, visible and understandable” 
(Working Group 1998, o f  fAe IForAz/zg Group om TroMjporemcy OM(/TccouMfo6fVf(y, (1998), Washington DC:
International Monetary Fund). These varied definitions, drawn from disparate issue areas, have in common as 
common objective the release o f information by institutions that is relevant to evaluating those institutions.
< W W W .transparency.oru>.
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affected by the outcome of the deals, especially those related to natural resources in their 
country.
According to Ann M. Florini’s suggestions, there are good reasons to believe that increased
transparency would be beneficial and often indispensable. According to Florini, consistent 
transparency provides means of detecting, and thus correcting, errors in policies of governmental 
and international institutions. Because transparency is a tool that permits evaluation, much of 
its value lies in overcoming the difficulties principals have in ensuring that their agents do what 
they want them to do, rather than what is in the interest of the agents themselves. In the corporate 
world, for example, firm managers are supposed to be agents of the owners, who hold stock, but 
without transparency owners cannot know whether the company is being well managed, and 
investors have poor grounds for determining whether they should become owners. Similarly, in 
the realm of politics, governments are the agents of their citizens, but the wave of corruption 
scandals seen indicates that too many government officials are serving private rather than public 
ends whenever no one is looking.
Once transparency becomes a norm, it can in turn enable awareness and mass publicity through 
the press. According to Myint, “secretiveness has been a key factor that has enabled public 
officials and politicians to get away with corruption”. The links between transparency and the 
lowering of corruption was recognised in a US case Bertoldi v Wachtler, where the court stated 
in per curiam that disclosure of financial information reduces the risk of corruption and conflict 
of interests in the course of public duty and in turn enhances public confidence in the integrity of 
public officials.
Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, ‘The second scramble for Africa's oil and mineral resources: blessing or 
curse?'(2008) 42 The International Lawyer 193,195. By making information transparent and available to the public, 
it will become possible to raise awareness o f the public and ensure that those responsible are made accountable for
their actions. The transplant society is, the more difficult it is for corrupt officials to misuse funds.
Ann M Florini, “Doe.; lAe a ri-a/zjparency o f  ", Paper
prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington DC., April 28-30, 1999 
<http://infb.worldbank.oru/ctools/docs/librarv/8299/fiorini.pdf> accessed 3 September 2009.
Ibid.
Ibid.
U Myint (n 145). A responsible press to gather, analyse, organise, present and disseminate information is 
considered vital to create greater public awareness and to provide the momentum for undertaking reforms to 
overcome corruption.
Ibid.
V IfacAf/en 952 F.2'"' 656, (2"'' Czr. 799?;, 660.
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2.8 Corruption in the Extractive Industries Sector
The extractive industries sector is perceived as one of the most vulnerable ones. The reason for 
this is the usually scarce nature of the resources, which makes them exceptionally expensive. 
Moreover, growing demand, particularly in the energy sector, makes the demand for 
commodities constantly grow.^^  ^ This generates an environment with high demand for scarcely 
available resources. As a result this creates an atmosphere susceptible to corruption, with 
lucrative profits at stake for the producers, with bribes demanded for goods made available. 
Furthermore, what makes the situation within extractive industries even more peculiar is the fact 
that most of the sources of the commodities are located in developing or less developed 
countries. One of the examples would be that of Africa, where interest in the areas of oil trade 
and investment is mounting. There are several grounds why multinational extractive 
corporations aim at developing countries in A f r i c a . O n e  of the main reasons, however, seems 
to be the fact that Africa, in the same plight as other developing countries in lack of the 
infrastructure and in need of external investment, offer more favourable, less complicated 
contractual conditions.
As for Azerbaijan, corrupt officials violate business and procurement procedures for their 
personal advantage. Procedures related to issuing licences are used to impede bribes and
Francisco Parra, O f / T M O f / e r / z  AM/o/y of^g/ro/gw/M (l.B. Tauris 2004) 68.
By energy sector are meant commodities of non-renewable nature, which are used in production of energy, 
among many of which are coal, oil and gas. It is not within the aim of this paper to concentrate on alternative 
sources o f energy production, such as renewable sources which come in form of energy extracted from wind power, 
solar power and water power.
According to the International Energy Outlook 2014 total world consumption o f marketed energy is projected to 
increase by 37 per cent by 2040.. The largest projected increase in energy demand is Ibr the non-OECD 
economies. China and India are the fastest-growing non-OECD economies, and they will be key world energy 
consumers in the future. Since 1990, energy consumption as a share o f total world energy use has increased 
significantly in both countries. By early 2030s China will become the largest oil-consuming country. In addition 
India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the sub-Saharan Africa will take over as the engines o f the global energy 
demand growth.
‘International Energy Outlook 2014’
<http://www.iea.org/publications/Ifeepublications/publication/WEO 2014_ES_English_WEB.pdf> accessed 9
October 2014.
Ian Bannon, Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (World Bank Publications 2003) 35. 
Chris Nwachukwu Okeke (n254).
According to Okeke, one o f the factors is Africa’s strategic location. The continent is almost entirely surrounded 
by water, making the transportation costs and other related risks significantly reduced. For example in case with 
Africa’s oil, it is easily loaded on a tanker at the point o f production and begins its smooth journey on the high seas, 
arriving quickly at the respective ports o f destination in Europe, Asia, or America.
Ibid 200.
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companies are required to make facilitating payments in order to secure a government 
contract.
Such uneven allocation of resource reserves has created a motivated and commercially 
dependent environment. Further to this, it has created a commercial environment where western 
extractive industries corporations had to become involved in the extraction of the aforementioned 
commodities, simply because the reserve countries had no ability to do it themselves. For 
instance, for oil-exporting countries the initial impact of energy transition from coal to oil was 
extensive exploration which led to significant discoveries of their oil resources.N onetheless, 
the countries’ capacity to benefit from these resources was severely limited for several reasons, 
such as underdeveloped economic and administrative structure as well as their weak bargaining 
position in relation to Western extractive c o mp a n i e s . T h i s  in turn has created a new 
environment for the host states which need to deal with a bidding process, initiated by the 
potential for the extraction companies. It is during these negotiations between the Western 
companies and the host state governments, where bribes and other types of corruption^^^ make
Azerbaijan Country Profile, Business Anti-Corruption Portal 
<http://www.business-anti-cormption.com/country-profiles/europe-centTal-asia/azerbaijan/general- 
information.aspx> accessed 10 December 2014.
In many situations the less developed countries, which possess the reserves do not possess sufficient technology 
and skill to extract and transport the commodity. Furthermore, in countries where the skills are available, the 
government's budgets do not possess the sufficient financial reserves to support the extraction. At times, particularly 
in the oil and gas sector, the reserves are located in such locations, where only highly skilled, technology enhanced 
companies can access and extract. It is thus the case, that western corporations, such as Dutch Shell and BP, who 
undertake on contractual basis such extraction and transportation.
Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, Papers on the Economics o f  Oil: A Producer’s View (Oxford University Press 1979); 
Published for the State o f Kuwait on behalf o f the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)), 
12 .
Ibid. One o f constraints is the application o f the conventional oil concession system which governed the 
relationship between the governments o f the oil producing countries and the foreign oil companies. Under that well- 
known system, the companies have had the power to determine the rates o f exploration and exploitation as well as 
the price level o f oil exports. In addition, the underdeveloped state of economies o f the oil-exporting countries, with 
poor administrative performance and high inelastic supply o f domestic goods and services also presented a problem. 
Working under such constrains, the oil-exporting countries are simply unable and at times unwilling to play an 
active role in the protection of their national interests.
The types o f cormption involve bribe taking by those responsible for the bidding process; embezzlement of the 
sums by the politicians in the host state, given to them by the extractive companies when applying for permits and 
other extraction related documentation. It should also be mentioned at this point that the issue o f corruption also 
takes into account the incentive system, which is used in many developing countries in Africa. See Sebastian James, 
'Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications' (Investment Climate Advisory Services o f the World 
Bank Group, December 2009) < https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/IncentivesandInvestments.pdf^ 
accessed 15 January 2015. Azerbaijan also used various incentives before the state oil Company (SOCAR) was able 
to acquire its own financial capacity. Some of the incentives, such as special corporate income tax regime and other 
types o f tax allowances for foreign investors still remain in Azerbaijan. (For more on incentives in Azerbaijan see
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extractive industries a highly vulnerable area. According to Dunning, “multinational companies, 
who tend to have contracts for extraction of natural resources, bribe governments of developing 
countries and thus ensure that they get a larger stake from the extraction than they deserve, and 
thus taking what is rightfully, ought to go to the developing country”. It is nothing new that 
western corporations take advantage of such situations, by attaining profitable agreements 
through b r i b e r y . I n  the recent decades, transnational corporations (TNCs)^^^ have gained 
unprecedented economic power, thus, of the top 100 economies in the world, over 50 of the 
largest ones are enjoyed by corporations.
Using the earlier mentioned examples of economic and social vulnerability in developing 
countries, TNCs abuse their powerful economic and even political position to amplify their 
already outsized pro fits. Inasmuch as weak governments give rise to corrupt activities by high- 
level officials in these countries, the activities are abetted by transnational extractive industries 
who themselves do not report on revenue payments made to developing governments or on the 
level of productivity they have in their host country. The incidence of large-scale corruption is
Aitor Ci arrêta and Shahriyar Nasirov, "Impact o f Azerbaijan Energy Policy on the Development of the Oil Sector" 
(2010) International Association for Energy Economics
<https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&ed=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCgQFjAB 
&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.iaee.org%2Fen%2Fpublications%2Fnewsletterdl.aspx%3Fid%3Dl 18&ei=qUTqVM 
LpK4HvUP32geAO&usg-AFQjCNGQmQg3T0SIUq6OB01bjc4F0ky8iw&bvm=bv.86475890,d.d24 > accessed 19 
February 2015
John H Dunning, Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges o f  Global Capitalism (Oxford University 
Press 2003) 78.
Nwachukwu Okeke (n254) 201 makes a point o f the fact that scramble for Africa’s natural resources by 
multinational corporations has had an unfortunate effect on triggering corruption.
Multinational Corporations (MNC) or Transnational Corporations (TNC) are generally regarded as an enterprise 
comprising entities in more than one country which operate under a system o f decision making that permits coherent 
policies and a common strategy. The entities are so linked that one or more o f them may be able to exercise a 
significant influence over the others and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the 
other. Taken from <http://www.unctad.oru/TEMPLATES.naue.asp7intltemlD=3159&lang=l> accessed 30 June 
2009.
John H Dunning (n272).
Ibid. Recent revelations through documents obtained by The Times reveal that Tony Blair lobbied Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi on behalf o f Shell in a letter written for him in draft form by the oil company. The 
correspondence, written while Blair was Prime Minister, bore a striking resemblance to a briefing note by Royal 
Dutch Shell weeks earlier promoting a $500 million (£325 million) deal it was trying to clinch in Libya. While it is 
common for government ministers to champion a country’s interests abroad, Shell’s draft reveals an unusual 
assurance in its ability to dictate Blair’s conversation with the Libyan leader. It also raises questions about the 
motives behind Britain’s improved relations with Libya and the subsequent release of Abdul Baset Ali al-Megrahi, 
the Lockerbie bomber. Lockerbie victims have claimed that the Government paved the way for al-Megrahi’s release 
as part o f a deal with Libya to give British companies access to Libya’s lucrative oil and gas industry. For more on 
this article visit
<http://busincss.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industrv sectors/natural rcsources/articlc7108957.ece > accessed 27 
April 2010.
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closely connected with contracting out/^  ^concessions/^^ and privatisation, where multinationals
based in OECD countries stand to gain a lot of profitable business/^® High levels of corruption 
in the extractive industries are associated with the lack of transparency in transactions between 
domestic governments and transnational enterprises, thus curbing the potential of these revenues 
to lift resource rich developing nations out of poverty/^’ In most instances, multinational 
corporations offer brides to the host state officials when bidding for a certain contract. 
Additionally, money gained from the sale of the extracted goods is misappropriated and 
embezzled by powerful officials to personal foreign accounts.Consequent ly,  the non­
transparent activities of transnational extractive industries in developing countries do as much to 
undermine the internationally advocated principles of good governance as does the actions of 
state officials themselves. Such participation by foreign entities also undermines the political 
stability of developing nations whose dishonest practices exacerbate volatility in the political 
climate.
Moreover, what makes corruption in extractive industries rather distinct in its nature is its size. It 
is clear that bribes vary enormously in size, and it is the bribes, and therefore the misappropriated 
sums by those in charge in the host states, that differ substantially within the extractive industries 
sector than in any other. Consequently, corruption within the extractive industries is of the 
grand nature, involving millions of dollars and differs from bribery in the form of gifts or minor 
payments. It should also be stated that this type of grand bribery differs not only in its size, but 
also in the resulting level of negative effects discussed earlier, both economic as well as 
social.
Contracting out happens when a person or a company is engaged from outside an organisation/country by 
contract to undertake or produce. <httD://www.thefreedictionarv.com/Contractinu+out > accessed 16 May 2013. 
Concession is a contract granting the right to operate a subsidiary business. 
<http://ardictionarY.com/Concession/9674> Accessed 16 May 2013.
Silvia Fazio (nl09).
Janelle M Lewis, 'The Resource Curse: Examining Corruption in the Extractive Industries’ (2007) 2(1) 
Perspectives on Global Issues, 2.
More information on kinds o f corrupt activities in the extractive industries sector is discussed in Chapter 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
For example, in 2000, during an investigation under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, authorities 
considered allegations that Exxon Corporation has engaged in a scheme to pay $78 million to the highest-ranking
official in Kazakhstan, the country’s president.
Nikolay A Ouzounov, 'Facing the Challenge: Corruption, State Capture and the Role o f Multinational Business’ 
(2003- 2004) 37 John Marshall Law Review 1181.
Ibid.
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Large amounls of national revenues accrued from the sale of natural resources theoretically 
should generate wealth for an economy, promote economic progress, and reduce poverty by 
providing a source of investment capital for socio-economic development. However, a majority 
of countries that are rich in natural resources and highly dependent on revenues from such 
resources, notably those in the developing world, have experienced negative economic, social 
development, and political t rends.Surprisingly,  these resource-rich countries have worse 
economic growth and poverty reduction records than many peer countries that lack 
concentrations of natural resource wealth. Furthermore, the studies have documented a wide 
range of negative correlations between development and resource a b u n d a n c e .Such 
conclusions are supported by the fact that the aforementioned opaque contracting and 
administrative processes in the extractive industries sector spur and enable corruption and 
political rent seeking related to the natural resource revenues. The corruption therefore becomes 
intensified when large commodity revenue flows are available.
Nonetheless, while the proportion of countries experiencing such a curse is high, a small number 
of resource-rich countries have successfully been able to use their natural resource revenues for 
social investments and policy initiatives that have generated markedly positive socio-economic 
development.^^’ Those countries typically had a strong government structure, oversight 
mechanisms, rule of law and active civil society before discovering or exploiting their natural
2 9 2resource.
Ahmad Komarulzaman and Armida S Alisjahbana, “ Testing the Natural Resource Curse Hypothesis in 
Indonesia: Evidence at the Regional Level” Working Paper in Economics and Development Studies, No. 200602 
Department o f Economics, Padjadjaran University, August 2006.
Ibid. Research shows that countries rich in mineral resources perform worse that those who do not possess 
natural resources. For example, countries like Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Chad and Sudan are highlighted as important 
oil producers. Despite this, these countries remain at the bottom o f the development scale.
Ibid. History shows that rather than a blessing, natural resource reserves can be a bane for many poor countries, 
leading to fraud, corruption, wasteful spending, military adventurism and instability. Too often, extractive industries 
revenues that should go to a nation's poor ends up in the pockets o f the rich, or it may be squandered on grand 
palaces and massive showcase projects instead o f being invested productively. A classic case is Nigeria, now the 
world’s eighth largest oil exporter, where despite half a century o f oil production and half a trillion dollars in 
revenues, poverty has actually increased, corruption is rife and violence persists in the oil-rich Niger Delta.
Ibid.
fgfro/gwfM a/nf [/.$'. /Mternuriona/ fo F/gAf r/ze
Resource Curse'"’, Report to the Members o f the Committee o f Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 110* 
Congress, Second Session, October 16, 2008 (available at <http://www.upoaccess.uov/conuress/index.html> 
accessed 1 September 2009).
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2.9 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
In view of the fact that transparency is perceived as a possible antidote to corruption, including 
that in the extractive industries sector, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg in 2002, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched by 
the then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. The EITEs main objective was set to promote the public 
disclosure of revenue flows from the oil, gas and mining industries to governments in countries 
that depend on natural resources. Greater revenue transparency, through the “Publish What 
You Pay” scheme, allows citizens to track revenues into national budgets, reducing the risk of 
corruption and promoting informed public debate about the best use of public money. Since the 
launch of the EITI, there are currently 31 resource-rich countries which are recognised as EITI 
Candidate or C o m p lia n t.Multinational extractive corporations, such as BP, have also shown 
interest in the initiative and have agreed to comply with the disclosure requirements.
However, the EITI objectives do not make it clear as to what exactly is meant by the need for 
transparency for the purposes of “Publish What You Pay”. What meant by transparency in the 
extractive industry of the country involved, is a thorough inspection by an independent firm of 
auditors of the country’s accounts related to the industry, followed by its publication and thus its 
subsequent availability to the public. It may, however, be the case that the sum of money that 
appears as correctly received based on the contract of sale, is in the end misappropriated by the 
authorities in charge, possibly under a pretext that it was used towards improvement of local 
infrastructure in a remote village. Nevertheless, the availability of the facts revealed and most 
importantly published by audits, through increased transparency, will provide the interested
The main objective o f the EITI can be found in The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Time to Go 
Global, Press Release 16/10/2006 at < www.eitransparencv.oru/scction/countriessunnort >.
Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic o f Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Timor-Leste, Yemen and Zambia.
Once a country is Compliant, the country must undergo Validation at least every 5 years, or upon the request from 
the EITI International Board. Validation is an essential element o f the EITI as an international standard. It provides 
an independent assessment o f countries implementing the EITI and what measures they should take to make better 
and faster progress.
African Rainbow Minerals, Alcoa, AMG Advanced Metallurgical Group N.V., Anglo American, AngloGold 
Ashanti, Anvil Mining, ArcelorMittal, Areva, B arrick , BG Group, BMP Billiton, BP , Chevron Corporation, 
ConocoPhilips, DeBeers, Eni, ExxonMobil, Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold , GDF SUEZ , Goldcorp, Gold 
Fields, Hess Corporation, Lihir Gold, Katanga Mining Limited, Lonmin, Marathon, Mitsubishi Materials, MMG, 
Newmont, Nippon Mining & Metals, Noble Energy, Norsk Hydro, Oxus Gold, OZ Minerals, Pemex, Petrobras, 
Qatar Petroleum, Repsol YPF , Rio Tinto, Santos, Shell, Statoil, Sumitomo Metal Mining, Talisman Energy, Teck, 
Total, Vale, Woodside and Xstrata.
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bodies, such as the press, with information that will enable further investigation of possible 
misappropriation.
Currently, one of the obstacles in getting all the necessary information related to the contracts
made between the extractive companies and the government are the confidentiality clauses. 
These clauses are commonly applied to contracts, especially those related to business conducted 
by the MNCs, but also the local extraction companies. The incorporation of confidentiality 
clauses into contracts prevents either of the parties from revealing certain types of information 
which can be, and for the purposes of the contractual terms as stipulated within an expressed 
contract, considered as confrdential.^^  ^ This creates a situation where neither the company nor 
the government officials can provide the auditors with any kind of information that falls within 
the restriction of the confidentiality clause. When examining the Nigerian reports, for example, it 
is evident that confidentiality agreements signed between host governments and extractive 
companies represent serious barriers for transparency. For example, external auditors are 
prevented from commenting on some of the transactions since their origin cannot be fully 
disclosed to them.^^^
It should be mentioned, that there is a substantial number of case law where a party has applied 
to court to seek its permission to rule for the disclosure of some of documents which were 
initially undisclosed due to confidentially clauses. The judgments show that courts are willing to 
rule for the disclosure, although the applicant must show that there is sufficient degree of public 
interest involved in the disclosure of the restricted documents. Undoubtedly, the exploration of 
possible corrupt activities would be considered as sufficient reason to satisfy the 
requirement. And thus it is expected that the courts will be willing to pass the judgement in
Confidentiality agreements are used to stop sensitive information becoming public knowledge. The agreement 
can last indefinitely, and if  an agreement has been made then there can be legal consequences for the party that 
discloses the protected information. For businesses and companies there are a number o f advantages to having a 
written clause o f  confidentiality. The agreement can set down clearly the terms and conditions o f what is considered 
protected information, and the type o f information that cannot be disclosed to the public. The confidentiality 
agreement can also be used if  a dispute occurs over disclosure and legal action is to be taken against the person who 
has made the information available to the public. ('Confidentiality Agreements Explained'.
<http://www.contractsandagreemcnts.co.uk/confidentialitv-aurecments.html>) For a sample o f a confidentiality 
clause please see <http://www.iDo.gov.uk/cda.Ddf > accessed 16 May 2013
For more detailed explanation of disclosure problems that external auditors faced during their evaluation in 
Nigeria, see Paul D. Ocheje "The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Voluntary codes o f Conduct, 
Poverty and Accountability in Africa'' 235 <http://www.isd-africa.com/Jsda/fall20Q6/PDF> accessed 13 October 
2011 .
See Te/rapm v 5'Mpp/y C (7/upes;) [1960] R.P.C. 128; Genera/ /o r  G n/W  K/ng(/o/n v
IFe///ng/on Vew.y;,aper.y ! /( / [1988] 1 NZLR 129; 7b/a/ EÆF ^ow(/an v Æ(//non(/.ÿ & G rf [2007] EWCA Civ 50.
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favour of disclosure. Nevertheless, it cannot be guaranteed that judiciary in all countries will be 
willing to pass such decisions. In a Ugandan disclosure case, for example, the magistrate 
involved was not convinced that the public interest in disclosing information regarding a 
production-sharing agreement was greater than the harm contemplated by the confidentiality 
clauses.^^  ^Despite this potential willingness of the legal system to assist the investigation, the 
confidentiality clauses, notwithstanding, still present an obstacle, the elimination of which is 
associated with considered financial and timing setbacks.
Moreover, a possible attainment of information that is protected through confidentiality clauses,
does not necessarily resolve the dilemma of concealment of, what can be seen as, unjustifiable 
payments made to the government officials. Well-drafted contracts can guarantee that certain 
types of information can still be considered as confidential, and not applicable for disclosure, 
without the use of a confidentiality clause. What happens then? How can it be ensured that the 
EITI-provided independent auditors have in their possession all the necessary contract related 
facts?
Perhaps this could be resolved by attempting to make it a requirement, so when a contract is 
being prepared involving a company, which is an EITI participant, or a government which has 
signed up to the initiative, or even both -  it must be made as a part of the initiative’s objective, 
that an impartial, EITI-delegated lawyer is present during formation of the contract, to oversee 
that the contract does not contain any clause, ambiguously written, which in due course may 
create difficulties specifically related to disclosure of contract-related material. This may be able 
to work, as a potential idea. An imposition of independent observers has been used in the past, 
such as in the case of the Chad-Cameroon Development Project, which was overseen by the 
World Bank delegation.^’’’’ It might be argued that in the latter case, the only reason why Chad’s 
government agreed to such an arrangement was because of the financial support that it had been 
given in return, thus having no chance of opting out of such arrangements as they were a 
necessary prerogative in Chad’s access to the World Bank’s loan. Nevertheless, the Chad- 
Cameroon experience shows that setbacks similar to those in the Nigerian EITI-managed audit 
struggles kept on appearing, as Chad’s government kept on repeatedly refusing to account for
'Uganda Ignores Law’ Ja Teline III ( 27 April 2010)
<http://www.castafricaprcss.net/index.php?optjon=com contcnt&vicw=artic]c&id=3 l8:uganda-ignorcs- 
law&catid=94:mcdia-law> accessed 16 May 2013).
<http://www.csso.com/Chad-English/PA/TD HomcPaüc.asp> accessed 1 December 2010.
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certain money allocations. In that case, considerable pressure on behalf of the World Bank, 
followed by persistent ignorance demonstrated by Chad government officials, the arrangement
had to be terminated.
At this point, it might be worth mentioning that governments of countries rich in natural
resources often decide to disregard their certain obligations, particularly if they believe them to 
be contrary to their interests.^”’ Such actions are rationalised by reason of the geopolitical power 
they tend to hold in the world, which is based on the demand for the natural resources.
This fact, therefore, supports the idea that a presence of impartial group of delegates can provide 
the required transparency to avoid any type of doubt concerning the openness of government 
authorities. More than once observers have speculated that a structure similar to that employed in 
Chad, but which is properly codified with agreements, can create properly controlled structures 
to track revenue flows. Such external management can better transfer the benefits of the 
natural resource extraction projects to the people rather than the rulers, even though such a code 
impinges on traditional notions of sovereignty.^”^
Similarly, in addition to the already mentioned obstacles that emerged in form of confidentiality 
clauses, the Nigerian government during the EITFs assembling of information made other 
governmental information also unattainable.^”'* In the case with the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, 
such ignorance and lack of cooperation on behalf of the government of Chad brought an end to 
the initiative. As fur as the EITI is concerned, such an outcome simply cannot be permitted, as it 
would undermine the entire purpose of the programme. The idea therefore is to appropriate a 
clear procedure in which implementation and practice of disclosure can be improved. 
Furthermore, as current reports from Nigeria illustrate, there is a lack of consensus among all 
concerned on the format, and variables required for assessment of taxes, royalties, and other
The South American Mega pipeline project is one o f the examples where Venezuela, a country rich in natural 
gas reserves, has been delaying an agreement with Petrobras (Brazil’s state-run oil giant) which would allow the 
latter to participate in the construction o f  the pipeline which would consist o f piping gas from deposits from the 
Atlantic Ocean off the coast o f Venezuela. Venezuela’s government opposition to allow the Brazilian multinational 
to get involved in country’s gas reserves demonstrates the power which countries rich in natural resources have in 
decision making regarding the distribution, allocation and handling o f their vast reserves. For more examples on 
how governments rich in natural resources manipulate MNCs over extraction can be seen in "Natural Gas and 
Geopolitics from 1970 to 2040” by D.G. Victor. A.M. Jaffe, M.H. Hayes (CUP 2006).
M. H. Hayes, A. M. Jafte, D. G. Victor, "Natural Gas and Geopolitics from 1970 to 2040” (Cambridge 
University Press 2006).
is the exclusive right to exercise, within a specific territory, the functions of a Nation-state and be 
answerable to no higher authority. By allowing an external coordinator to oversee and manage the extraction of 
natural resources within a State, the host State thus diminishing its power over extraction o f its natural resources.
Paul D Ocheje (n 287) 230.
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charges payable by oil companies to governments/”^  It is not simply the issue of transparency -  
meaning the availability to the public and other relevant bodies the information related to 
government contracts and other profits and expenditure made from the use of natural resources. 
Such examples underline one of the main arguments as to the weaknesses of the EITI: precisely, 
the voluntary nature of the initiative. On the one hand, its voluntary character may be an essential 
element that appeals to governments and companies, and thus influences their decision to join. It 
enables them to, on the one hand, receive credit for their apparent interest and support for 
fighting corruption, while on the other hand, allowing selective disclosure and publication of 
information.
It tends to be difficult to persuade countries to comply with all the regulations entailed through 
membership requirements. In such cases the EITEs voluntary nature permits some of the 
powerful nations on the extractive industries arena, such as Russia, to circumvent their 
participation. On the contrary, some evidence suggests that by making the initiative voluntary 
could be seen as an encouragement for active participation rather than an easy way to avoid it. 
Catherine Pedamon in one of her articles examines the subject of voluntary initiatives rather 
well. She explains that from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, legal attempts to regulate corporate 
activities domestically and internationally were opposed by corporations and northern 
governments. As a result, it was suggested that companies and other related stakeholders were 
self-regulated through voluntary initiatives. In response, various initiatives were launched. 
However, the image that emerges from the plethora of standards and codes of conduct that has 
emerged since is rather confusing.
Corporations and governments have defined ad hoc codes that often ignore crucial issues and 
stakeholder concerns. Too often these codes are not really integrated into the everyday running
of the business. A considerable gap is noticed between the rhetoric and actual practice, a factor 
which draws criticism from activists.^”” Pedamon makes reference to a report published in 2004 
by a UK NGO Christian Aid, which denounces the inadequacy of voluntary codes. The report 
states that, those who have championed voluntary initiatives fail to adhere to principles embraced
Ariyo Ademola and Ososanya Zacc, "Observations on updated NEITI interim audit report on Nigeria’s oil and 
gas industry” <http://www.neiti.oru.nü/filcs-pdf7obscrvations-auditrcnorts.ndf. Last visited at 12:47 > 
accessed 22 April 2009.
Catherine Pedamon, 'Corporate social responsibility: a new approach to promoting integrity and responsibility’ 
(2010)31(6) Company Lawyer 172.
Christian Aid, t/ze TTze rea/yâce o f  Co/pora/e 5'ocza/ 7?es/zo/z.yz6z/z(y (Christian Aid, 2004).
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by the codes. Moreover, those who have shown evidence of following the rules as laid down by
the codes, demonstrate that this has been done partially and selectively. On the other hand, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the EITI address changing business policy and practice 
through constructive agreement, thus avoiding confrontation. Accordingly, such initiatives 
encourage a “social dialogue” between different stakeholders, such as companies, NGOs and 
communities within which they operate, and who normally would be expected to be in 
opposition to each other.
2.10 Conclusion
This chapter provided an in-depth introductory study into the nature of corruption. It looked into 
what is currently considered as possible of causes of corruption and looked into which acts can 
be considered as corrupt. Thus, various definitions as appear in various legal instruments that 
cover the area of corruption as well definitions provided by international organisations, such as 
TI have been analysed. Consequently, it has been deduced that corruption surrounds the abuse of 
one position for personal gain. Following from this wide definition, different types of corruption 
have been identified, such as bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation and so on. Finally, it has 
been stated the corruption is currently being fought through various methods. In light of this it 
can be seen how different legislative approaches, both at national and international levels attempt 
to deter corrupt practices by imposing different types of punishment. However, punishment 
cannot always act as a sufficient method of deterrence, particularly in countries with weak 
judicial system and lack of enforcement mechanism. Thus in addition to legislative challenges of 
criminalising corruption, various voluntary schemes, both for governments and businesses also 
exist. This notion is supported by various voluntary initiatives, which are based on the notion 
that openness can also deter corrupt practices. This is what the principle of transparency is based 
on. The discussion in this part of the thesis provided a brief overview of the EITI, a voluntary 
initiative that uses transparency of revenues as a main tool for tackling corruption in the 
extractive industries sector. Before moving into an in-depth study of this particular initiative, it is 
now important to study the natural resource sector in order to see how corruption is related to 
this particular area. This will be done in the next chapter.
Voluntary codes o f practice are examined in more detail in Chapter 4 o f this thesis.
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Chapter 3 
The Extractive Industries Sector
3.1 Introduction
Section 2.7 in the previous chapter identified how the scarce nature of the extractive 
industries sector makes it vulnerable to corruption. Since the aim of this thesis is the study of 
corruption in the extractive industries sector, this chapter examines the operation of this 
particular sector so that the circumstances in which corruption could occur can be identified. 
This chapter looks at the nature of the extractive industries, with particular attention given to 
the operation of the oil sector. This involves an examination of types of oil extraction, 
involvement of foreign investors, and various types of contracts based on which foreign 
investors operate in a host country. While discussing these issues, examples are drawn from 
Azerbaijan’s oil extraction contracts. Finally, the chapter identifies areas in the oil extraction 
process that are susceptible to corrupt activities.
3.2 The extractive industries sector
A number of developing countries are rich in natural resources, such as oil, copper and gold. 
These countries attract international and national extractive companies but also their 
governments, which have their own investment agendas that view developing countries as a 
major potential source of energy to supply their own ever-increasing and demanding 
domestic markets. ’ Although extractive industries cover a wide range of resources, this thesis 
concentrates on the oil industry.
According to BP’s latest survey of the world’s proven oil reserves,^ a large percentage is 
located in the developing countries of the Middle East (752.5), South and Central America 
(239.4), and Africa (132.1). Europe and Eurasia have a total share of 139.7, where countries
such as Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have
'Leon Moller, The Governance o f  Oil and Gas Operations in Hostile but Attractive Regions: West Africa’
(2010) 4 International Energy Law Review 110
 ^ "Proven oil reserves ” generally refers to the quantities o f  oil that geographical and engineering information 
indicates with reasonable certainty could be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing
economic and geological conditions. BP Statistical Review o f the W orld Energy , June 2011 
<httn://www.bn.com/assets/bD intemct/ulobalbn/ulobalbn uk emzlish/renoi-ts and nublications/statistical ener 
ÜV review 2011/STAGlNG/local assets/ndf/statistical review o f world energy full report 2011.pdf>
accessed 14 May 2013.
82
the jargest share/Moreover, a notable trend exists of international oil companies leaving
established, mature regions and competing for the under-explored and rich in oil resources 
most commonly found in developing or under developed countries/
Overall, the attraction for the world’s oil resources depends on several factors. These include 
the availability of vast reserves that could be exploited cheaply, the relations between the 
producing and consuming countries, between traditional international oil companies and the 
state-owned national oil companies. A large number of importing consuming countries strive 
to achieve energy security through direct imports from producing developing countries. As a 
result, in recent years, the level of competition for oil resources in the producing countries 
has intensified at an alarming rate and developed into a strategic matter. This, in turn, leads to 
key structural changes in government policies of the producing states. Such changes are 
particularly noticeable in times of sustained upward trends in petroleum prices whereby the 
governments of petroleum producing countries inevitably seek fundamental revisions of the 
terms in the agreements under which investors carry out their original investment in the oil 
sector.^ Examples of such revisions vary from the renegotiation of oil contracts, direct threats 
to stop oil production, commitments from companies to train and employ local citizens, and 
the transfer of businesses to local partners.” Furthermore, the attraction to oil and gas 
resources is increasingly influenced by the emergence of new players in the global market. 
National oil companies as agents of their governments have adopted a more proactive role in 
the industry, both at home and abroad. Some of the wealthiest national oil companies are 
based in developing and transition economies and include companies from Saudi Arabia, 
Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Brazil and Malaysia/ This means that international oil 
companies that once dominated the entire oil industry are now competing with more parties 
for favourable positions with host governments in developing countries.^
 ^BP Statistical Review o f  the W orld Energy, June 2011
<httn://www.bp.com/assets/bp intemet/slobalbD/dobalbD uk english/reports and publications/statistical ener 
GV review 2011/STAGING/local assets/pdFstatistical review o f  world cnerev full report 201 l.nd f> 
accessed 14 M ay 2013 
^Leon Moller (n 1)
 ^ Ibid.
 ^Ibid.
H b id  112.
* Ibid.
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The affirmation of rights in oil and gas is based on the concept of “sovereignty”, which plays
an important role in the law and derives from the internationally recognised principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The purpose of this principle is to recognise 
and respect the right of every state to freely dispose of its natural resources in accordance 
with national interests, and respect for the economic independence of States.” This, as a 
result, means that companies also need to deal and get consent of all those key organs of the 
State responsible for the regulation of the oil and gas sector. Hence, in most cases the 
government minister responsible for oil and gas is empowered by the law to issue the licence 
award to the company after a process of negotiations that would allow the company the right 
to participate in the exploration and production of oil and gas, and in many cases the 
requirement is that this is done with the local national oil company as a local partner.’” Since 
the natural resource sector has a very lucrative nature, certain public officials, using their 
power behave as if the reserves belong to them and not to the country.
These examples show that although the oil and gas business is very attractive in terms of 
profits, the projects are inherently risky and are affected by the political situation in the 
country. Moreover, the returns on the capital investment in these projects could be highly 
unpredictable, as some countries use natural resources as political leverage. Other important 
factors that also affect oil exploration and contribute to uncertainty include ineffective legal 
and regulatory frameworks and inadequate public service; social concerns and weak 
macroeconomic environments.
Likewise, natural resources and their exploration lead to conflicts, where various local groups 
or outsiders strive to take control and possession of the resource-rich piece of land. A branch 
of conflict analysis explores the link between natural resources and armed conflict -  that is 
the influence of natural resources on the onset of conflicts. Since 1990s, several analytic 
approaches have identified various causes of resource-based conflicts. The causes tend to 
revolve around the scarce nature of resources, economic factors and greedy motivations of 
individuals, as well as political factors and institutional weaknesses. ’ ’
 ^Ibid. 
Ibid
11Charles-Philippe David & Jean-Francois Gagne, ‘Natural Resources: A Source o f Conflict?’ (2006-2007) 62 
International Journal 5
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3.3 The oil sector in Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan, the traditional birthplace of the Russian oil industry, has been the focus of effort 
on the part of some international oil companies to secure exploration and development rights
to its deposits of oil. Similar to other transitional economies of the former Soviet Union, 
Azerbaijan has been affected by an ineffective economy and socio-political difficulties, 
connected with the protracted conflict with Armenia.'^ Nevertheless the country has made 
progress on its foreign investment front, mainly in the production of oil and gas.’^  Following 
Azerbaijan’s declaration of independence, the Government embarked on restructuring the 
framework of its energy industry. Today, the heart of the energy industry comprises of the 
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), which was formed in 1992 and enjoys an 
unprecedented degree of autonomy in light of the importance of the petroleum sector in the 
economy. It should be mentioned that SOCAR is truly a vertically integrated company as 
all previous existing production associations, supply and service companies, refineries and 
crude oil pipeline companies have been amalgamated under one roof. To this end, SOCAR 
retains absolute ownership of all petroleum occurring within the territory of Azerbaijan, and 
has sole licensing rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the resources.’” The 
influential growth of Azerbaijan’s oil industry has been supported heavily by foreign 
investors.’”
3.4 Oil production: process overview
It would be wrong to talk about the nature of oil industry without talking about the nature of 
oil or petroleum. Petroleum is considered one of the most important resources in the world 
because people have used it for various reasons for more than two thousand years. Petroleum 
products became widely traded commodities across the world in the late 1800s, when
The Soviet Union created the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan in 1924, when over 
94 percent o f the region's population was Armenian. (The term Nagorno-Karabakh originates from the Russian 
for "mountainous Karabakh.") As the Azerbaijani population grew, the Karabakh Armenians chafed under 
discriminatory rule, and by I960 hostilities had begun between the two populations o f  the region. By the end o f 
1993, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh had caused thousands o f  casualties and created hundreds o f 
thousands o f  refugees on both sides.
Andrew Seek, Safa Mirzoev, Vagif Nasibov and Fatima Mamedova, 'Azerbaijan: Rediscovering its Oil 
Potential? A Legal Perspective’(l995) 13(3) Journal o f  Energy and Natural Resources Law 147 
'hbid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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kerosene emerged as a major source of lighting fuel. Then, with the invention of the 
automobile, petroleum saw a second major boost in popularity. ’ ^
The process of production is the same, regardless of the company or country that explores it, 
and is divided into four major stages: production (including exploration and extraction), 
refining, transporting and marketing. Two terms are generally used to differentiate the stages 
of petroleum production. The first stage is called upstream and covers the stage of 
exploration, drilling, and production of petroleum. The second stage is called downstream 
and refers to transport, refining, and other petrochemical processes that get the oil to the 
consumer.’^
When discussing the size and value of their crude oil fields, countries and companies refer to 
reserves. The term means that the field, which can consist of several wells, is estimated to 
have a certain amount of barrels of crude oil.
Crude oil is extracted from two locations: onshore and offshore. Most oil is extracted from 
onshore fields, while an increasing amount of oil is now being produced from offshore 
sites. Offshore drilling refers to extraction of oil from any depth in the ocean. Before, 
companies were able to drill only at a depth of a few hundred feet. Today, technology allows 
drilling to take place in depths of few thousand feet and at distances hundreds of miles from 
the coast. It is noted that most of the oil producing countries which are not landlocked, 
started their production onshore, near the coast and with the time have shifted to offshore 
drilling.^”
Once oil is extracted from the ground, it is moved, via a pipeline, from the well to a 
production tank. This is where oil from several wells is put together and measured, tested and
'^Toyin Falola& Ann Genova, The Politics o f  the Global Oil Industry; an Introduction  (Praeger Publishers
2005)
In regard to the upstream, the term crude oil is used frequently. Crude oil is the substance that oil workers 
pump up from under the ground. It is o f  little practical use in its natural state because it may contain impurities 
such as sulphur, oxygen, and metals, which must be removed before the final product can be delivered to the 
consumer. In any event, in m ost instances, regardless o f  which type o f  oil is being referred to, names petroleum 
and oil are being used. In addition, it should be noted that when crude oil is extracted from the ground, it is said 
to have come from an oil fie ld , which is the geographical area under which an oil reservoir lies.
Toyin Falola& Ann Genova (n 17)
Ibid.
M artin S. Raymond & W illiam L. Leffler, Oil and Gas Production in Nontechnical Language (PennWell 
Books 2005)
Ibid.
Toyin Falola& Ann Genova (n 17)
86
separated before being sent to a refinery. It is after the oil has been tested in the production 
tank that a report is sent to the producer, royalty owners and the purchaser, informing them of 
the quality and the quantity of the oil produced. '^*
Once oil has been tested at the production tank, it can then be transported to three places. 
Firstly, the oil can be sent through a pipeline to a port for overseas shipping. Petroleum is 
shipped in a special type of ship called a tanker. Large tankers are used to carry oil across 
oceans and seas, while small tankers are used to carry oil along coastal areas or rivers.
flat-decked vessels, are also used to transport oil and other petrochemical products, 
which they shuttle back and forth through a network of rivers, lakes and chaimels, with the 
help of a tugboat and water current, since barges lack the power to move on their own. It 
should be noted that while tankers are the most efficient way of transporting oil, they tend to 
cause major environmental damage when sinking and spilling large amounts of crude oil.^” 
Additionally, the crude oil can be taken to a storage tank. The storage tank is one of several 
places where crude oil is held when demand is lower than production. ^ ^This practice allows 
regulation of a country’s crude oil industry to prevent too much oil from hitting the 
international market at one time and depressing oil prices. Alternatively, some oil producing 
countries take the excess oil, and instead of placing it into storage tanks, inject it back into the 
ground. This way not does it only utilise a great storage space for surplus crude oil, but the 
pressure the created pressure can be used to pump out even more crude oil.^^
If crude oil is not stored or transported straight away through a pipeline, it is sent to a 
refinery. Refinery facility process involves transforming crude oil into usable products such 
as gasoline, kerosene and aviation process. Some more developed refineries contain 
petrochemical complexes in addition to simple fuel oil complexes.^” Refineries vary in their 
capacity, which is measured in the amount of oil that flows through it per day.”” In 
Azerbaijan, some of the oil produced from its wells is refined at its two oil refineries which
Martin S. Raymond & William L. Leffler (n 21)
Ibid.
For example, in November 2002, the independently owned tanker Prestige split in half, spilling oil o ff the 
eoast o f Spain. Since its sinking, thousands o f  barrels o f  oil have continued to wash up on shore.
Jan -  Henrik Johnsen, Oil and Gas, from  Reservoir to Refinery (Forlaget Vett&Viten 2010)
Ibid.
Ibid.
The smallest refinery that is economically feasible has a capacity o f  4,000 to 10.000 barrels o f oil per day. 
Large refineries include those with a capacity from about 100.000 barrels per day up into the several hundred 
thousand.
87
are part of the state oil company.”'
It is not only the oil producing countries that own refineries. Some of the non-oil producing 
countries also own refineries, where the crude oil which arrived via a pipeline or a tanker is 
subsequently refined. Through an oil refinery, a non-producing country can have an 
opportunity to engage in the world’s oil industry. Moreover, in the long term, it is more 
advantageous in terms of economic benefits, for a non-producing country to refine crude oil 
itself, rather than import already refined petroleum products.”^  Additionally, for a country 
with a weak currency, be it producing or non-producing country, owning a refinery means 
that amount of strong currency such as US dollars or EUROs in which oil and oil products 
are traded, leaving the country is reduced. This is because finished petroleum products cost 
more than raw crude oil.”” Also, having a local refinery allows a degree of control over what 
crude oil the country imports, how much of this crude oil is processed and who distributes the 
refined products and where. ”"* Lastly, for non-producing as well as producing countries, 
building and operating a refinery represent a positive national development project, as it 
represents a big step toward economic growth and modernisation.””
Depending on the size of the pipeline, the oil can be transported not only as far as a port, but 
overseas. An example of an international pipeline is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
that takes oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean instead of using tanker transport 
along the Black Sea and the highly congested Bospoms.”” Such oil transferring pipelines run 
both below as well as above ground. In places with severe weather conditions, pipelines tend 
to run above ground, with sometimes several pipelines running next to each other. ”^ The 
downslide to this is that in unstable countries such pipeline arrangement leaves oil companies 
vulnerable to sabotage or siphoning.”^  As for offshore production, the pipelines are often laid
^'Sabit Bagirov, 'Azerbaijan's Oil Revenues: Ways o f  Reducing the Risk o f  Ineffective Use' (January 2007) 
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in a seafloor trench so that pipes are not affected by various marine activities.””
The oil reserves around the world are vast; however the still undiscovered reserves will be 
found in isolated areas, and hostile environments that present serious technical challenges.'*” 
Moreover, some of these potential sources of carbohydrates are in isolated areas, 
environmentally fragile regions, and in countries with political instability. Therefore, even 
though there are still ample opportunities in the oil sector production, their development 
requires large capital expenditures. It should be mentioned that it is a fundamental view that 
worldwide investment in the oil sector is below the levels needed to effectively meet the 
increase in actual and expected demand.
In the oil sector, most of the investment must concentrate on exploration and development of 
conventional oil. Moreover, increase in investment is needed not only to expand existing 
capacity but also to replace existing and future supply facilities that will become obsolete.'*” 
One of the main reasons for this is the fact that decision making and planning in the 
extractive activities of the oil industry are difficult, because it is driven by economic rent 
generation and capture where geology rules are supreme.'*"* Also, the oil industry is driven by 
delays between planning and actual production caused by legal and fiscal regimes, as well as 
by the capital intensity of its assets and price risk management. Such factors and the 
interactions between them generate a very complex situation, which as a result often produces 
not very optimal investment decisions from a global perspective.^”
The underinvestment in upstream oil is determined to a large extent by developments in the 
oil markets during the 1980s and mid-1990s. At the time, OPEC producers had a large 
surplus of oil, which in conjunction with new oil discoveries in non-OPEC countries, resulted 
in the reduction of investment in upstream oil production. Moreover, the reduction in 
production at the time can also be associated with fall in prices for oil, afact that threw the 
industry into a deep recession and reduced the attractiveness of both existing and new
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investment plans/” As a result both national and international oil companies reduced 
considerably their investment in upstream oil exploration and production throughout the 
1990s. Meanwhile, demand for oil was unprecedentedly increasing, and with supply figures 
decreasing, made a substantial contribution to the current predicament of underinvestment. 
Thus, the current lower capacity in oil production, as well as the bottlenecks in refining and 
pipeline systems, in a way are results of the past history of low oil prices and long periods of 
oil demand pessimism, which created an environment that is not encouraging to investment in 
upstream and downstream oil."*^
Overall, prices of crude oil play an important role in upstream investment decisions.
Moreover, the high volatility of oil prices tends to blur the distinction between short-term 
transitory and permanent movements. As a result, under uncertainty the large investment 
outlays in oil projects and the irreversible nature of these investments have the effect of 
increasing the value of the option to wait."*^  It is therefore the case that companies tend to 
delay their investment until more information about market conditions is known, particularly 
information related to global oil demand and supply from other countries and com p an ies.It 
can be deduced from here that for the oil industry the option to wait is very valuable and is 
customarily exploited by investors. This may be rational, rather than to invest in the face of 
falling demand and prices. Thus, it is more profitable for oil investors, both national and 
private companies, to opt for underproduction for a certain period of time.
Moreover, although oil prices have become more transparent over the years, information 
regarding crude oil supply and production remains uncertain, both in quality and timing of 
publication.”” This uncertainty is now felt by the oil industry more than ever, with the 
increasing importance for consumption statistics from some growing economies with large 
oil consumption such as China and India. As for the production figures, a degree of 
uncertainty is also present, particularly now that the market is being entered by more and 
more new players, represented by smaller oil producers. As can be seen, a rather large degree 
of uncertainty is identified with the crude oil industry. Hence, it creates a volatility of the oil 
market and therefore instability in terms of investment decisions. As some research shows, an
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increase in oil price volatility induces a decline in investment in exploration and production/' 
For investment purposes, there are two sets of oil prices: one is a spot price, for oil delivered 
immediately, and the other is a futures price, for oil delivered at a certain time in the future/^
The two sets of prices create different market conditions, which influence investment spirit 
accordingly. So, when the spot price for oil is less than the future price, it creates a coMrawgo
market. During the contango market, the investors are more likely to invest in oil production. 
On the other hand, during a backwardation market, the investors are reluctant to spend 
money on further production and exploration, since the future price for oil is forecast to fall.^^ 
Apart from price volatility and the supply and demand figures for crude oil, geopolitical 
reasons also act as an important factor in investment decisions. Unfavourable geopolitical 
factors prevent capacity expansion in many oil-producing countries by creating an adverse 
investment climate. Historical experience on oil supply disruption due to armed conflict 
shows that oil infrastructure is more resilient to armed conflicts than expected. Nevertheless, 
although conflicts inflict limited damages to the infrastructure, they do adversely affect future 
investment.^"' For example, according to Robert Mabro, “economic and political sanctions in 
Libya and Iran had hindered investment and deferred the development of these countries’ 
resources”, while “in the gulf area, military intervention has negatively affected the 
investment climate”.
The extent of investment in upstream production is reflected on the investment in 
downstream production of oil. When investment in exploration and production of crude oil is 
low, so is the investment into pipelines and refineries. Investment in refineries is driven by 
demand in products. Many investors do not want to risk by investing in refineries the use of 
which will not be necessary after a short while.
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3.5 Investment in the oil sector
One highly specific feature of the natural resources sector is that exploration and 
development of the resources must take place where the resources are located/^ Ventures in
this sector are of a high risk nature in the physical and commercial sense, as it is difficult to 
predict in advance the existence, extent and quality of the reserves.
The most common combination of parties involved in the resource extraction is a host 
government which represents a developing country with the resource and a multinational 
company from a developed country. It is often the case that the interests of the two sides 
clash. In this respect, one of the main aims of the foreign company is profit maximisation, 
while the government of the host country is interested in maximising its revenues.^'' 
Considerable time may elapse between the initial investment in the resource extraction and 
the realisation of profits. Thus, this type of investment is usually a long-term one. As a result, 
it may be that the bargaining powers of the two parties change throughout the stages of the 
project.^' Thus it is very important that the likely sources of potential future conflicts are 
identified in advance, so that the relevant contract is written accordingly and as 
comprehensively as possible.
It goes without saying that contract terms usually vary. It is being pointed that first-movers 
have an advantage, given that early investors can secure more favourable terms than the 
latecomer since the government has the desire to encourage exploration by offering various 
incentives. Besides, a lack of knowledge on behalf of the government can also contribute to 
attractive deals for foreign companies. In the oil sector, four main types of contracts are 
concessions, joint ventures, production-sharing agreements and service contracts. Each form 
of contract can be used to accomplish the same purpose. The difference between the types of 
contracts are of a conceptual nature, mainly with regard to levels of control granted to the
^^Kirsten Bindemann,’ Production -  Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis'! 1999) Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies
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foreign oil company, remuneration arrangements, and degree of involvement of the national
-1 63Oil company.
Foreign investment in the natural resources sector became necessary to ensure that the raw
materials were available in abundance, when Western states required larger quantity of raw 
materials for production purposes. Liberalisation, which began in the USSR in the 1980s, 
created certain opportunities for foreign investment. Given the opportunity, the increase in 
the number of invitations to foreign investors and the richness of the Soviet Union’s natural 
resources could not but attract the attention of transnational companies.^ Azerbaijan was one 
of the resource-rich countries that the representatives of the foreign oil companies visited. 
The interest in Azerbaijan was above all caused by the Chiraq and Azeri deposits that were 
discovered in 1985-87.^^ Since a major part of these deposits are located in the depths of 
Caspian Sea, a great amount of investment, new technologies and equipment were required 
for its exploitation. Since that time, many agreements were signed between the Government 
of Azerbaijan and the foreign companies. Currently Azerbaijan has 26 oil contracts.A fter 
being signed, contracts are ratified by the parliament. After being ratified, the contracts have 
to be made available to the citizens of the country. However, while conducting this research, 
it became apparent that most of the contracts for some reason are not available.
3.5.1 Concession agreements
The early oil companies used concession agreements also known as licenses, in order to 
secure production in large areas of land for considerable periods of time.^  ^ However, 
concession agreements by their nature imposed a high number of limitations upon the State 
with respect to the degree of control over its resources. This is because concession 
agreements often affected transfers of sovereign powers over vast tracts of land to foreign 
corporations for long periods of time, in return for the payment of royalties calculated on the 
quantity o f oil produced at a fixed rate.^  ^ The financial bargain stuck between the host 
government and the foreign company was very uneven. Companies paid small sums to the
63Ibid.
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host government for the rights over its natural resources, and the remuneration to the 
government was determined by the volume produced, but did not reflect the value of the 
resource/^ As the prices for oil kept on rising, this type of production contract became 
unpopular with the states, as they kept on receiving a fixed rate payment, while the
companies’ profits were increasing based on the oil market price/''
Such agreements were found to be unfair from the perspective of democratic notions of 
sovereignty. Such contracts are usually entered by rulers, who tend to disregards any 
implication that such contracts may have or they do not care, since being absolute rulers, they 
can utilise the royalties they receive for their own benefit.^' Nevertheless, this type of 
contract has evolved considerably since and is not as one-sided as it used to be. The 
commercial risk is still there, however, since at the time of the conclusion of the contract, 
there is a lack of adequate knowledge about the potential of a concession area because 
seismic exploration has not been fully undertaken. This results into an auction type bidding 
system, where a company is cautious in the amount it is prepared to bid since there is no 
guarantee the concession will cover the company’s costs and return of profit.Moreover, the 
scope of the concessions was broad, especially with reference to concession duration and 
geography. The broad remit means that the interests of companies in exploiting resources 
were not always matching those of the host government.^"' However, because the company 
had the concession granted to it for a long time, the government could not seek another, more 
interested company and grant a new concession, since the exploitation was contractually tied 
up.
On the other hand, some governments opt for this type of contract, since all financial risks of
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development, including the costs of exploration, are absorbed by the successful bidder. Thus 
there are few serious financial or other drawbacks for the host government, other than the loss 
of opportunity or the loss of time, in case the bidding system does not attract an acceptable,
financially strong, and technically competent bidder/^
Although the traditional concessionary contract is now a relic, concessions nevertheless still 
survive and flourish, through so called “licenses” or “leases”/^ Fundamentally, what 
distinguishes these two generations of concessions is the shift from an unequal bargaining 
power to a partnership-based one/^ The aspects of the old concession agreements did not 
survive decolonisation and as many newly created states, many of which were rich in natural 
resource came into existence, new types of contracts were renegotiated. Thus, the new 
generation of concession contracts aims to fulfil national development and welfare goals as 
well as purely financial ones.^^ As with the old type of concessions, today’s contracts grant 
companies the right to explore, produce and market the resources. However, the leeway 
afforded to the companies is relatively limited. Most transformations from the traditional to 
the modem types of the concessions took place due to government-initiated renegotiations.^^ 
Since the initial criticisms of the old concession agreements were related to features such as a 
large degree of foreign control, geographical scope, duration of the concession as well as 
financial compensation, it is understandable that the newly renegotiated contracts addressed 
these issues. Accordingly, the new type of the concession contracts allows governments to
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limit the acreage of the concession and the duration of the contract. Furthermore, host 
governments are now keen to ensure that companies do not leave areas unexplored for long 
periods. Thus time limits are incorporated into current concessions, which stipulate dates on
which company must commence exploration of a certain area.^" Moreover, host states now 
have a say in when a company must hand control of unexplored land back to the government. 
Overall, extraction contracts today are premised on transnational public-private partnerships. 
Together, a transnational group of governments and companies generally share control over 
the financing, exploration, production and marketing of natural resources in varying 
degrees.^'None of the Azerbaijani current oil contracts is a concession contract.
3.5.2 Joint ventures
As mentioned above, there is a shift in the type of oil exploration contracts with greater
power sharing between the host state and the foreign extractive companies. For instance, an 
alternative to concession agreements for oil exploration and production is through joint 
ventures. There is no common definition of what constitutes joint ventures, however, a joint 
venture implies that “two or more parties wish to pursue a joint undertaking in some still to 
be clarified fbrm”.^  ^ Given the open-ended nature of this type of structure, joint ventures are 
not very commonly used, since both parties have varied goals, interests and ways of doing 
business, and they find it difficult to agree on mutually acceptable terms. As a result, joint 
ventures require difficult negotiations over an extended period of time to ensure that all 
matters are thoroughly addressed and that the parties agree on how to work with each other. 
Joint ventures usually involve a state oil company on behalf of the host government and an 
international oil company. The advantage for the state company from being in a joint venture 
is that it is not alone in the decision-making and responsibility for a project. It can thus rely 
on the expertise of a m^or international oil com pany.In  joint ventures, the profits are
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shared. In addition, the government receives other remuneration in form of taxes or royalties. 
In joint ventures, the foreign company and the government both participate actively in the 
operation of the oilfield and have ownership of a specified part of production. Thus, in 
addition to receiving royalties, taxes, and profit oil, the government is also entitled to a share 
of profits. However, this type of venture also means that the government is also partially 
responsible for the development and operating costs. Joint ventures enable a more effective 
transfer of management and technology to the local joint-venture partner. Joint ventures 
ensure that the state has direct or indirect control over the venture. Furthermore, as has been 
mentioned above, the bargaining powers of the two sides lend to shift as the exploration 
progresses, and although the contracts at that stage may not be alterable, if it has become 
apparent that the contracted area is highly productive, the government will try intervening 
indirectly. Such interventions take various forms, such as the establishment of an artificial 
exchange rate, posted prices for valuing exports, as well as altering laws with regards to tax 
and accounting practices. This is the case where entering into joint ventures with local state 
oil company is an advantage, since in such cases the foreign company, party to the joint 
venture can be assured that the government will not try to impose new legislation or 
regulation that will damage the revenues of the joint venture.
Although joint ventures often involve a local state oil company, they can also be entered into 
with a local private company. It is believed that in such cases a joint venture also ensures the 
emergence of local entrepreneurial class, which profits by its association with foreign 
investors through the acquisition of managerial and business insight. The latter approach 
creates criticism in terms that it gives rise to an elite group of local businessmen and who in 
turn form associations with foreign capital and enables governments that are favourable to 
their business interests to remain in power. Moreover, it is sometimes also alleged that such 
association between foreign capital and the local elite leads to repression, corruption and 
human rights abuses. Although measures to deal with such issues may exist in principle, the 
willingness of the administrative authorities to pursue them may depend on the bargaining
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strengths of the state and the foreign party/' Nevertheless, joint ventures exist and
Azerbaijan’s SOCAR has quite a few of them, although most of the joint ventures do not 
involve production and exploration of the reserves, but deal mainly with construction and 
maintenance/^ Currently, because SOCAR has an interest in expanding its influence, the 
company has joint ventures outside Azerbaijan and aims at companies who supply and refine 
Azeri oil. For example, SOCAR has a joint venture with Turcas, and has now started 
construction of a new oil refinery in Turkey.
Joint ventures take either equitable or a contractual form. In the first case a joint stock 
company is established and each partner owns a specified percentage of the equity. Ihe 
contractual form, on the other hand, is governed by a joint operating agreement where each 
partner owns a share of the production.^ "*
3.5.3 Production-sharing agreements
As stated earlier, concession agreements are rarely used nowadays for oil exploration. If the 
involved parties do not agree on creating a jointly operated venture, a production-sharing
agreement is used. The production-sharing agreement (PSA) is based on the concept that the 
ownership of the natural resources is always in the state, and that the state alone has the right 
to its disposal. The principle of the PSA operates on terms which allow the foreign 
company, which extracts the oil, to have a certain percentage of the extracted amount as 
stipulated in the PSA, this way allowing the company to recover the expenses of the 
exploration and secure a reasonable profit. Under a PSA, an oil company carries most of the
Ibid.91
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financial risks of exploration and development/^
Whereas under concessions all crude oil produced belongs to the foreign company, under the 
PSAs the oil produced belongs to the host government, and the share of production is 
allocated to the foreign company and can be regarded as payment or compensation for the 
risk taken and services rendered/^
PSAs have become increasingly popular in the countries of the former Soviet Union and 
particularly in the Caspian region. Azerbaijan for example, currently has several PSAs, some 
for offshore exploration and others covering onshore exploration.^  ^ It should be mentioned 
that joint ventures for exploration and production of oil were not very popular in Azerbaijan 
immediately after its independence in 1990s. Azerbaijan was very weak and its economy in 
crisis, thus due to SOCAR’s lack of modem inffastmctures and considerable need for foreign 
funding to exploit its hydrocarbon resources, the government preferred to opt for PSAs.'"" As 
a young state with a lack of capital, Azerbaijan’s low credit rating meant that it was unable to 
get long-term loans from foreign credit institutions to fund its oil and gas projects. It is in the 
recent years that the country seems to have started using joint ventures for production. '"' 
According to information available on SOCAR’s website, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company is 
currently participating in fifteen PSAs, six of which are for offshore production and nine for 
onshore oil production. '"^
PSAs have different styles, and vary in levels of complexity. Nevertheless, most of them have 
in common the basic information such as the names of the parties to the contract, cost 
recovery scheme, and share of profits of each party .Usual ly  there are two parties to the 
contract, a foreign oil company and a government representative which can be a head of state.
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<http://ncw.soear.az/socar/cn/comDanv/production-sharin2-a2reements-oftshore/absheron> accessed 20 April 
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for Energy Economics, 2011)
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a minister or a national oil company. It is often the case that the national oil company 
represents the second party, as is the case in Azerbaijan’s PSAs where SOCAR, rather than 
the head of the State, is a party to the PSAs. In some PSAs, Azerbaijan is represented through 
SOCAR’s subsidiary, Azerbaijan (ACG) Limited. On the other side of the foreign contractor,
it is very often that contracts are concluded by joint ventures of foreign companies or 
consortia, rather than an individual foreign company.
Most of the PSAs in Azerbaijan have more than one foreign company as a party to the PSA. 
For example, one of the largest deep water projects in Azerbaijan, the Azeri, Chirag Fields 
and the Deep Water of the Gunashli Field, has nine parties participating in the production.'"^ 
It should be noted here that the number of foreign oil companies involved has no impact on 
the structure of the contract. As far as the PSA is concerned, the members of the consortium 
or a joint venture are treated as one partner.'"" It is the foreign company that operates the 
oilfield, although there are PSAs that stipulate an option that allows the national oil company 
to participate directly in the development process. '"^
Azerbaijan's contracts on deposits in the Caspian Sea cover areas that any commercial
contract normally would such as the subject of the contract, the names of the parties to the 
contract, as well as terms that are specifically related to the extraction of oil such as the 
period of exploration, the additional period of exploration and the period of development and 
extraction.'"  ^ Generally, the period of exploration is about three years and starts upon the 
contract coming into effect. As a rule, in contracts for the exploration of the offshore deposits 
in Azerbaijan, the period of development and extraction is 25 years. However, out of all the 
contracts, three contracts have considerably different exploration periods. Specifically, the 
Azeri,Chirag-GunashIi and Shah Daniz deposits exploration contracts have exploration 
periods of 30 years. '"" Perhaps these longer time specifications stipulated as an initial 
timeframe is due to the fact that the concerned deposit fields are the largest in the country and
^Kirsten Bindemann (n 58)
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are considered as the biggest projects in terms of the expected reserves. In fact, one of the 
mentioned projects, the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields, is often referred to as the contract of 
the century, where an international consortium is expecting to extract an estimated five 5 
billion barrels of oil. It should be mentioned that there is a possibility that the contract can 
be extended, and in such cases such possibility and the relevant conditions which determine 
such action are reflected in contracts. In contracts that have been signed to the date, the 
additional period of exploration ranges from one to three years. ' ' '
As any other commercial contract, the PSAs indicate the rights and the responsibilities of the 
parties. For example, the contractor has exclusive rights to carry out oil operations in the 
contractual area within the framework of conditions established by the contract. In addition, 
the contractor has a right to have his expenses reimbursed and make a profit. The contractor, 
in turn, commits to provide the necessary funding for the programmes agreed with regards to 
the oil exploration, to carry out oil operations according to the principles of safety and 
effectiveness. On the other side, the government, or as in case of Azerbaijan its oil company 
SOCAR, is committed to provide the contractor with all the necessary geological and 
technical information, as well as to create the necessary conditions to allow the contractor to 
carry out its operations. This would mean providing the foreign companies with all the 
necessary exploration and operation licenses, customs documents, visas for its employees 
when and as necessary and others."^ As mentioned above, the foreign oil company has a 
certain percentage of the extracted oil, and this percentage of course is mentioned as part of 
the terns of the contract. Some PSAs give the national oil company an option to actually 
participate in the venture. Still, this does not mean that the national company shares the costs 
and risks involved in the exploration period. Usually, it would have a so-called carried 
interest, which means that the foreign company bears the costs and the risk during the 
exploration and carries the national company through. Subsequently, the NOC's financial 
contribution comes out of its share in production. However, foreign companies do not prefer 
such participation by the host country, as it tends to be unattractive as it allows the NOC as a 
partner in the everyday running of the project, to interfere with the day-to-day management 
of the operation, and where conflicting views and experiences from both sides may lead to a
"^Mehdi ParviziAmineh, Towards the Control o f  Oil Resources in the Caspian Region (St.Martin's Press New 
York 1999)
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less efficient running of the project. '
In addition, once oil is produced the foreign company may have to pay royalties levied on 
gross production to the government.""* Thus royalties can be seen as sources of guaranteed 
additional revenue flow from the foreign companies to the government regardless of the
overall profitability of the project for the government. It should be mentioned, that in most 
PSAs the operating foreign company can also recover some of its costs at a pre-specified 
percentage of production, also known as the cost oil."^ The level of cost recovery varies 
according to characteristics of the field in question. For example, in cases where the deposits 
are marginal, cost oil ceilings tend to be higher, this way ensuring the expected return of the 
company's investment. It is the remainder of the production that is then split between the 
foreign company and the national company at a stipulated rate and is called the profit oil."" 
Overall, PSAs have a large number of variables, which apart from the already mentioned 
ones include contract clauses on bonuses, tax duties, work programmes, pricing, marketing, 
stabilisation clauses and dispute resolution.
As far as tax duties are concerned, it is worth noting that the degree of taxation is largely 
determined by the terms of the contract related to the amounts of royalty payments and the
share of the profit oil. This means that if the government, according to the terms of the PSA, 
receives high royalty payments and a large share of the profit oil, it is expected that the 
income taxation will be very little or non-existent. Otherwise there would be no incentive to 
the foreign companies to participate in the project, as their expenditure would be too high as 
the government's take increases and the foreign company's interest in the venture diminishes 
correspondingly. Similarly, if the government's profit oil share in the project is very small 
or none and thus its only financial provision is the payment of royalties, then high income 
taxes are levied on the foreign company's income.
Royalties, taxes and in cases where there is a share in the profit oil, are not the only sources
Kirsten Bindemann (n 58)
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of income for the government in the PSAs. Bonuses represent another source of revenue for 
the host country, and usually comprise of signature bonuses and production bonuses. In some 
cases, discover bonuses are also paid by the foreign company to the government."" As the 
name itself suggests, a signature bonus is a one-off payment that is given to the government 
upon the signing of the contract. It secures the host state’s economic intake regardless of the 
future success of the exploration involved.'^" The discover bonuses are used less frequently 
and are also a one-off fee, which is paid once commercial discovery is declared.'^' 
Production bonuses, on the other hand, are a recurrent event in one contract, and are due each 
time the production reaches a certain level.
Despite the fact that the PSAs are known to differ from their predecessor (i.e. the concession 
agreement), particularly in respect of the fact that in the former the state had ultimate control 
over the oil, it is also argued that in practice the actions of the state can be severely 
constrained by the terms of the contract.Since  the PSAs are complex in their nature, it is 
the precise terms in the text of a specific agreement that determine the balance of control and 
revenues between the State and foreign company, rather than the type of model employed.
3.5.4 Service agreements
Sometimes countries and foreign extractive companies, instead of signing PSAs or going into 
joint ventures, opt for service agreements. While some service agreements bear similarities to 
PSAs, for example in both cases the host state has the full control over the resources, they 
nevertheless differ. As the name itself suggests, a service agreement is a type of contract 
where a foreign company is hired by the host state to conduct exploration and development 
work for a fixed rate.'^  ^ In this model of exploration contract, the extent of involvement of 
foreign companies is that they are asked to carry out certain well-defined services and know­
how for a specific length of time, and being a sole bearer of the financial risk.'^" Moreover,
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as far as the service contracts are concerned, the foreign company has no equity position in 
the venture, and the state makes all the decisions. In some service agreements, also known as 
buyback agreements, the foreign company in addition to receiving a fixed rate payment, has 
also the right to buy the extracted oil.
The above discussion covered the area of energy sector contracts, which are used to govern 
the exploration and production processes. In addition to the contracts themselves, companies 
are also subject to the local legislation related to foreign investment and its regulation. In 
Azerbaijan, for instance, foreign investment is regulated by a number of international treaties 
and agreements to which Azerbaijan is a signatory, as well as by domestic legal acts, such as 
the Law on the Protection of Foreign Investment of 15 January 1992 and the Law on 
Investment Activity of 13 January 1995.'^^ While foreign companies are eager to go abroad 
in search of lucrative opportunities, as investors they are also are exposed to new risks. In the 
energy sector, such risks include the prospect that the host state will expropriate the assets 
invested or the rights acquired by the investor. Although expropriation risks can apply to 
any type of foreign investment, they are particularly significant in the energy sector, because 
a high percentage of the world's energy resources are located outside the home territories of 
the companies and often in countries with political and social instability and pervasive state 
involvement in the economy.
Under Azerbaijani law, foreign investors are provided with various guarantees. For example, 
the regimes applies to foreign investors, except as otherwise provided in an
applicable bilateral investment treaty. Moreover, foreign investors have the right to repatriate 
profits and revenues received in connection with investments, provided that all the taxes and 
other duties have been paid in Azerbaijan as per legislation or applicable agreement. In 
cases where a change in Azerbaijani legislation adversely affects an investment project, the 
application of that law upon that investment is subject to a 10-year moratorium. However, 
legislation that governs the areas of national security, defence, public order, morality, public
’^^ ‘Doing Business in Azerbaijan’ (Baker & McKenzie 2012)
<httD://www.bakermckenzie.com/BKDoin2BusinessAzcrbaiian12/> accessed 14 May 2013
George K Foster, 'Managing Expropriation Risks in the Energy Sector: Steps for Foreign Investors to
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health or environmental protection, as well as acts related to credits and finance, fall outside 
the scope of the moratorium."' In the same way, nationalisation is possible, provided that 
there is a resolution of the National Assembly, however only under exceptional 
circumstances. Such circumstances arise in need to prevent harm to people or state interests. 
Confiscation is also allowed, only under circumstances of natural disasters, epidemics, and 
other exceptional circumstances as decided by the Cabinet of Ministers.
3.6 Oil extraction and corruption
As can be deduced from the above discussion related to legal agreements governing this 
business sector, the development of natural resources requires substantial upfront outlays of 
capital and ongoing investments in exploration, appraisal and extraction. This means that the 
amounts at risk and periods of exposure are substantial. Even though, in recent years states 
tend to take a more subtle approach, thus seizing control of Ibreign-owned assets indirectly, 
through domestic entities subject to their influence, or through the imposition of regulatory 
barriers that undermine the value of the investment. Nevertheless, the management of 
expropriation risks must be a high priority for any energy company with international 
operations. Taking this into account, companies operating abroad are advised to take steps, 
particularly before or during the contract execution, and position themselves to minimise 
such occurrences or to maximise prospects of recovery in the event that a taking occurs.'^ "* 
Interestingly, some of the suggestions that lawyers currently provide to foreign companies 
involved in the extractive industries abroad, advise their clients that the act of contracting 
with the state, as for example in the PSAs, can be seen as a valuable opportunity to establish 
privity and obtain express written undertakings from the state that can help guard against 
expropriation.'^^However, although it is helpful to be partners with the host state or its 
representatives, lawyers warn foreign companies regarding bribery of officials who 
participate or assist in negotiations or other subsequent contract dealings, with or on behalf of 
the host governments.
As stated earlier in section 2.2 of this thesis, corruption in the extractive industries sector
Ibid.
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cornes in myriad of forms. However, the most common manifestation of corruption involves 
political elites and their families using resources for self - enrichment.
Certain types of revenues received from natural resources for example through PSAs in form 
of royalties and often paid in lump sums, which go directly into officials' personal bank 
accounts, or those of their relatives. Although corruption within the sector comes in different 
forms, bribery remains the most commonly used form of this phenomenon. Incidents of 
bribery are more likely to occur in case with bidding for concession agreements, being given 
a share in a PSA or joint venture or being awarded a service agreement. It is the case that 
when bidding for state assets, negotiating a profit sharing or joint venture agreement, or 
otherwise seeking to secure business with a host state, foreign companies are known to seek 
the assistance of agents who purport to have connections and influence with governmental 
officials or government officials themselves. Often, in exchange for the help, a foreign 
investor offers the person involved a percentage of the value of any business secured with the 
agent’s assistance. Very often, such agents or the investors themselves bribe the local 
government official to secure the contract."" It is such acts that investors are currently 
warned against, as international and national laws consider such acts as criminal and subject 
those involved to criminal liability.
Nevertheless, the current reports, particularly those by an international non-govemmental 
anti-corruption organisation. Transparency International (TI), show that the oil and gas sector 
has an extremely high incidence of bribery of public officials when conducting business 
transactions."^ According to a TI survey, the oil and gas sector has the third-highest 
incidence of corruption among all other business sectors."" Considering the secrecy involved 
when concerning corrupt dealings, it is therefore difficult to find precise information about 
where and how corruption takes place. In some cases, as the one described above, the 
companies extracting oil could be paying an extra amount to various State employees to 
provide a long-term contract and ensure that the contract is at a favourable price. Judging 
from the analysis of corruption in the previous chapter, one may assume that service contracts 
would be susceptible to less severe forms of corruption, such as petty bribes of facilitation
Ib id .I36w
Detailed reference to such national and international laws has been made in Chapter 1 o f this paper.
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payments to responsible for the bidding civil servants. On the other hand, more lucrative in 
nature contracts, such as concession agreements or PSAs would involve more severe types of
bribery and embezzlement. Another form of corruption in the oil sector takes place when 
signed contracts are provided by the governments of any given country and take the form of 
signing bonuses, not all of which are paid to the state. In order to avoid corruption liability, 
it is therefore advised that investors make sure that they do not make payments to undisclosed 
recipients or transfer funds to bank accounts that do not bear a logical relationship to the 
legitimate ends of the transaction.
Corruption in the natural resource sector involves large corrupt practices on behalf of the host 
government and the local companies. For example, SOCAR Trading, a subsidiary of the state 
oil company of Azerbaijan, has been used for direct selling of a portion of the national oil 
since 2008."^ Moreover, SOCAR Trading has a very ambiguous structure and nature of 
activities."^ In one case, a construction contract initiated by SOCAR Trading was signed 
with a company years before the actual public bid took p lace.'"  Additionally, there was no 
truly competitive public bid for the relatively small onshore fields in Binagadi, an area close 
to Baku.
A report by the Oil Industry Workers’ Rights Protection Organisation in Azerbaijan 
published in 2003 demonstrates a further corruption incident on behalf of the state oil 
company.'" The case involved Baku Factory of Deepwater Constructions (BFDC), which is 
controlled by SOCAR. The company allegedly rented BP construction land for developing 
infrastructures for the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli project, which was financed by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and a World Bank branch and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). The generated revenue was supposed to fund the
''^°Jean-François Seznec, ‘Politics o f  Oil Supply; National Oil Companies vs. International Oil Companies’ in 
Robert E. Looney (ed), Handbook o f  Oil Politics (Routledge 2012)
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company's re-laimch, such as renovating equipment, expanding production, re-building the 
plant, but was instead used to pay for grossly overpriced maintenance by sub-contractors, 
who were indirectly controlled by SOCAR managers. The incident underscores a broader 
corruption mechanism at work in the oil sector, which is the sub-contracting. By means of 
complicated financial transactions, the state company hires sub-contractors that are often 
indirectly owned by the Ministry of Oil of Azerbaijan or by SOCAR officials. In most cases, 
sub-contractors are managed by engineers who left multinationals operating in Azerbaijan to 
start their own businesses, and while many of them are the owners of legitimate sub- 
contracting companies, others are simply puppets.'"
Moreover, the Azeri Committee of Oil Industry Workers' Rights Protection has illustrated 
how top managers from oil companies, such as of the state-owned SOCAR, systematically 
extract money by forming private companies to which they submit orders at prices much 
higher than the market price. Subsequently, the companies typically pay 50% back to the 
managers, such as those of SOCAR, and keep the other 50%, sometimes even without 
carrying out any work. In 2003, the Azeri Committee of Oil Industry Workers' Rights 
Protection submitted a complaint to the IFC and EBRD concerning corrupt practices at 
SOCAR. The complaint states:”Corruption in SOCAR increases every year and this money 
can be seen as Western backing for criminal practices which deny benefits for the wider 
population of Azerbaijan.”"^  NGOs claim that the State Oil Fund is basically controlled by 
the Presidential Bureau and that massive fraud and misappropriation of the fund's money by 
top politicians and officials take place systematically. In 2003, the Ministry of Taxes began 
an investigation of suspected corruption in the state oil company SOCAR. The investigation 
revealed 800 private companies involved in a corruption scheme. A few low-ranking officials 
were arrested, but the investigation was halted when it reached governmental levels. "" 
According to Terry Lynn Karl, petroleum dependence turns oil states into ones that are raided 
by all participants in the industry, both foreign and domestic, in pursuit of oil rents thus 
producing a situation that threatens not only the economic and political stability of the state
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itself, but also the health of the intemational economy."" Thus it is suggested that a lot of 
work must be directed towards transparency, to create incentives to change the rent-seeking 
behaviour of all the actors, both international and domestic."' From the examples above, it is 
apparent that both companies bidding for the contracts and government officials responsible 
for allocating the contracts are involved in corruption.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter examined the nature of oil production and the scarcity of this commodity, which 
explains the intensity of the oil exploration market. The chapter looked into the nature of 
agreements that prevail in the oil exploration and extraction business, such as concession 
agreements, PSAs, joint ventures and service agreements. It has become apparent that in oil 
exploration, a small number of multinational corporations strive to get access to oil that is 
available only in limited amounts at certain geographical locations. Hence, it can be seen how 
corruption, such as bribery of the local authorities on behalf of the companies when bidding 
for service agreements, or higher levels of bribery, misappropriation and embezzlement of the 
revenues received by those authorities who have access and power when involving 
concession agreements and PSAs, may be very rampant. Examples of corrupt activities of 
some of the Azeri senior officials showed that Azerbaijan is not immune to corruption in its 
extractive industries sector. As reported by the local committees and the media, vast sums of 
untraced revenues received from the sale or production of oil are unaccounted for, and 
involve ministers as well as SOCAR officials.
Secretive agreements take place behind closed doors, thus making corrupt activities go
unnoticed. According to TI, corruption can be prevented by increasing transparency. In 
relation to the oil sector, TI states that very often wealth stays in the hands of a few 
politicians and industry insiders. This is due to the fact that revenues do not get published and 
checked, payments made to the government remain secret, and bribery and embezzlement go 
undetected.According to TI, many oil and gas companies protect the identities of their
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equity holders and subsidiaries, allowing corrupt leaders to hide stolen funds unnoticed. Also, 
many oil and gas companies do not publish information country by country. This allows them 
to hide the royalties, taxes and fees they pay. Without this information, it becomes impossible 
to hold governments to account for the money they receive. As a result, TI suggests that oil 
and gas companies, as well as host governments become more transparent, thus showing all 
the payments related to the exploitation of the oil reserves open to the public.
It would therefore be useful to continue this work by examining how transparency works and 
thus contributes towards lessening in the levels of corruption. The next chapter looks at what 
is understood by transparency and how it can contribute to the reduction of levels of 
corruption. In addition, the chapter examines the operation of the EITI in detail.
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Chapter 4 
The Need for Transparency
4.1 Introduction
Transparency as a means of reducing corruption in the oil and gas industry was introduced in 
the concluding sections of the last chapter. It was also stated that transparency could be 
identified as a possible antidote to corruption. Transparency can be achieved by making the 
business ventures more open and thus less prone to secretive deals. This chapter looks at the 
notion of transparency in detail. By examining the current academic research in the area, the 
chapter identifies how transparency operates. Most importantly, it examines how 
transparency can contribute to the reduction of corruption. When discussing ways of 
combating corruption, it was identified in chapter 2.7 that corruption could be reduced not 
only through legislative, hard law principles, but also through application of various 
voluntary practices. Such practices are considered as soft law. Further into the discussion, this 
chapter introduces the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and considers 
how this particular initiative aims at increasing transparency in the extractive industries sector 
as a whole by means of soft law.
4.2 Background to transparency
Transparency may seem a straightforward matter, as it means the open flow of information. 
In reality, however, achieving transparency is not simple. Cultural, social, and economic 
conditions are an important prerequisite for the creation of a transparent society. ' 
Transparency should not be seen as synonymous with knowledge, although both overlap. 
While knowledge is validated information that can lead to action, transparency depends on 
access to information which is held by authorities.^
Transparency means conveying the truth by carrying something across. Ideally, what should 
be carried across is the truth. It is usually presumed that the information held by those in 
charge of it is always genuine, although it must be accepted that sometimes this presumption 
is wrong.^ Nevertheless, transparency represents the fact of seeing clearly.'* The word
transparency in itself is rather hard to define. According to Henriques.
'Burkart Holzner and Leslie Holzner, Transparency in Global Change: The Vanguard o f  the Open Society 
(University o f Pittsburgh Press 2006).
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“on hearing the word, usually the first thing that we think is glass; glass is transparent 
because light passes through it and so you can see what is behind. But there is also another
meaning, such as when we say that someone behaved transparently -  in other words you can
see what they were up to”/
Similarly, Holzner and Holzner define transparency as “a social value of open, public, and/or 
individual access to information held and disclosed by centres of authority”. ^  Accordingly, 
campaigns for transparency, particularly those related to the fight against corruption, aim to 
focus on making information about what has happened more available. In such cases, “the 
light is reflected by the behaviour, making it visible”.^  Moreover, public scrutiny of state 
affairs and access to information are key phrases in the context of the fight against 
corruption.^ The reason for this is that it is increasingly understood that the scourge of 
corruption can only be eradicated by nurturing a culture of scrutiny, transparency and 
accountability -  in other words, the information culture."
Transparency establishes a balance between the aims of the state and private interests in a 
practical spirit of agreement that widens the horizons of citizen participation, both in 
monitoring the action of the authorities as well as in taking decisions on issues of national 
importance.'" According to social scientists, transparency is valuable because it contributes in 
overcoming so-called agg/zcy In most governance situations, principals (such as
citizens or shareholders) delegate responsibility to agents (such as a government or a 
corporate board) to make decisions on their behalf. Problems arise when the principals are 
unable to monitor their agents." As a result of this flaw in monitoring on behalf of the 
principals, the agents have the freedom to make misguided or self-serving decisions.
The lack of transparency creates opportunities for the agents, to withhold information. 
Withholding of information make accountability difficult. Secrecy provides the opportunity 
for special interests to have greater influence and thereby relationships with special interests 
allow insiders to exchange favourable policies for personal gain, in the form of bribery.
 ^ Ibid 30.
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political campaign contributions, etc. However, it is more difficult to maintain such profitable 
relationships when financial transactions and decision-making processes are transparent. "  On 
the whole disclosure is demanded because it contributes to a large extent towards improving 
governance in a variety of ways, such as by enabling people to enjoy a wide array of basic 
rights, deterring corruption, improving decision-making, enabling actors to coordinate their 
actions, and building public support for needed policies. "  Today, disclosure is seen not only 
as a right in itself but also as a vital tool for the achievement of all other rights.
The achievement of transparency requires the establishment of norms for transparency. These 
norms may come in different forms. For example, transparency norms may be compulsory 
and legal, or other laws that force disclosure under penalty of law. Alternatively, such norms 
may be self-imposed programmes, such as in the case of codes of conduct. Moreover, 
voluntary disclosures may be coerced by strategic efforts to expose various misdeeds." 
Transparency can be achieved by creating a right to access to the archives and files 
maintained by the authorities; creation of a freedom of information culture, which would 
oblige all public, and only public, services to publish information on the kind of data they 
hold. Most importantly, clear mechanisms for keeping the public informed must be 
established, most notably through the Internet. "
Secrecy has long been an ancient tool of authority in most, if not all societies. The battles for 
information freedom and against secrecy have been bitterly fought. Secrecy is the deliberate 
withholding of information actually or potentially desired by others. Secrecy is most vigilant 
about guarding, protecting, withholding information that, if disclosed could endanger self- 
interest." As an information value, secrecy has long been a means of gaining and keeping 
power." At all levels of social organisation, secrecy enables individuals or groups of 
individuals to control their environment for their own benefit, by denying outsiders vital 
information. It is often the case that secrets in business or governments are those that would 
cause condemnation and ought to be punished if revealed. Behind the reason of secrecy there 
is a wish to deny gross errors, to protect personal interests, to hide conflict of interests or 
outright corruption.
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On the contrary, transparency is most vigilant about the widest scope of accountability for 
authorities of any kind/" Its focus is the citizens’ right to know and the duty of the authorities 
of all kinds to disclose information. The cluster of values surrounding transparency is the 
freedom of speech and expression, accountability, free inquiry and other. Transparency also
depends on accountability, or taking responsibility for one’s actions and their consequences. 
Transparency on the part of those in power clearly requires accountability to the public at 
large. Accountability for authorities thus is closely linked to transparency. It is the 
responsibility of actors dealing with public property to justify their actions, their motives, and 
the consequences.^^ This means that in some cases some unjustifiable actions make one liable 
for damages caused.
Transparency makes it possible to challenge the truth claims attached to the information 
made available. These claims can carry consequences, thus giving transparency its power.
It should be kept in mind that there is always a chance that authorities disclosing the 
information to the public are likely to put the best spin on it, select the most favourable 
methodology for measuring their successes or disguising their failures, or divulge information 
while withholding the important f a c t s . A s  a result, scepticism becomes important, as it 
provokes debate which enables the testing of the validity of truth claims.
Today’s extension of solidarities to become global in scope occurs in a context of great 
diversity and inequality. Similar changes affect the dynamics o f transparency and secrecy in 
the global era. Many seek to avoid transparency, but measures to fight deceit, fiaud and 
corruption have been created and are growing and taking diverse forms. Thus, effective 
strategies include reliance on credible sources of truthfulness, validity and accountability 
represented by various NGOs; the powerful threats of legal penalties against fraudulent truth 
claims; and evaluation studies to assess the validity and relevance of claims for accountability 
and truthfulness.^" The sources of energy that power the transparency phenomenon fall into 
various groups such as information technology that has become more inexpensive and 
efficient, owing to a continuous stream of innovations. The Internet has created global 
networks of communication and information.^  ^In addition, interest groups and their political
Ibid.
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and economic constellations often take a vital role in legislative battles about information 
n o r m s Moreover, there are value-rational influences pushing for transparency in the many 
volunteer organisations of civil society. Thus the worldwide movement to establish corporate 
codes of conduct illustrates the impact of these efforts where specific values by means of 
well-formulated strategic plans and alliances are pursued.^" Overall, decisions to adopt 
transparency norms are diverse and range from the voluntary adoption of disclosure norms to 
the external imposition of such norms and regulations. Moreover, legal constraints such as 
fear of legal suits also motivate disclosure. Lastly, many countries nowadays have a rich body 
of legislation about disclosure norms that must be obeyed.^"
4.3 Transparency, investment and the extractive industries sector
The concept of transparency is closely associated with promotion and protection with regard 
to the field of international investment. Mainly, because through transparency the participants 
in the investment process are able to obtain sufficient information from each other in order to 
make informed decisions.^'
The overriding aim of transparency, particularly in relation to Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), is to enhance the predictability and stability of the investment relationship and to 
provide a check against circumvention and evasion of obligations, by resorting to covert or 
indirect means. Thus, transparency can serve to promote investment through the 
dissemination of information on support measures available from home countries, investment 
conditions and opportunities in host countries.M oreover, transparency can contribute 
towards the reduction of corruption, by bringing to light payments paid and received, and as a 
result improve the climate of governance. '^*
In the area of investment, the need for transparency is usually viewed from the perspective of 
foreign investors. Thus emphasis is usually placed on the desire of foreign investors to have 
full access to a variety of information in a host country, which may potentially affect the
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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able to pull curtains o f  secrecy around decisions that can be revealed without injury to the public interest". See
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tenns and condkions imckr vdnch die irw^stor vwiuld have to openüe/^ Hbv/ever, 
transparency issues in an investment relationship may also be of particular concern to the host
country, for example, where the host country may wish to have access to information about 
foreign investors as part of policy-making processes and for regulatory purposes.
The issue of transparency concerns a number of specific matters. It is therefore important to 
identify the potential addressees of the transparency obligation. These addressees are not only 
the host countries, but also home countries and of course the in v esto rs .F o r example, if a 
foreign investor is exempt from providing information on its operations to the host country, 
this will naturally not only undermine the capacity of the host country to assess the nature and 
value of the contribution being made by particular foreign investors, but also restrict its 
capacity to assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of its regulatory framework. 
Moreover, transparency may be of benefit to the home country of the investor, in order to 
acquire information about operations of the investor in other countries, both for taxation 
purposes and as a means of assessing the country’s legal rules and policies that have 
extraterritorial reach.
Investment in the natural resources market is highly dependent on public procurement.'^' 
Public procurement affects many aspects of peoples’ lives and assumes a large share of 
government budget. Public procurement provides for the construction of roads, acquisition of 
land and buildings by national or municipal governments.''^ In the area of natural resources, 
public procurement contracts exist for the extraction and refinement of natural reserves 
involved for future consumption or sale, as well as the maintenance of oil w e lls .P u b lic  
procurement often represents 10-15 per cent of a country’s gross national product.'^'' With the 
increasing globalisation of the world economy, international trade in procurement is also on 
the increase and currently accounts to several billion dollars.''^ As in any other corrupt
Ibid.
3* Ibid 7.
3* Ibid 8.
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Public procurement, also known as public contracting, is a multi -  step process o f  established procedures to 
acquire goods and services by a government entity. Public procurement is applicable to any government contract 
for goods, works or services, including for consultancies.
In Azerbaijan tenders for public procurement can be accessed through <http://abc.az/enu/news/tenders/> 
accessed 13 May 2013.
‘Corruption and Public Procurement’ (2010) Transparency International Working Paper 05/2010. For more on 
corruption in public procurement see Vinod Rege, “Transparency in Government Procurement” (2001) 35(4) 
Journal o f W orld Trade 489.
Vinod Rege, ‘Transparency in Government Procurement: Issues o f  Concern and Interest to Developing 
Countries’ (2001) 35(4) Journal o f World Trade 489.
Ibid.
116
transaction, corruption in public procurement involves a series of actors who take decisions 
based on their own interests rather than the public good. Like any other type of corruption 
related to the natural resources sector, some of the most important actors involved include 
public officials who are responsible for procurement and management of the procurement 
contracts; politicians who influence decisions at the planning and contracting stages; and 
bidders, suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors who are involved in competing for and 
delivering on contracts.
Transparency International estimates that damage from corruption associated with public 
procurement can represent on average ten to twenty five per cent, and at times up to fifty per 
cent, of a contract’s v a l u e . I n  such cases, the presence of a transparent environment is 
absolutely imperative for the avoidance of corrupt practices. Since the public procurement 
process involves decisions about the scope, economic viability, as well as environmental and 
social impacts of the project, and the corresponding budget allocation, or as with cases with 
extraction and sale of natural resource -  share of the profits, corruption risks are linked to the 
approval of unnecessary, overestimated purchases, or where contracts were allocated to 
bidders which were not necessarily the best in terms of what they could offer. Such practices 
of favouring a particular company often arise as a result of conflicts of interest on the part of 
the government official and where the decision responds to bribes received by the official 
from the bidding company.
Best practice to avoid corruption in this area is by providing extensive access to information 
and facilitating discussions with all the project stakeholders, using public hearings.''  ^
Moreover, once the contract has been allocated to a bidder, it is important to ensure that an 
effective control system is in place, such as regular visits and checks by representatives of
civil society. Such control can help to check whether there is a clear compliance with the 
contract terms. Such third party, impartial controls are also important in the accounting part 
of the contract, to detect any major discrepancies. Moreover, final financial and performance 
audits should be made publicly available.''  ^ If the public is kept in the dark about the revenue 
earned and its terms and conditions, resource wealth often ends up concentrated in the hands
'^ '’‘Corruption and Public Procurement’ (n 43).
Ibid 2.
'^Ibid 3. A good example on how transparency in public procurement has been implemented can be seen 
through an example o f  Argentina. There, public hearings have been organised to increase credibility and prevent
corruption in public procurement. At the hearing, the responsible authority convenes citizens, businesses, 
experts and representatives and presents the details for the project and the procurement provisions, and enables 
the participants to express their objections and suggestions. See ‘Corruption and Public Procurement’ (n 20) 3. 
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of local and international elites. It is thus important that data systems are in place for the 
collection, analysis and dissemination of information on procurement processes, including the 
decisions taken and money spent and received. The technologies in use must facilitate broad 
public access for increased transparency and accountability. Where technical information is 
involved, it must be presented in simplified terms in order to be accessible to civil society and 
the broader public. As for the information that is considered confidential, it must be defined 
as narrowly as possible.^'
4.4 Possible obstacles for transparency
Although it may be required of parties to commit to absolute and unconditional transparency, 
it would, however, be unrealistic to expect countries and corporations to accept such a wide- 
ranging commitment. It is therefore possible that there will be some exceptions with regard 
to information that is to be disclosed. Such exceptions are often based on public interest or 
national security grounds, particularly on the part of the addressee g o v e rn m e n t.S u c h  
exemptions should be considered by an independent court of law on a case-by-case basis by 
taking into account all the factors for and against the disclosure.^'' The factors in favour of 
disclosure that may be taken into account in the public interest test include several 
presumptions such as the presumption that the openness is, in itself, to be regarded as 
something which is in the public in terest.M oreover, the test should take into account 
whether such disclosure is in the interest of the public, as well as the fact that limited 
promoting of accountability and transparency may endanger the confidence of the public.
Still, at times when information is regarded as qualifying for an exemption, factors such as 
firms’ commercial interests, loss of confidence in the markets as well as political and 
economic stability of the country are looked at.^^
(n 31).
Ibid 6.
(n 31) 82.
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An example of qualifying exclusion would be commercially sensitive information, or the 
content of intellectual property rights or secret know-how in possession of corporation 
involved in a transparency agreement. As a result, many agreements which contain reference
to duty of disclosure, tend to include special clauses, which exempt certain information from 
being disclosed. For example, in 2003 Trade Agreement between Singapore and the United
States, “The United States-Singapore Trade Agreement”, contains special provisions that 
protect confidential information of parties to the Agreement, as well as corporate entities. In 
the chapter covering the area of investment, it states that any confidential information is 
protected from any disclosure that would prejudice the competitive position of the investor or 
the covered investment. Further to that, there is an increasing trend for legal contracts to 
specifically prohibit the very existence of the contract and not just its terms, from being 
disclosed.
The precise implications of such exceptions to disclosure on development are hard to 
discern. It is argued that such exemptions are aimed at creating parameters of intrusiveness 
acceptable, for countries, which intend to protect their public policy and national security 
goals, as well as for companies that seek to protect their sources of comparative advantage.^' 
On the other hand, it is argued that people, as taxpayers, have a right to know what they are 
paying for and how the resources of their country are being used.^^ This applies not only to 
government-related disclosure, but also to disclosure by corporations, which can inform the 
public as to how their country’s resources are being utilised and what benefit it brings them. 
This point is of particular relevance to countries rich in natural resources, as it enables the 
tracing of revenues gained through their extraction. Additionally, corporations may also 
benefit from the disclosure, provided they comply with all the regulations, to demonstrate 
their input into the domestic economy. Equally, such disclosure can also demonstrate to the 
public the effect of various norms and regulations on their society.
The above-mentioned disclosure by governments as well as corporations can be achieved 
through codes of conduct, as well as voluntary global reform based on expertise. Such 
proposals are seen as essential steps towards transparency, notwithstanding the fact that they
^^The United States -  Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Article 15.13, para 2
<httn://www.ustr.eov/sites/deFault/filcs/uploads/aureements/fLa/sinuapore/asset upload fileVOH 4036.pdf> 
accessed 12 December 2013.
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can sometimes be perceived as too lenient and ineffective/^ The adoption of such principles 
by states and corporations, albeit for their voluntary nature, is nevertheless feasible due to
external pressure and the fear for the loss of reputation.^ The avalanche of business and 
accounting scandals created a crisis for the reputation of many corporations and state 
officials.
As a response to the above presumption of the importance of various voluntary codes of 
conduct related to the high importance of transparency, particularly in the natural resources 
sector, the International Monetary Fund has published a guide to resource revenue 
transparency.^  ^ The guide applies principles of revenue transparency to a unique set of 
transparency problems faced by countries that derive a significant share of revenue from 
natural resources. The guide provides a set of points that need to be taken into account when 
adopting the policy of revenue transparency. It provides a detailed set of guidelines to address 
the issues arising from the size of natural resources to many countries, combined with the 
technical complexity and volatility of the transaction flows. Thus the guide can be used to 
assess resource specific issues that should be considered in fiscal transparency, but also to 
provide generally recognised good and best practices for transparency of resource revenue 
management.
The framework identified in the guide may be used as a platform for identifying the extent to 
which the needs of transparency in resource revenue must be encompassed. For example, it 
states that the governments must ensure that an open budget process exists, and that the 
government accounting system should clearly identify all government resource revenue 
receipts and enable the issuance of timely, comprehensive, and regular reports to the public. 
Such information should include statements on budget and resource revenue spending, 
reporting on company resource revenue payments, reporting on resource-related debt, if such 
exists, reporting on assets and their worth, as well as any fiscal risks.
The content of transparency obligations needs to be clearly identified and as delimited as 
possible. As has been seen in previous chapters, the trend in investment relations is 
supportive of greater disclosure on the part of both governments and enterprises. Many
investment treaties tend to have a disclosure clause of varied types of information on behalf
'’^ Burkart Holzner and Leslie Holzner (n 1).
^  Ibid.
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of parties-,signatories. There is, however, the question of the degree of “intrusiveness” of such 
action.
The scope of a transparency obligation is determined by the precise items of information to 
be made public by the relevant addressees.^'' In relation to governments, for example, 
disclosed information may range from items at the least intrusive level, such as general 
policies that may be of importance, to the terms of increased intrusiveness, such as financial 
statements, laws, regulations and administrative rulings and procedures.^' Similarly, in 
relation to corporate information, the range of items of disclosure depends on a distinction 
between traditional disclosure for the purposes of correct application of national company, 
fiscal and prudential laws, to newer items, related to disclosure of a social nature, and 
involving information as to the operations of the company in question, which are not always 
required under national laws, but which can serve to inform specific groups of stakeholders 
other than shareholders, so they can better understand the effects of company’s operations 
upon their vital in te re s ts .T h e  latter type of information may be more intrusive in nature, 
since it refers to a wider range of information than is traditionally required of corporations, 
and thus may entail a greater devotion of time, expertise and resources to be delivered than a 
mere basic financial information, which a company needs to compile as a matter of usual 
business management practice.
One of the important aspects to be taken into consideration when speaking of transparency, 
are the different types of mechanisms that can be used to implement a transparency 
obligation. An important factor to be considered is how disclosure should occur, as this 
detail affects the quality of the disclosure provided.^''
Overall, four types of disclosure mechanisms have been identified, particularly in foreign 
investment practice. Those are: consultation and information exchange, making information 
publicly available, answering requests for information, and notification requirements of 
specific measures that need to be notified to the other party or to a body set up for the 
purpose under the agreement/^ Moreover, in each case the modality can be voluntary or 
mandatory, reciprocal and based on mutual agreement to disclose. Out of the above.
Ibid.70j
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voluntary obligation to disclose is usually considered as the weakest. In contrast, mandatory 
unilateral obligation is accepted as the strongest type of disclosure mechanism.
Another important point about disclosure that needs to be observed is that of timing. Where a 
disclosure document, be it either a Treaty, domestic or international law, does not contain a 
reference to timing, the parties to disclosure agreement may be inclined to treat compliance 
with the obligation to disclose rather lightly. Thus, a general timing clause that offers no 
specific dates or deadlines by which the transparency obligation must be fulfilled allows for a 
measure of discretion as to the process of compliance with the transparency obligation. 
Equally, from a development perspective such a general commitment may be important for 
parties that wish to show a commitment to effective and regular disclosure of information 
under their transparency obligation, but which due to resource implications of such a 
commitment cannot be bound by strict deadlines. Such approaches may be helpful for small 
and medium-sized enterprises as well as for developing and less developed countries with 
limited resources.
In contrast, the use of specific deadlines for compliance with transparency can ensure that a
greater degree of compliance is placed upon the parties to the obligation than a more flexible 
period. Moreover, such a commitment shows a degree of seriousness in the country’s 
approach to transparency.^" Even though small and medium-sized enterprises and less 
developed states might find such deadlines relatively burdensome, effective regulation
depends on effective and timely disclosure of information. Thus, the existence of such 
deadlines may be of value in ensuring regulatory compliance.^'
4.5 Transparency through legislation; Azerbaijan
Despite its potential utility, transparency is hard to come by. Demand for information is 
essential, given the nature of bureaucracies that almost instinctively hide information, 
whether or not they have something to hide.^  ^It is believed that the most important source of 
demand for disclosure comes from civil society, since civil society groups can excel at 
creating political pressures by mobilising political coalitions. Moreover, pressure for 
disclosure can also come from outside, such as from membership of international
^Ibid.
''Ibid.
'^Ibid.
'°Ibid.
"ibid.
'^Ann Florini ( n i l ) .
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organisations/'' As globalisation and privatisation shift even more information of public 
concern into the hands of the private sector, and large corporations handle major projects, 
disclosure and the fight of the public to have access to information related to dealings within 
their country becomes more prominent. Taking into account the fact that the private sector 
often depends on information asymmetries for its profits, it is difficult to ensure that the 
private sector discloses everything to anyone who asks.^^ Perhaps this is the reason why most 
of the legislation addresses public sector disclosure, and only very few laws address the 
private sector.
Since this work is dedicated to the study of Azerbaijan, during the research process, Azeri 
laws were examined. Thus, with regards to legislative measures related to transparency,
Azerbaijan has a disclosure law, particularly the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the 
right to obtain information.^^ According to this law, interested parties are allowed to free, 
unrestricted and equal information access. Even though the law extends to the information 
held by private entities, it applies to private entities involved in education, healthcare, and the 
cultural and social s p h e r e . No  definition is provided on what can be constituted as the social 
sphere. Thus, it is unclear whether a private entity’s involvement in the extraction of oil 
would fall within the remit of this definition. Moreover, according to Article 34.4, entities 
may refuse to disclose information if it is considered commercial. This means companies may 
refuse to disclose information related to their revenues or contracts, as it is constituted to be 
commercially sensitive.Furtherm ore, the law restricts information disclosure if it is 
believed to generate harmful consequences to the information holder."" The following 
examples demonstrate that information available for disclosure can still be limited 
notwithstanding the fact that legislation pertaining to public right to obtain information exists.
"ibid. 
"ibid. 
"ibid 347.
87Law o f the Republic o f Azerbaijan on the Right to Obtain Information,
< http://www.revenuewatch.0r2/traininu/rcs0urce center/azcrbaiian-law-riuht-obtain-infbrmation > accessed 15 
May 2013.
"A rticle 9.1.2 states that for the purposes o f the information disclosure, information owners are “legal entities 
implementing the public functions, as well as private legal entities and individuals engaged in the spheres o f  
education, healthcare, cultural and social sphere based on legal acts or contracts."( Official translation can be 
accessed at < http://www.lexadin.nl/wlu/leuis/noff/oeur/lxwcaze.htm > accessed 12 December 2013 
'^Article 34.4 states: “Official secret, professional (doctor, attorney, notary), commercial, investigation or 
judicial secrets with access limited in order to protect the lawful rights o f  individuals, entities, agencies, 
organizations and other legal entities, irrespective o f  the type o f  ownership, as well as private information are 
the confidential information.”
^Article 35.2.10 states that information should be considered for official use only, “when the disclosure
deteriorates the lawful interests o f the information owner, or the utilization o f the information for official use is 
provided by agreement with private legal entities engaged in exercising public functions -  information on 
technology solutions” .
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In cases where restrictions are put on request for information based on domestic laws, the 
public is left to rely on company voluntary disclosure of information, or the so-called soft 
law.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined in detail the notion of transparency and the positive impact it can have 
on the reduction in the levels of corruption. It identified how by promoting disclosure an open 
environment is created. This leads to a creation of a society where it is more difficult to 
conceal secrets and misdeeds. By creating a transparency society, the actions of those in 
charge of common resources are revealed and open for public scrutiny. The subsequent 
chapter will examine the implementation of the EITI in Azerbaijan. The aim is to identify 
successes and failures of Azerbaijan's application of the EITTs soft law approach to tackling 
corruption in the extractive industries.
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Chapter 5 
The EITI and Azerbaijan
5.1. Introduction
This chapter concentrates on a mainly doctrinal study of the implementation of the EITI in 
Azerbaijan. As stated earlier,' Azerbaijan was the first country to undergo the EITI 
Validation process resulting in Compliant country status in 2009.^
This chapter commences with a general background to Azerbaijan’s country profile, in
particular its extractive industries sector. The discussion then moves onto the EITI validation 
process, discussing the purpose behind it as well as familiarising the reader with its main 
requirements. In light of the doctrinal study of the validation process, this chapter 
subsequently analyses the information gathered from the Azerbaijani Validation Report. In 
light of the analyses, this part of the thesis facilitates a constructive discussion of the EITI 
implementation process. This in turn, provides an opportunity for an enhanced criticism of 
the Initiative. In particular, this chapter criticises the EITTs lenient approach towards 
participants, in an effort to keep the initiative attractive, and the EITI Board's and 
Secretariat's weak participation in the pre- and post-implementation process. Finally, at the 
end of the chapter it is suggested that the EITI validation and the implementation process 
should be made clearer for the implementing countries and companies.
5.2 The EITI Validation Process
The background to the EITI was given earlier in this thesis.^ When a country becomes an 
E/77 caMüfWafg'', having met the four "sign up” indicators, including the development of a
work plan, which documents how the country intends to achieve EITI Compliance.^ The plan
' See Chapter 1.1
 ^ Since then Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Peru, Central African Republic, 
Liberia, Mali, Timor-Leste, Zambia, Niger, Norway and Yemen have also received a Compliant status.
^See Chapter 1.3
 ^ Candidate countries are those who have signed up to implement the EITI and met all four indicators in the 
sign-up stage o f  the Validation. This includes: committing to implement the EITI; committing to work with civil 
society and the private sector; appointing an individual to lead implementation; and producing a Work Plan that 
has been agreed with stakeholders.
have fully implemented the EITI. They have met all the indicators in the Validation grid, 
including the publication and distribution o f an EITI Report, (to see the Validation grid visit 
< http://eitransparcncv.ore/files/document/validationuuide.pdf>  , 4 accessed 14 May 2013
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is then discussed and agreed by key stakeholders. To achieve EITI Compliance status a
country must complete an EITI Validation.
Validation is an essential element of the EITI global standard. It provides an independent 
assessment of the progress achieved and identifies what measures are needed to strengthen 
the EITI process.^ Validation is the mechanism that the EITI Board uses to determine a 
country’s candidate or compliant status. There are currently 13 Candidate countries.^ These 
countries have met the four “sign-up” indicators and are at different stages in EITI 
implementation. The EITI requires that these candidates complete Validation within two 
years to assess whether they have achieved EITI Compliance. Validation is carried out by an 
independent Validator selected by the Multi-stakeholder Group (MSG), using the 
methodology set out in the EITI Validation Guide." If the EITI Board considers a country to 
have met all the indicators in the Validation grid, the country will be recognised as EITI 
Compliant. Validation is therefore the gold standard because it shows that a Candidate 
country has met the standards of the EITI. According to Global Witness comments on EITI, 
without validation, “EITI would be little different from the many well-meaning but 
ineffectual initiatives on governance that exist around the world”."  For this reason. 
Validation needs to be as objective and credible as possible. Any suggestion that a country 
has been given special treatment would be fatal to the EITTs credibility.
'’The Cabinet o f Ministers o f  Azerbaijan established the National Committee on EITI by its Ordinance No.224 
dated November 13, 2003 following the instruction o f  President Ilham Aliyev to establish an interagency 
committee on EITI to implement obligations taken at the EITI Conference in London. The Committee, chaired 
by the Executive Director o f the State Oil Fund, includes Azerbaijan's Ambassador to the United Kingdom and 
representatives o f the Ministries o f Foreign Affairs, Economic Development, Industry and Energy, Finance, 
Tax, Ecology and Natural Resources, Statistics and the state oil company. The Committee is charged with the 
task o f  collecting information about receipts (including from foreign and local industry companies) o f  the 
governmental agencies, companies and other governmental institutions and preparation o f the government's 
reporting form. The national Committee on EITI is closely cooperating with the foreign and local extractive 
industry (oil and gas) companies and NGOs to implement the EITI in Azerbaijan. At the result o f such 
cooperation a Memorandum o f Understanding (MOU) was signed on November 24, 2004 between the 
Committee on EITI, foreign and local extractive sector companies and the NGO Coalition.
'EITI Secretariat, E/TY frogrej.5 2007 -  2009. Rgjowrce TFa/zjpare/zcy
< http://eiti.oru/files/EITI% 20Prouress%20Report%202007-2009.ndf > accessed 15 May 2013 
'The current candidate countries are Afghanistan, Chad, Guatemala, Honduras, San Tome and Principe, 
Tajikistan, The Philippines, Ukraine, Guinea, Indonesia, Senegal, Solomon Islands and Trinidad and Tobago. 
^Ibid. Validation requirements can be seen in the documents on the EITI Standard, which can be obtained from 
<http://eiti.org/files/English_EITI%20STANDARD_l lJuly_0.pdf> 2 January 2014 
EITI Progress Report 2007 -  2009: Establishing Resource Transparency (n 8)
' '  Global Witness Comments on EITI, Highlights from EITI Global Conference 1 6 - 1 8  February 2009, Doha, 
Qatar.
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The first step in the EITI Validation process is the appointment of a Validator by the MSG.'^ 
The selected Validator will then use the three key documents to fortify their work.
The Country Work Plan
The host country Work Plan is an essential component of the validation process. According
to the EITI criteria, the Work Plan must be financially sustainable and should include 
measurable targets, a timetable for implementation of the initiative and an assessment of 
potential capacity constraints.This information is also important to determine whether the 
participant country needs any financial or technical assistance. Such assistance for 
implementation is provided through the Multi Donor Trust Fund financed by 12 supporting 
countries and managed by the World Bank, as well as by regional development banks 
bilateral aid agencies and non-governmental organisations.'^ The Work Plan should also 
show how the government will ensure the multi-stakeholder organisation for the EITI 
implementation in the host country, in particularly that related to the involvement of the civil 
society.'" Here it should also be mentioned that once the MSG’s structure is established, the 
World Bank offers training for the EITI stakeholders. Similarly, the EITI Secretariat itself 
provides week-long courses to all EITI implementing countries.
One of the essential components of a Work Plan is the timetable for the EITI implementation, 
which the government along with the stakeholders agree on. The timetable is usually based 
on and reflects the country’s needs as well as how the government plans to finance the 
Validation. The presence of a timetable in the Work Plan is an imperative feature for the 
Validator, when assessing the country’s implementation progress as the key element in the 
country validation process is whether the timetable for implementation is being followed.'^ 
One important point about the timetable is that if the timetable is not followed, according to 
the Validation Guide of the EITI, the Validator can still overlook the matter provided that it 
can be determined that the delays in meeting the timetable are reasonable.
"All Candidates must set up MSG committees with representatives from government, companies and civil 
society to promote and manage the EITI process at the national level.
"The three key documents are: the country work plan; the validation grid and indicator assessment tools; the 
company forms.
"EITI Secretariat ‘EITI Validation Guide’(EITI Secretariat 2006)
< http://eitransparencv.orG/files/docum ent/va lid ation uu id e.nd f> accessed 14 May 2013, 5 
"EITI Progress Report 2007 -  2009 (n 8).
" ‘EITI Validation Guide’ (n 14) 5.
"The EITI Secretariat and its partner In Wet (Germany) have provided a week-long course to all EITI 
implementing countries in 2008 and 2009, and will repeat the exercise in 2010.
" EITI Validation Guide (n 14) 5.
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Subsequently, following all the observations with regard to the Work Plan, the Validator 
must capture the views in a narrative report.
E/77 PhWarioM GrW 7bo/j
Apart from the Work Plan, at the heart of the Validation process are the EITI Requirements. 
At the time of the Azerbaijan's Validation, the Validator had to follow the Validation Grid, 
which comprised of 20 indicators which the Validator used to assess progress.^" The EITI 
Validation Grid was supplemented by the Indicator Assessment Tools (lATs).^' The lATs 
have been created to provide further explanation to the Validator as to how to assess and 
interpret the points mentioned in the Validation Grid. In other words, the lATs exist to further 
explain the objectives sought by the 20 indicators and thus further elaborate upon the 
approach which the Validator should take in judging whether a particular indicator is met. 
From the 20 indicators listed in the Validation Grid, 18 should be assessed by the Validator 
as met or unmet. The two remaining indicators, company validation and review, must be 
assessed in the Validator’s narrative report.Approximately half of the indicators in the 
Validation Gird are objective and require the Validator to decide whether they are met or not 
met.^^ However, the other indicators are less objective and require the Validator to decide 
whether they are met or not met. '^* It is this space for subjectivity that may be perceived as a 
potential weakness of the EITI. Although the administrative and legal differences as well as 
the difference in development levels of participating countries must be given consideration 
when judging their implementation progress, it nevertheless must be acknowledged that 
allowing subjectivity in the implementation techniques can contribute to the creation of 
disequilibrium. In other words, by applying a subjective approach during the Validation 
process, one allocates the Compliant country status to countries which in essence have 
implemented the initiative on different, exclusively pertinent to their situation, basis. For 
example, the Preparation Stage expects that the "assessment of progress by the Validator in 
the preparation stage necessarily involves consideration on the approaches to implementation
"T he 7 requirements can be found in the EITI Standard,
< httnV/eiti.orG/files/EnGlish EITI%20STANDARD lUulv 0.ndf> accessed 2 January 2014
°^A list o f  the 20 indicators can be found in the EITI Validation Guide ( n 14) 10. The process has changed since
then, and as o f  December 2013, the Validator only needs to follow 7 requirements that are listed in the EITI 
Standard. Overall, the requirements remain the same as before, only that the requirements which were
previously listed in 20 indicators have been compressed to 7.
''T h e  lATs can be found in the EITI Validation Guide (n 14) 12.
"  EITI Validation Guide (n 14) 6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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in different countries”/^ It is acceptable that for some indicators, countries may employ 
different approaches, and this should not be seen as a major problem as long as the 
Candidates have met the final objective of the indicator. What is worrying, however, is the
subjective approach permitted to the Validator, which may allow for accepting some 
indicators as met, although not entirely, but as good enough, when taking into consideration
the position of the particular Candidate. Such performance can undermine entirely the sole 
purpose behind the EITI -  that of holding all implementing countries to the same global 
standard.
As part of a country’s Validation process, all the companies operating on the territory of the
implementing country should also implement the initiative and hence undergo Validation 
together with the country.^" As a result of this factor, a country’s Validation process involves 
companies filling in a self-assessment Company Form, which are then returned to the 
Validator. Now, at this stage it is still unclear as to what happens to companies who decide 
not to disclose all or some of their revenues. Companies extracting on the territory of the 
implementing country automatically become responsible for implementing the initiative’s 
objectives. Of course, the companies have their representatives taking part in all the 
negotiations taking place among the MSG. What is yet unclear is what happens should a 
company, under various contractual pretexts, disagree with the disclosure procedure 
mechanism as advised by the EITI. Again, all is left to the MSG to negotiate their way 
through to a mutually acceptable position.
After having collected all the information based on the three above-mentioned documents, 
the Validator meets with the MSG, the organisation contracted to reconcile the figures
disclosed by the companies and the government and other key stakeholders.^^ Following the 
meeting with the stakeholders and using the information gathered, the Validator then
completes a report. "^ The Validation Report contains the completed Validation Grid, 
supported by a progress reports against the indicators in the Validation Grid. In this Report,
Tbid. 
Ibid 7. 
Ibid.
25^
26 
27
"ibid 3.
'^The report is comprised o f  the following parts; a short narrative report on the progress against the Country 
Work Plan; a short narrative report on the progress against the indicators in the Validation Grid; the completed 
Validation Grid; a narrative report on company implementation; collated Company Forms; an overall 
assessment o f  the implementation o f  EITI: whether a country is a compliant, a candidate or whether there is no 
meaningful process.
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the Validator should also write a report on the country’s progress against the Work Plan, as 
well as a narrative report on company implementation along with the Collated Company 
Forms/" Finally, the Validator must enclose an overall assessment of the country’s 
implementation of the EITI and suggest whether the country should remain as a Candidate or 
can be allocated the status of a Compliant. In some cases the Validator can decide that the 
country has shown no meaningful progress. The Report should also contain lessons learned, 
as well as any concerns any of the stakeholders have raised. It may contain recommendations 
in pursuing the implementation of the EITI further.^'
Following the completion of the Validation Report by the Validator, the Report initially goes
to the MSG, the government and the EITI Board and following their approval the report is 
then published and suggestions are acted upon/^ If there is a disagreement regarding the 
Validation process, then this is dealt with locally by the means of negotiations between the 
stakeholders in an attempt to reach a consensus. The EITI Board is however called in to help 
in cases of serious dispute. In such instances, the EITI Board takes upon the role of a 
mediator/^ Yet again it is apparent that the EITI implementation is left by large to the MSG, 
and the process as well as all the subsequent developments are intended to be resolved 
through negotiations among the stakeholders.
It is important to note that Validation is not a financial audit, and the job of the Validator is 
not to undertake financial audits.^"' Those are done prior to the Validation by the chosen and 
EITI approved auditors. The job of the Validator is to check that countries and companies are 
doing what they have committed to doing. In cases where the Validator following the 
Validation process feels that a country has not made progress in line with the EITI Principles 
and Criteria, the Validator needs to provide a clear explanation as to whether this means that 
the Board must consider de-listing the country from the list of Candidate countries.^" Such 
decisions are however made ensuing second rather than first Validation of the country, thus 
clearly evidencing the fact that country is not capable or rather willing to implement the 
Initiative’s directions.
It would now be helpful to provide an overview of Azerbaijan as a country, and explain 
attempt to look into the reasons behind its decision to join the EITI.
'"EITI Validation Guide (n 14) 8.
"ibid.
''ibid 4.
"This was confirmed by the EITI when clarifications were sought.
"See EITI Criteria at < httn://eiti.orG/eiti/princinles> accessed 14 May 2013 
"  EITI Validation Guide (n 14) 4.
Ibid 8.
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5.3 Azerbaijan and the EITI
The EITI implementation in Azerbaijan is overseen by the National Committee on the EITI, 
which is chaired by the SOFAZ/^ With the launch of the Initiative in Azerbaijan, a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was prepared and signed by the country’s 
government and the rest of the stakeholders, the latter including extractive companies
operating in the country and the civil society representatives/^ The MOU promulgates a set 
of rules, as well as the intentions of the parties involved, to be followed by all the signatory 
parties when conducting an audit for the purposes of the subsequent disclosure of revenues/" 
The disclosure is done by means of a report'"' which is made available to the public. Since 
joining the EITI, Azerbaijan has completed nine EITI reports, which were published twice a 
year/' Throughout the preparation of reports and in general, during the implementation of 
the EITI, Azerbaijan did not require any financial or other assistance. The country managed 
to undergo all stages of the implementation process without external intervention.^^
In January 2009 Azerbaijan was the first country to undertake the EITI Validation and thus to 
ascertain its status as a compliant country. The process took place in two stages. The first 
stage was a preparatory phase, during which the validation team had a chance to review all 
the relevant documentation on the EITI process in Azerbaijan, these documents include the 
Memorandum of Understanding and the previous reports that had been published by the EITI 
Azerbaijan. The team also held discussions with the EITI Secretariat about the Validation 
approach and the methodology they were expected to exercise. The team also collected 
confidential submissions from all the parties to the MOU and requested the participating 
companies in Azerbaijan to complete Validation Company Self Assessment f o r m s . T h e  
second stage of the Validation took place in Baku, where the Validation team held meetings 
with the Azerbaijani Working Group. The time during the meetings was spent on discussions.
"For more information on the Oil Fund (SOFAZ) and its objectives visit <http://www.oilfund.az/cn/contcnt/2 
(accessed 20 September 2012); http://www.oilfund.az/cn/content/3> (accessed 14 May 2013)
"For a list o f participants in Azerbaijan read EITI Secretariat, ‘EITI Implementation in Azerbaijan’ at 
http://WWW.oiIfund.az/eiti/en/content/2/2/ (accessed 20 September 2010)
'^A copy o f  the Memorandum o f Understanding can be obtained from the EITI at
< h t t p : / / e i t r a n s p a r e n c v . o r G / U s e r F i I e s / F i I c / a z e r b a i j a n r c n o r t s / a z e r b a i i a n m o u . p d f >  (accessed 15 December 2009) 
'^Ibid 2.
'"Copies o f  the reports can be obtained from SOFAZ website at < http://www.oiIfund.az/en/account> (accessed 
15 May 2013)
^'international financial institutions play an increasingly important role in supporting the EITI. Several major 
international financing institutions support the EITI, including the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank 
o f  Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
W orld Bank Group. These organisations are active in providing technical assistance to implementing countries 
and outreach to resource-rich countries.
" a  copy o f  the Company forms can be found in Annex 2 o f  ‘Validation o f  the EITI in the Republic o f  
Azerbaijan’ (n 38)
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where each stakeholder group expressed their views and feedback on the position of the EITI 
implementation in Azerbaijan. Based on the oral and written feedback and following the
Validation Guide and the Assessment Tools, the Validator prepared a report. It is worth 
mentioning at this stage, that Validator had no other information apart from that given to him
by the stakeholders. The Validation process has no relation whatsoever to the audit reports. 
Similarly, the Validation team makes no onsite visits or any other in action involvement into 
the day-to-day efforts of all those involved in the implementation of the initiative.
The country has been given a Compliant country status, notwithstanding that the Validation 
report, assembled based on the Validation Grid Indicators has shown what may seem as 
considerable flaws.
5.4 Azerbaijan’s EITI Validation Process; a step by step analysis
The EITI Validation in Azerbaijan was undertaken by a consortium led by Coffey 
International Development, in association with International Petroleum Associates Norway 
(IPAN) and PKF. The Validation team had to assess the progress made against the Work 
Plan, or in case with Azerbaijan the MOU, followed by the assessment of the progress against 
the Indicators as presented in the EITI Validation Grid. The step-by-step description and 
analysis of the particular Validation is as follows.
Indicator 1: Has the government issued an unequivocal public statement of its intention 
to implement EITI?
According to the Validator’s report, this Indicator has been met by Azerbaijan. Indeed, after 
the launch of the EITI at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 
September 2002, President Heydar Aliyev indicated the willingness of Azerbaijan to support 
and join the EITI. A delegation headed by Ilham Aliyev participated in the first EITI 
Conference at Lancaster House on 17 June 2003 where Azerbaijan officially declared its 
decision to join the EITI and to become a pilot country. This is a fact to which all the 
stakeholders in Azerbaijan EITI agreed.
Indicator 2: Has the government committed to work with civil society and companies on 
EITI implementation?
On 24 November 2004, following a period of negotiations, the MOU was signed by the 
National Committee on EITI, the Coalition of NGOs for Improving Transparency in
132
Extractive Industries, as well as foreign and local extractive industry companies/'' The 
number of NGOs participating in the Azerbaijan’s EITI implementation has since grown. The 
number of individual members has also grown since the signing of the MOU in 2004.'^ The 
MOU also contains the names of the companies operating on the territory of Azerbaijan and 
which have also signed up to the MOU.
In the MOU the signatory parties agreed to support Azerbaijan’s dedication to follow the 
principles of the EITI and thus set out their commitment to report all the payments/allocations 
received by the country’s government: all the payments made by local and foreign companies 
involved in the exploitation of Azeri natural resources to the government. The MOU also sets 
out the format which the reports from all those involved should take. Moreover, it refers to 
the process of selection of an internationally recognised audit company, whose purpose 
revolves around reviewing and collating the reports submitted by the government, the local 
and foreign companies, as well as in drafting findings on the reports submitted.
Based on this, the Validator, along with the stakeholders, agreed that this particular Indicator 
has been met.
Indicator 3: Has the government appointed a senior individual to lead on EITI 
implementation?
Pursuant to the Ordinance of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan 224 
Part I, it has been decided that taking into account that the Republic of Azerbaijan joined the 
EITI to establish a National Committee on EITI for the realisation of the requirements arising 
out of the Republic of Azerbaijan joining the EITI. The EITI National Committee consists of 
a Chairman of the Committee and the Members of the Committee.''" The newly updated list 
of the Committee Members can be found in the text of the Ordinance of Ministers of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan FIs 3 6 3 . Similarly, it is ascertained in the Ordinance Fib 224 that the 
Executive Director of the State Oil Fund (the earlier mentioned SOFAZ) should be the 
chairman of the National Committee on EITI implementation. The EITI Chair heads the 
national committee on EITI, which includes representatives of all ministries and government 
agencies engaged in the extractive industries, including the ministries of foreign affairs.
'^ F^or a list o f all the most recent signatories to the MOU, see “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
Committee o f the Republic o f  Azerbaijan: Independent Accountants' Report for the year ended 31 December 
2012" pg. 27-28
< http://www.oilfund.az/pub/uploads/HW GKW H2U.ndf > accessed 13 May 2013 
'^ 'ibid.
'*^ Text o f  the Ordinance o f the Cabinet o f  Ministers o f the Republic o f  Azerbaijan JV» 224 Part I along with the 
list o f  the Members o f  the EITI Committee can be found at <http://www.oi I fund.az/en/content/14/45> accessed 
21 December 2009
" < http://www.oilfund.az/en/contcnt/14/44> accessed 21 December 2009
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economic development, energy and industry, finance, tax, ecology and natural resources, 
statistics, and the state oil company/^
Furthermore, the Ordinance Fib 224 Part II states the duties and responsibilities of the 
Committee, in particular, determining the content and period for submitting reports about
benefits of the state bodies related to the extractive sector, state companies and other state 
property institutions (including the benefits from payments by foreign and domestic 
companies) in the Republic of Azerbaijan and providing aggregation of data/" Moreover, the 
National Committee is responsible for preparing the general country reporting form on the 
basis of the disclosed data in accordance with the reporting form accepted by EITI 
participants and publishing the report in the press as well as the website, the creation of 
maintenance of which is also within the Committee’s obligation/" Thus far, the Committee 
has published reports which can be found at the designated website/'
The facts above therefore support the Validator’s decision that Azerbaijan has met the 
particular indicator. Indeed, the Ordinances made by the government look explicit in their 
contents and unambiguous as to their explanation with regard to the EITI National 
Committee, its members and their duties and obligations respectively.
Indicator 4: Has a fully costed Work Plan been published and made widely available, 
containing measurable targets, a timetable for implementation and an assessment of 
capacity constraints?
So far Azerbaijan has not come up with a country Work Plan, which is one of the crucial 
stages in EITI implementation and thus especially important for Validation purposes/^ As 
has already been mentioned, a country Work Plan is a document which contains a public.
"O rdinance o f  the Cabinet o f  Ministers o f the Republic o f Azerbaijan JVb 224, Part I (Members o f the 
Committee)
"ibid. Part II states that the Committee is charged with 1) Determining the content and period for submitting 
reports about benefits o f  the state bodies related to the extractive sector, state companies and other state property
institutions (including the benefits from payments by foreign and domestic companies) in the Republic o f  
Azerbaijan and providing aggregation o f  data; 2) Preparing the general country reporting form on the basis o f 
the disclosed data in accordance with the reporting form accepted by EITI participants and publishing the report 
in the press and realizing cooperation with the foreign extractive companies in the Republic o f  Azerbaijan as 
well as the Department for International Department o f  the United Kingdom which is the coordination office o f 
the EITI for preparation o f  the reporting forms; 3) Launch a web site for the Committee with the aim o f 
publicizing the activity o f  the Committee.
'°Ibid, Part II (2) and Part II (3)
''v is it < http://w w w .eiti-az.orG /ts ucn/enG /fcal/indcx fl0 .nhn> accessed 21 December 2009 
"The Indicator Assessment Tool for this indicator states that the Work Plan is the foundation o f  the country 
validation process. A key element o f the country validation process is whether the timetable for implementation 
is being followed.
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financially sustainable work plan, including measurable targets, a timetable for 
implementation and an assessment of potential capacity constraints/^ It is therefore one of
the essential documents for validation purposes, as it allows the Validator to see whether the 
timetable as set in the Work Plan has been properly followed. Without such documentation, 
the Validator has nothing against what he can conciliate the real achievements. The 
Azerbaijani government argued, and the Validator agreed, that the MOU is a similar 
document and thus serves the same purpose as the Work Plan, hence making the country 
compliant with that particular progress indicator.
It must however be noted that, although the MOU does include some of the information 
which is expected to be covered by the Work Plan, it omits some, of what should be 
perceived as vital, components. One of these elements is the timetable for implementation. 
Indeed, the government of Azerbaijan did manage to fulfil the implementation requirements 
within the two-year phase. However, this timescale, or any other for that matter, had not been 
mentioned in the MOU at the time of it coming into force. Moreover, the Work Plan is 
required to contain a section on how the country plans to pay for the validation. Although it 
has become clear that Azerbaijan did not require external financial aid, this should have 
nevertheless been included into the Work Plan in advance. In general, a properly constructed 
Work Plan will allow the government but most importantly the civil society to develop 
adequate plans and schemes which enable the realisation of what should be clearly structured 
tasks. Even though the Validator decided to accept the indicator as having been met, it must 
be stated that this was done notwithstanding the lack of a clear Work Plan, and based on what 
can be called only as partial fulfilment of the indicator. Even then, it is still difficult to assess 
whether the compliance with the indicator was met fully or partially, as the Validator had 
never been presented with a clearly structured document with regard to the areas which are 
covered by the indicator, to assess if they were or were not met. At this stage it should also be 
mentioned that perhaps the main reason behind the waiver of the Work Plan was the fact that 
Azerbaijan started and developed the EITI process and published the reports prior to the EITI 
Validation guide being published. Taking into consideration the fact that Azerbaijan was one 
of the first countries to have the EITI implementation experience, it was agreed that certain 
allowances could be made.
Overall this leads to the main pitfall in the implementation process that the government 
should not be allowed to waive some requirements and replace them, on ad hoc bases, with
" ‘EITI Validation Guide’ (n 14) 10
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those which seem more suitable or convenient. Such acts on behalf of governments, if 
persistently permitted and waived by the EITI Validation team and the EITI Board, can create 
a precedent, which with the time will undermine the entire purpose and more importantly, the 
effectiveness of the EITI.
The Validators, in their report, state that a new Work Plan has recently been drafted and sets 
out the established EITI process as agreed in the MOU. However, since its distribution for 
comments on 12 January 2009, the Work Plan awaited approval by the MSG. The 
government of Azerbaijan was reluctant to accept the Work Plan, claiming that the already 
existing MOU covered all the necessary areas and served the practical point behind the idea 
of a Work Plan. It was left in the hands of the stakeholders to negotiate and decide the 
outcome of the talks. At some point, the EITI Secretariat was apprehensive of the possible 
failure in negotiations held between the stakeholders. Such failure could put the entire 
Initiative in Azerbaijan at risk. Although this diversity to shape the EITI into something 
which is distinct and relevant for each country is a core strength of the EITI, but at the same 
time it creates a lot of confusion and instability, thus weakening the Initiative overall. It must 
be mentioned, that after long negotiations, the MSG finally managed to agree on a work 
plan.^''
Indicator 5: Has the government established a multi-stakeholder group to oversee EITI 
implementation?
Having mentioned certain waivers which were allowed in the case of Azerbaijan, one should 
mention that the formation of the MSG was one of them. According to the lAT for this 
indicator, implementation of the Initiative should be overseen by a group comprising all 
appropriate stakeholders. The stakeholders must represent, amongst many, the private sector, 
civil society and relevant government ministries. Upon the formation of the group, the 
members should agree on terms of reference, which should include, but not restricted to, the 
process for selection and appointment of auditors to undertake audits where data submitted 
for reconciliation by companies or the government are not already based on international 
audit standards. The terms of reference should also include the Work Plan and the aims of its 
revision when necessary.
In the case of Azerbaijan, a MSG was not formed, as required by the EITI rules. Instead, the 
country decided to create two EITI committees -  one for the selection of the audit company 
preparing the EITI reports and one for the selection of the Validator and oversight of the
copy o f  the current Work Plan can be accessed at <httn://eiti.orG/Azcrbaiian/imnlcmcntation> accessed 14
February 2014
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validation exercise/^ Each committee was comprised of three members, each being a 
representative of the EITI stakeholder group that is government, civil society and companies. 
In addition, other ad hoc committees can also be set up. This arrangement fulfils the
requirement of setting up an EITI MSG, albeit partially. Nevertheless, from a theoretical and 
even practical perspective this clearly does not satisfy the idea behind the establishment of a 
permanent MSG, whose responsibility includes constant overseeing of the EITI 
implementation in the country. Formation of such an MSG would enable the selected 
members to discuss how the EITI implementation process can be developed and strengthened 
further. Furthermore, the existence of the group can assure the EITI implementation and the 
Initiative in general has an appropriate place on the country’s agenda.
The chosen system, according to the government, was more flexible and it allowed each 
stakeholder group to select representatives for each ad hoc committee that are best qualified 
for each specific issue. At the same time, the civil society representatives criticised that the 
arrangement did not give the civil society a chance to play an active role in the EITI in 
Azerbaijan, allowing the government to dictate the EITI agenda. Similarly, some companies 
chose to ignore a number of queries made by the civil society with regard to some reports. 
Without a permanent MSG responsible for the EITI implementation in Azerbaijan, the 
concerns raised and the progress of the Initiative in general, could not be given the sufficient 
attention as required. Moreover, the civil society representatives were worried that the 
government of Azerbaijan, having the country reached a certain minimum with regard to the 
EITI criteria for implementation, would be reluctant to take the implementation further. "^ 
Following the visit of the Validation team to Baku in January 2009, and acting upon their 
recommendations, the Azerbaijan EITI Secretariat proposed the formation of a formal MSG 
on January 30'", to which all parties to the MOU endorsed their proposals. The MSG was 
finally formed in 2010.
Indicator 6: Is civil society engaged in the process?
Overall civil society’s engagement in the EITI implementation in Azerbaijan can be 
described as active. Civil society has been engaged in the EITI implementation since the very 
beginning of the country’s assertion of the Initiative. A group consisting of non-govemmental 
organisations has been present, and therefore became a signatory party to the MOU. Since 
then more NGOs have joined the group, thus increasing even further the level of participation 
of civil society in Azerbaijan’s EITI stakeholder group. Subsequent to civil society’s
" ‘Validation o f the EITI in the Republic o f  Azerbaijan’ (n 38) 8
56Ibid.
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engagement in the Initiative, a website has been created where the group actively informs the 
public of any developments with regard to EITI implementation and other infbnnation 
thereof/^ Despite their active participation, the Coalition argues that it has not got enough 
power to conduct their duties. In most cases their requests are being ignored, especially by 
the companies .Thi s  again underlines the problem of the lack of a permanent MSG, the 
presence of which would give more substantial power to its members, and especially to the 
civil society.
At this stage it is important to mention that civil society in Azerbaijan has proved to be very 
active. Although not necessarily througli EITI, nevertheless the NGOs work hard to improve 
transparency and public awareness in their fight against corruption. Telephone hotlines have 
been installed to allow citizens to report any corruption activities they may have encountered. 
According to the Executive Director of the Fund of Fight Against Corruption, in an interview 
given to an Azeri channel, the number of citizens reporting acts of corruption has risen 
considerably.^" This, however, does not reflect on the progress of the EITI implementation 
itself, but it does show that if civil society is given enough influence within the EITI, it can 
contribute considerably towards the Initiative’s successful implementation.
Indicator 7: Are companies engaged in the process?
As with civil society, so it is with the companies which according to the EITI criteria must be 
actively engaged in the EITI implementation process. It is therefore an important factor 
which the Validator must assess, such as whether the extractive companies that conduct their 
business on the territory of Azerbaijan abide by the EITI advocated principles.
It had been mentioned earlier when illustrating the MOU that companies involved in the 
extractive industries in Azerbaijan are parties to the agreement. This means that according to 
this document they must participate in disclosure of payments made to the government, and 
publish that information in their reports. Although company reporting in Azerbaijan is 
voluntary, all companies in the extractive industries are signatories to the MOU and have 
therefore agreed to report.
At the beginning confidentiality clauses in contracts between the companies and the
government for the extraction of natural resources were seen as major obstacles to EITI 
implementation.
" v isit <www.citi-az.orG> accessed 14 May 2013
" ‘Validation o f  the EITI in the Republic o f Azerbaijan' (n 38)
59,Opposition o f  Citizens Against Corruption Grows in Azerbaijan’ 
< http://www.aznocorruntion.az/enG/news/314-opposition-of-citizens-aGainst.html> accessed 14 May 2013
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In response to requirements for the EITI implementation, the State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan (SOCAR) issued a communication No. 01-44/832 on 18 November 2004, stating 
that disclosure of information about the payments does not contradict the confidentiality 
provisions of the agreements concluded between companies and the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Particularly, the wording of the communication is as follows: “Disclosure of the information 
about the payments constitutes a part of implementation of EITI... and it does not contradict 
the confidentiality provisions of the agreements concluded between your Company or Joint 
Company and the Republic of Azerbaijan.”"" This statement does not, however, make the 
disclosure of infbnnation protected by confidentiality clauses immediately available for 
disclosure, but merely makes it available should the parties to the contract wish to disclose it. 
Moreover, a possible attainment of information that is protected through confidentiality 
clauses, does not necessarily resolve the dilemma of concealment of, what can be seen as, 
unjustifiable payments made to the government officials. Well-drafted contracts can 
guarantee that certain types of information can still be considered as confidential, and not 
applicable for disclosure, without the use of a confidentiality clause.
Indicator 9: Have reporting templates been agreed?
Another setback in company engagement was that with regard to the reporting templates. As 
has already been mentioned, reporting templates were agreed between stakeholders as part of 
the MOU signed in 2004. A manual advising on how to complete the templates has also been 
produced to assist the companies but also the government in their reporting. Nevertheless, 
inconsistencies and various flaws, in particular in company reporting have been noticed. One 
of the shortcomings of the EITI policy is that it allows production share to be reported purely 
in terms of physical amounts (e.g. tonnes or barrels of oil). Azerbaijan, when deciding on the 
template structure, following the EITI Sourcebook, has incorporated the suggestion into its 
template reporting. As a result, reporting templates include volumes of the resource extracted, 
without giving the monetary equivalent. For example, in the 2012 Report a total of 160.8 
millions of barrels of oil was reported by the government and 161.3 millions of barrels were 
reported by the companies as extracted on the territory of Azerbaijan. It further states that 
73.0 million USD was received by the government for oil production."' What the report does 
not do, however, is that it does not convert the amount of 65.7 millions of barrels of oil into
^ ‘Validation o f  the EITI in the Republic o f Azerbaijan' (n 38).
^'The Committee on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative o f  the Republic o f  Azerbaijan Independent 
Report as o f  31 December 2012 < http://eiti.orG/flles/Azerbaiian-2012-ElTl-Report.pdT> accessed 14 February 
2014
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monetary value according to the price of the commodity at the time to which the report is 
referring. Taking into account that one of the main objectives of the Initiative is that reports 
are publicly accessible and comprehensive, the current template structure appear 
contradictory to such an intention. Most citizens in developing countries cannot readily 
convert tonnes of oils of various grades into a monetary figure. Nor, given the very 
significant variations in how production share is calculated and disposed of (taking into 
consideration marketing and transportation arrangements; price differences etc., lead to 
considerable variations in the price of a shipment of oil or gas), is it easy to calculate reported 
physical quantities and equate them to the quantities reported on government receipts.
Another issue with the reporting is the fact that ETTTs scope, according to the EITI criteria, 
intends to cover production share purely in terms of physical amounts, anything additional 
such as security, training and infrastructure, may be included should the country stakeholder 
group decide to do so."^ For example, business expenditures are often counted as a business 
expense (thus reducing corporation liability tax), or may well be delivered by a company in 
return for a lower rate of production royalty."^ In other words, whilst the payments are 
indirect, they are often directly linked to production and may well be material payments. This 
once more illustrates the fragility of the EITI, precisely, the fact that it does not set out clear 
parameters for implementing countries. Consequently, by setting vague criteria and thus 
allowing the implementing countries the prerogative to create their own implementation 
system, the Initiative creates a dilemma for countries and companies to act freely according 
to their demands. In Azerbaijan, for example, the infrastructure contribution by companies as 
well as their payments to the State Social Protection Fund are not included in the templates, 
something that civil society is very keen to include, but is strongly opposed by the 
government and the companies that believe that releasing this kind of information will not 
make any significant difference to the aim behind the reporting and disclosure.
Moreover, civil society has argued from the very beginning that inclusion of disaggregated 
reporting of the companies must be contained within the reporting templates."'' Such 
reporting would allow the people to see which company has made the most contribution in 
terms of payments to the government. Likewise, should the infrastructure contribution be 
included in the templates, it would illustrate which company has contributed most. Such
" ‘Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Source Book’ (EITI Secretariat 2005)
< http://eiti.orG/document/sourcebook > , 26 accessed 14 May 2013 
" ‘Validation o f the EITI in the Republic o f Azerbaijan’ (n 38)
^^Disaggregated reporting involves the disclosure o f payments on a company-by-company basis, unlike the 
currently adopted aggregaW  reporting, which includes a disclosure o f  the overall sum o f  payments made by
extractive companies operating on the territory o f  the host state.
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disclosure would even benefit the companies which have contributed the most. On the other 
hand, it would allow for more transparency and hence provide the public with an opportunity 
to scrutinise those companies which have benefited from the extraction a lot more than they 
have reconstituted. Such observations would create a debate as to which companies are more 
beneficial to have operating within the country.
In addition, the Validation report shows that two companies, Shivran Oil and NICO, at the 
time operating on the territory of Azerbaijan and being signatories to the MOU, had not met 
the first indicator. Precisely, the two aforementioned companies have not made public 
statements in support of the EITI process in the country. Equally, although Azergemeft 
submitted the data of the reconciled figures, this data was not audited from independent 
accounts satisfying international standards.A s a result many companies reported wrong 
figures, thus resulting in reconciliation reports having many discrepancies. These 
discrepancies were then noted and eliminated, but the fact that the companies' passive 
participation yields results adverse to the implementation process, and thus setbacks, has not 
been given enough attention by the Validation team.
Besides, it has been noted by the civil society that many companies have delegated members 
of staff to be their EITI representatives and thus members of the stakeholder panel, despite 
the fact that their rank within the company is very low and they are thus restricted from 
actively participating in the decision-making process. Yet again, no clear course of action 
with regard to such companies is provided by the EITI. The companies have only been given 
a request by the Validator to participate according to the MOU requirements, notwithstanding 
the fact that civil society had expressed their fears on numerous occasions with regard to the 
fact that some companies are reluctant to follow their obligations as per MOU and often 
refuse to co-operate with the civil society. The civil society also expressed its concern that the 
semi-annual reconciliation exercises do not represent an audit undertaken to international 
standards. In addition they argue that certain contracts between the companies and the 
governments should be evaluated. The Validator disagreed with such statements, by 
insisting that it was never intended that semi-annual reconciliation reports should be 
conducted according to the audit terms. The Validator did, however, express his surprise by
Validation o f  the EITI in the Republic o f Azerbaijan’ (n 38) 
^Ibid23.
^Tbid 16.
^*Ibid.
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the number of repeated mistakes made in the company reports and mentioned that such
mistakes place and additional and unnecessary burden upon those involved.
As for the government of Azerbaijan, it must be mentioned that its reports are based on 
figures from the Ministry of Taxes, SOFAZ, SOCAR and the Ministry of Ecology and
National Resources. According to the Validator, SOCAR and SOFAZ have been audited 
according to international standards since 2007 and 2001 respectively.^* Government 
accounts, such as those from the Ministry of Taxes, are audited by the Chamber of Accounts, 
the auditing standards of which are in the process of being harmonised with the international 
standards and according to the plan should be completed by 2010.^^
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the documents required (and used) for the Validation process in 
Azerbaijan. The examination revealed that the country has been granted a Compliant status 
despite not having fulfilled all the requirements. Thus, the Validator had overlooked the fact 
that Azerbaijan had not comprised a thorough Work Plan, as required by the EITI regulations. 
Moreover, some revenue reports showed that not all companies that operated in Azerbaijan at 
the time of the disclosure reported their revenues.
Additionally, the country had not established a properly comprised working group to oversee 
the implementation process. Nevertheless, the country has been awarded Compliant status. 
This examination showed that the Validator was too lenient when making the decision, factor 
that undermines the initiative’s credentials, considering that the Validation process is the 
process that acts as a type of quality assurance mechanism. The decision of the Validator not 
only informs the public of the current position of their state in terms of levels of transparency 
in the extractive industries sector, but is also acted upon by investors when making their 
decisions.
Having reviewed the documents provided by the EITI on the initiative’ status in Azerbaijan, 
the following chapter analyses the data gathered from the survey and assesses the views and 
experiences of the companies and the NGOs, in relation to the implementation of the EITI in
Azerbaijan.
^ I^bid 19. 
^°Ibid 17. 
^'ibid. 
^ I^bid.
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Chapter 6 
The EITI; Questionnaire Analysis
6.1 Introduction
As stated earlier* the methodology adopted for this thesis consisted of both doctrinal and 
empirical research. The previous chapters were concerned with the doctrinal part of the 
research, whereby various academic writings and legal documents related to the area of 
corruption were identified and analysed. The empirical part of this thesis was conducted via 
the distribution of questionnaires and this chapter concentrates on the analysis of the data 
collected through these questionnaires.^ Following the data analysis this chapter proceeds 
with an overall evaluation of the EITI implementation in Azerbaijan and provides comments 
on the overall level of progression of the EITI implementation in Azerbaijan.
6.2 Questionnaire overview
6.2.1 Questionnaire distribution
The issues in relation to the questionnaire distribution were discussed in section 1.2 in 
Chapter 1. As explained there, two questionnaires were designed to enable data collection: 
one for distribution to the civil society^ in Azerbaijan and the other to the oil extracting 
companies that operate in Azerbaijan."* Despite the fact that no questionnaire was sent to 
government representatives, it cannot be said that this omission had an adverse effect on the 
findings. The questions addressed to the two chosen groups did necessarily cover the issues 
relating to government actions.
Although similar in layout, the two questionnaires differed in terms of the nature of questions 
asked, each concentrating on issues specific to each group surveyed.^ On some points, such 
as general questions regarding EITI implementation in the country, both questionnaires had 
similar questions. On the other hand, some questions in each of the two questionnaires were
‘See Chapter 1, Section 1.2
^ h e  reasons for the choice o f this type o f  research methodology and the use o f questionnaires were explained in
earlier in Chapter 1, section 1.2.
T o r  the purposes of this thesis, civil society is defined based on the definition provided by the World Bank, and 
refers to "non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the 
interests and values o f their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientihc, religious or 
philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide o f array of 
organizations: community groups, non governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, 
charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations" 
<http://web.worldbank.orgAVBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0„contentMDK:20101499-menuPK:244752~ 
pagePK:220503-piPK:220476-theSitePK:228717,00.html > accessed 12 January 2014 
T easons for choosing these two groups were identified earlier in Chapter 2, section 2.1 
^Responses on file with the author.
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related to the types of participating groups to which the questionnaire was addressed. Thus, 
for example in the questionnaire addressed to companies (Questionnaire I), questions 
included those related to legislative obstacles, and so on.
The list of companies participating in the initiative and which operate in Azerbaijan was 
taken from the EITI website. As for civil society, to whom Questionnaire II was addressed, 
the choice of organisations was made based on the list of those that signed the initial 
Memorandum of Understanding in Azerbaijan. Additionally, however, it was decided to send 
Questionnaire II to NGOs and other organisations which are registered and operate in 
Azerbaijan, and have as their main objective the fight against corruption, but which have not 
signed up to the EITI implementation. These NGOs were found through an international 
registry of NGOs and were selected based on the description of the work they do and the 
objectives of each organisation.^ In addition, one public anti corruption organisation was 
identified during the research, which according to its description plays an important role in 
the fight against corruption in the country. Thus, it was believed to be appropriate to send 
Questionnaire II to this organisation as well. For the ease of data analysis, this particular 
organisation and its response will be included in the analysis of the data received from civil 
society.
The intention of sending the questionnaire to the latter group was to identify the extent to 
which registered anti-corruption NGOs and other anti corruption organisations in the country, 
which are not parties to the EITI, are involved in the EITI implementation. The reason was 
also to seek the extent of their knowledge in relation to the EITFs effect on Azerbaijan’s
corruption levels.
Thus, 28 participants were chosen as a survey sample. However, when preparing 
questionnaires for sending, it became apparent that some of the electronic mail addresses
provided were non-existent and the correspondence would not go through. Hence, 21 
questionnaires were successfully sent to the intended recipients.
6.2.2 Questionnaire design
Having decided on the method of data collection, it was important to design the actual 
questions, taking into account the fact that the interviewer would not be present when the
<^httD://www.wanEo.ore/aboul:.asDx> The World Association o f Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) 
is an international organisation uniting NGOs worldwide in the cause o f advancing peace and global well-being. 
WANGO helps to provide the mechanism and support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, share, inspire, and 
multiply their contributions to solve hum anity’s basic problems.
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questionnaires are being answered. Two types of questions were taken into consideration: 
closed and open. Closed questions are preferred in quantitative survey research, as they 
provide the respondent with a limited number of options from which to choose the answer.  ^
These types of questions ensure ease of response and tend to maximise questionnaire returns.  ^
On the other hand, open-ended questions allow the respondent to answer the question in a 
number of ways and tend to encourage the participants to be more open about their attitudes, 
thoughts or feelings.^ Having both types of questions as part of the questionnaires enables the 
analysis to take both quantitative and qualitative forms and thus allows for a better evaluation 
of the topic in a sense that results can also be demonstialed in the form of graphs, to enable a 
better picture of the situation addressed.
When designing questions, the objectives of the survey were taken into account. The aim of 
the questions was to obtain information from people who directly or indirectly participate in 
the implementation of the EITI, or follow its implementation in Azerbaijan closely. The 
information, being of a practical nature, could not be extracted through doctrinal research. 
Some of the questions on both questionnaires were identical, while others were different as 
the addressed questions were specific in nature and directed at a particular group of 
respondents. Thus, at times, the questionnaire addressed to companies contained different 
questions from the questionnaire addressed to the civil society groups.
The questionnaire addressed to civil society representatives included questions that related to 
their connection to the EITI implementation in Azerbaijan. This was set up to identify 
whether the person responding was a representative of an NGO or simply a concerned 
individual who decided to join the civil society group of the EITI in Azerbaijan. Questions 
were also made to identify the levels of easiness and comprehensibility of the EITI reports, 
particularly for Azeri citizens. Participants in this group were also asked whether Azerbaijan 
had any other mechanism which required the publication of revenues and the promotion of 
transparency. One of the questions had as its main objective to see the reason that prompted 
the government of Azerbaijan to participate in the initiative. This question was designed with 
the intention of identifying which internal or external factors prompt governments to join the 
initiative.
^Simeon J. Yates, Doing Social Science Research (SAGE Publications 2004)
Tioyd J. Fowler, Jr., Swrvgy /(ejgarc/z ( Lenard Bickman and Debra J. Rog eds., T'' edition, SAGE
Publications 2009) 72 
T)id.
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Similar questions were addressed to company representatives. Questions included those 
related to a company's reporting mechanisms. Companies were asked whether they had any 
other reporting mechanisms, not linked to the EITI. Companies were also asked to address 
any impediments in relation to disclosure required under the EITI. Some questions were also 
related to subsidiary companies and their responsibility to disclose payments.
Both questionnaires included questions in relation to training received and relationship with 
the EITI headquarters. The reason for asking these questions was to identify how the EITI 
mechanism works in practice, particularly, the extent to which the EITI headquarters are 
involved in the Initiative’s implementation on the ground.
Questions were also designed to identify whether there were any obstacles in relation to 
disclosure and the extent of the information available for disclosure. This question was 
particularly important in relation to the companies that participate in the EITI. As far as the 
civil society was concerned, it was important to ask whether contract disclosure existed in the
country and if so, to what extent the information was easily accessible.
Finally, both questionnaires were designed to find out whether participants could comment 
on any improvements that they might have noticed in relation to the reduction in the levels of 
corruption in the country.
The number of questions included in the questionnaires was important. It needed to be 
sufficient to cover all the issues needed to be addressed, while at the same time not too long, 
as to make the questionnaire more attractive and encourage participation. Therefore, the 
questionnaire sent to companies consisted of 39 questions, while the questionnaire sent to 
members of the civil society had 33 questions.
The choice of the wording of the questions was also important since acceptability and validity 
of the survey depends on the way in which the questions are phrased.C onsidering that the 
questionnaires were written in English, which for most of the participants would not be their 
mother tongue, simpler words and easy terminology were used, to ensure that participants did 
not face any ambiguous terms and that the accuracy of responses was not jeopardised. * * In 
order to maximise the validity of the data received through questionnaires, it is essential that
"Tbid.
" if the respondents do not understand what the questions asks for, or do not have the same understanding o f  
what the questions mean, there is a high risk of receiving incorrect results. In his research, Fowler has shown 
that people tend to answer questionnaire questions even when they do not exactly understand their meaning. 
And since researchers cannot assume that the respondents will ask for clarifications, the data collected would 
produce distorted results. See Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., Survey Research Methods (Lenard Bickman and Debra J. 
Rog eds., 4'*’ edition, SAGE Publications 2009) 106
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the questions are written in a way which is consistently understood by all respondents.*  ^
Since the function of a question in a questionnaire is to obtain a particular communication 
that the respondent possesses, possible misunderstandings provoked in the respondent, the 
choice or phrasing of the questions and the choices for possible answers, all have influences 
on the final result.*  ^ Questions must also be worded in such a way as to motivate the 
respondent to continue with the questionnaire.*'* There was a possibility to make the 
questionnaires more flexible by allowing respondents to use Russian when responding. 
However, in order to avoid having a questionnaire sheet which included questions in one 
language and answers in another, the respondents were sent an English version of the relevant 
type of the standardised questionnaire, but were given an option to request a fully translated 
Russian version. It must be noted that none of the respondents requested a translated version. 
It can, therefore, be concluded from this that most of them had a good command of English 
and did not have any problems answering the questions.*^
Another aspect of maintaining the respondents’ co-operation that was taken into account 
while creating the questionnaire was the fact of making the questionnaires more appealing. In 
the self-completion type of questionnaires, the layout of questions, spacing, answering 
directions and so forth, must be considered carefully.*  ^This is why questions which were in 
the form of a multiple -choice layout were made in such a way so as to ensure consistency in 
the layout of the answers. The number of open-ended questions was reduced to a minimum. 
This is due to the fact that these usually require thought and writing on the part of the 
respondent and tend to make questionnaires less appealing.*^
In addition, each questionnaire contained instructions to the respondents. These instructions 
included answering procedures,*  ^ as well as routing directions or skipping to instructions.*  ^
Also, following the common practice in self-administered questionnaires,^** definitions of
various terms used within the questionnaire were provided.
Having constructed the questionnaires, and having obtained all the available email addresses 
of the participants, overall, 21 questionnaires were sent out. Ten copies of questionnaire I
"Ibid.
‘^A.N. Oppenheim, Dgjfgn, //îfervigvvmg (Continuum 1992), 121
‘'‘ibid.
“’On one occasion a representative o f an NGO said that although she personally did not know English, there was 
a translator available at the organisation who normally assisted her in these types of tasks 
‘^A.N. Oppenheim (n 13)
"ibid.
‘Tor example see Questionnaire I, question 4 
‘Tor example see Questionnaire I, question 22 
^"A.N. Oppenheim (n 13)
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were distributed to extractive companies that operate in Azerbaijan, and 11 ^copies of 
questionnaire II were sent to 10 NGOs and one public anti-corruption organisation, all of 
which operate in Azerbaijan.
Table 6.1 Questionnaire distribution figures 21
Questionnaire
Complete questionnaires re­
turned
Questionnaires returned with 
an explanation 
No response recei\ed
Based on the data collected from the questionnaires.
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Questionnaire I
I Complete questionnaires re­
turned
I Questionnaires retuned with an 
explanation 
I No response recei\^d
6.3 Questionnaire analysis
6.3.1 Response overview
Data analysis consists of distinct activities. The first one is assembling the collected data."^  ^
As far as the data collected is concerned, in relation to companies, three completed 
questionnaires were returned and one questionnaire was returned blank with an explanation. 
Thus, 40 per cent of companies responded to the questionnaire, either in full or by simply 
sending an explanation. While in relation to civil society, four questionnaires were returned 
complete by representatives of the NGOs and two were returned blank with an explanation. 
One of the blank questionnaires was returned by the public anti-corruption organisation, 
which stated that it had no involvement with the EITI implementation in the country. This 
equals to an overall 55 per cent response rate to Questionnaire II.
For the purposes of an overall quantitative data collection, seven completed questionnaires 
were used. For the purposes of the overall analysis of the current EITI implementation in 
Azerbaijan, the explanations accompanying the return of the three blank questionnaires were 
also used.^^ In total, out of 21 distributed questionnaires, 10 were used for the purposes of 
data analysis, which means that there was a 48 per cent turnout of responses.
^^Steven J. Taylor and Robert Bogdan, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A Guidebook and 
Resource (Third Edition, John Wiley & Sons, INC 1998) 141 
^^Copies of email responses on file with the author.
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Having sent out the questionnaires and obtained data from them it is necessary to analyse 
them. As nowadays most of the data collected are analysed through the use of a personal 
computer, the same method is applied in analysing the data for the purposes of this thesis.^ "* 
The method of analysis depends upon the data produced.^  ^ For this purpose, the use of 
nominal and ordinal variables is employed. Nominal variables are those that are identified by 
names, such as type of training received'. On the other hand, ordinal variables rank the 
differences in replies; for example, answers in relation to the degree of comprehensibility of 
EITI reports.^*’ For this reason, some of the questions were in the form of the Likert scale. 
Subsequently, when analysed, the answers were represented through bar charts.
It was not possible to send the civil society questionnaire to all the organisations listed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. Although the entities are listed as participants in the 
initiative, it was impossible to find their contact details either on the EITI-dedicated website 
in Azerbaijan or on the World Wide Web in general. Moreover, some of the NGOs’ 
addresses that were provided, which in some cases contained only an electronic mail 
addresses, turned out to be out of date and therefore the questionnaires did not reach the 
intended recipients. In addition, the new report that was published by the EITI in Azerbaijan 
after the questionnaires were already distributed revealed that the number of NGOs that are 
now also parties to the Memorandum has increased as more NGOs and individuals have 
joined. No contact details for either the NGOs or private individuals can be accessed on the 
EITI Secretariat's or EITI Azerbaijan's websites. This creates many difficulties when the need 
to contact these organisations and individuals arises.
As far as contacting the companies participating in the initiative, the EITI site provides only 
the list of those companies that have signed up to the initiative, and even then it states that the 
list provided is not complete. Since similar difficulties of contacting the NGOs were also 
noticed, at this point of the research it became obvious that the list of EITI participants and 
their contact details should be clearer and up to date. As a result, of the overall seven 
companies that were approached, only three companies returned completed questionnaires,
‘T im  May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (Open University Press 2001) 24 
Ibid.
^T)id.
"A ttitudes are often difficult to quantify (e.g. “bad”, “good” etc). As a result various techniques exist that 
facilitate the quantification and evaluation. One o f these is a rating scale. The rating scale is often useful when a 
behaviour or attitude needs to be evaluated. Rating scales were developed by Rensis Likert. This is also called 
the summated rating approach. Items in a Likert scale can look interesting to respondents, and people often 
respond positively. It has also the advantage of being relatively easy to develop. For samples of a Likert scale 
and how it is used see Colin Robson, Real World Research (Second Edition, Blackwell Publishing 2002), 293- 
295
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whereas one US company responded by stating that it does not participate in surveys. On the 
other hand, out of those that sent positive responses (that is, completed questionnaires) two of 
the major European companies provided full responses to all the questions, whereas one 
Asian company responded by answering only some of the questions claiming that it was not 
able to answer all the questions due to lack of knowledge regarding the Initiative.
Surprisingly, two leading anti-corruption organisations, one an NGO and another a public 
organisation in Azerbaijan, responded by stating that they were not involved with the EITI 
and were therefore unable to comment on any questions related to the EITI implementation.^  ^
The survey confirmed the assumptions made in chapter four, that the EITI rules must make 
clearer the criteria that need to be followed by each participating country when selecting 
NGOs to become parties to implementation. Perhaps the EITI Secretariat should play a more 
proactive role in the selection of NGOs and other civil society participants to ensure that their 
contribution is essential to EITI implementation. A recent update of the EITI standards 
continues to fail to identify clear criteria for the selection process.A lthough requirement 1 
states that the government of the participating country must ensure that civil society actively 
participates in the implementation of the EITI, no clear guidelines for the selection of the 
participants are provided."*** The guidance should specifically state what criteria should be 
taken into account during the selection process.
While conducting the doctrinal research of the EITI criteria as well as collection of data 
through the questionnaires it was worrying to learn that some important anti-corruption 
NGOs in Azerbaijan are not party to the Memorandum and are not participating in the 
initiative at all. Thus, when some anti-corruption NGOs in Azerbaijan were asked to respond 
to the questionnaire, they were not in a position to respond, stating that they do not take part 
in the initiative’s implementation in the country and therefore do not possess any information 
regarding its implementation. Moreover, when asked, they were unable to answer even the 
last question in the questionnaire, which only required general comments in relation to the 
initiative. This shows that some anti-corruption NGOs do not possess even general 
knowledge in relation to the EITI implementation in the country of their operation.
This response raises two concerns. Firstly, since the EITI does not provide clear instructions 
on the selection process, and certain anti-corruption organisations do not participate in any
‘^‘Responses 2 and 3 (responses are on file with the author)
"E IT I International Secretariat, The EITI Standard (11 July 2013) < http://eiti.org/document/standard> accessed 
1 September 2013
^% id, EITI Requirement 1, Section 1.3
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way in the implementation process, it would be appropriate for the EITI to take a more 
proactive role in overseeing participation. In order to increase the credibility of the civil 
society, an independent selection panel must conduct the selection process of participants. 
The selection panel should consist of representatives from the EITI Secretariat, which would 
select participants based on a set of criteria. These criteria could include the nature of work 
that participants are engaged in, and the extent of their work in relation to corruption. The 
problem with such a selection process could be that independent representatives from the 
EITI Secretariat may not be fully aware of the real nature of work of certain members of civil 
society in each country. Factors such as high dependence on donors and civil society's ability 
to receive access to budgetary resources may affect the operation of the participants. 
Moreover, CSOs often lack clear, enforceable rules that govern the ways in which their 
officials relate to beneficiaries.
The EITI must ensure the existence of good communication links between all those 
organisations which may have some relevance to fight against corruption in the country and 
the rest of the civil society which is directly involved in the EITI, taking into account the fact 
that all these parties have the fight against corruption as their main pursuit.
According to Fung, Graham and Weil, following their research into effective transparency 
mechanisms, effectiveness of transparency depends heavily on two factors. Firstly, in order to 
be successful, transparency policies need to be user-centred. Thus, successful transparency 
policies need to place individuals and groups who will use the disclosed information at centre 
stage. *^ Based on this, one can state that the EITI in Azerbaijan is not user-centred. Not all 
those who can use and disseminate the disclosed information are involved in the Initiative's 
implementation, while those who are involved, do not seem to be contactable.
6.3.2 Data coding
Once the data was assembled, the next step consisted of coding the data. During this phase, 
the data were carefully studied in order to identify themes into which they could be divided 
for the purposes of ease of analysis.^  ^In qualitative data analysis, coding is an important way 
of developing and refining the data. Apart from giving codes to participants for ease of 
reference, the process involves assembling and analysing all the data collected, which bears
"A rchon Fung, Mary Graham & David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise o f  Transparency 
(Cambridge University Press 2007)
^^Steven J. Taylor and Robert Bogdan (n 22) 143. In qualitative research it is important to look for themes by 
examining the data in as many ways as possible.
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the same themes.^  ^ For the purposes of this data analysis it was not very difficult to develop 
the themes, as they were automatically developed based on the questionnaire questions, 
which were structured in such a way so as to cover various themes related to the EITI
implementation.
As themes were noted down, the data within each theme were compared to identify any 
similarities and differences.^"*As such, the analysis that follows is structured based on the
themes which were identified.
6.3.3 Reasons for joining the EITI
One of the issues addressed as part of the questionnaire was the reason for joining the EITI. 
The reason behind this question was to identify what circumstances prompted the government 
of Azerbaijan to join the initiative. Representatives of civil society were to state what, 
according to them, was the main reason why the government of Azerbaijan joined the 
Initiative. Responses received to this question were disparate. One of the respondents. 
Respondent B, stated that the main reason was the pressure from the international 
community. Respondent A stated that: ''Process is advantageous for the government",while 
Respondent D thought that it was a matter of "PR".^  ^The other two respondents thought that 
the reasons were the pressure from the international community and contractual requirements 
with the foreign companies respectively.
As for the companies, two of the responding companies stated that they joined the Initiative 
voluntarily. Judging from their answers to question 4 that followed, these companies had 
been disclosing their revenues even prior to joining the EITI. One was disclosing its revenues 
as part of its sustainability report,w hile the other as part of quarterly business updates.^  ^
Both stated that the reason for disclosure was a part of a voluntary code of conduct.^  ^
Respondent B stated that it was disclosing payments as it was part of a consortium of 
companies that operate in Azerbaijan, and that "all consortium parties disclose 
information”.'***
^ I^bid 151.
^By studying themes and looking for and relating different pieces of data, the researcher is able to come up with
generalisations. See Steven J. Taylor and Robert Bogdan (n 22) 145
^^Questionnaire 11, Respondent A
^^Questionnaire 11, Respondent D
^^Questionnaire I, Respondent C
^^Questionnaire 1, Respondent A
^The companies did not specify which voluntary code of conduct they implemented.
^Questionnaire 1, Respondent B
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The above responses make it difficult to analyse how effective the EITI was in promoting 
disclosure amongst companies. The responses do not provide a clear indication that the EÏTT 
has encouraged wider disclosure amongst companies. This assumption can also be supported
by the fact that the EITI Coalition has raised its concerns in relation to the fact that some of 
the companies operating in Azerbaijan do not pass audit inspection in full."**
6.3.4 Training
Overall the survey suggested that most of the NGO participants were content with the amount 
and type of training received in terms of the EITI implementation. This way the data
collected from the responses received from civil society showed that various international 
NGOs were at the heart of organising training, which was done in the form of seminars. 
Some NGOs stated that they would prefer if the training was conducted by the EITI 
Secretariat, or at least if the level of engagement from the Secretariat was higher. In addition, 
the views of civil society are such that representatives of the companies involved in the 
disclosure in Azerbaijan have very little knowledge and low skills in the area. This data 
suggest that there are discrepancies in terms of the provision of training. The EITI should 
therefore make it clear who should be receiving the training, and once that is clarified, it must 
be ensured that the training offered is co- ordinated by the EITI, even if external parties are 
used for assistance (i.e. international NGOs with local ofEces in the country). The data 
received contradicts that supplied by the EITI Secretariat’s own publication, the Evaluation 
of the EITI report, which states that the recent research showed that no improvements in 
training were needed."*^
Responses received from companies in relation to training are not consistent. While one 
company"*^  stated that the training received was organised by the EITT Secretariat, the other"*^
stated that it was done as part of company’s internal on-job training. Interestingly, a third
'"statement by the Azerbaijan Coalition o f  NGOs, "EITI in Azerbaijan -  July Statement" (11 July 2012) 
< httDV/www.DublishwhatvouDav.ore/resources/eiti-azerbaiian-iulv-statement > accessed 1 September 2013
“^ Evaluation of the EITI, 201T, (2011) Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 
<httD://eiti.org/document/2011 -evaluation-reDort> (accessed 20 June 2013). This report has made an attempt to 
study the effectiveness o f the EITI. It analyses the experiences o f some o f the countries that have been accepted 
either as candidate countries or have undergone the validation process. It has also set up a Strategy Working
Group (SWG) tasked to look into the issues raised by the Report. There are, however, some issues both with the 
Report and the SWG. In methodological terms the Report is based on the country reports and documents 
provided by three countries: Mongolia, Gabon and Nigeria. The Report, however, does not provide a list or 
copies o f the reports which were analysed for the study. Neither are samples o f questions asked o f the 
interviewees provided.
'“‘Questionnaire I, Respondent C 
^Questionnaire I, Respondent A
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company/^ which is a party to the consortium operating in Azerbaijan, said that nobody had
received any training in relation to EITI implementation.
6.3.5 Disclosure requirements
As disclosure lies at the heart of the EITI, it was important that the questionnaire addressed 
this issue and particularly, any obstacles that might exist with regard to this. The practice of 
contractual confidential clauses between the state and the extractive companies is usually 
expected to pose a problem for the EITI implementation. In Azerbaijan, the State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) issued a communication,'*^ stating that disclosure of the 
information about the payments does not contradict the confidentiality provisions of the 
agreements concluded between companies and the Republic of Azerbaijan.'*^ This statement 
is of limited impact since it does not make the disclosure of information protected by 
confidentiality clauses immediately available. It merely makes it possible, should the parties 
to the contract wish to disclose.
The responses from the civil society representatives in relation to the disclosure requirements 
tend to show that contractual clauses stand as an impediment to proper disclosure. One of the 
responding NGOs thought that the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding itself 
opposed the disclosure. Another respondent stated that the lack of clear terms in the EITI 
clauses contributed to difficulties in reaching disclosure. Overall, it was a common view that 
more direction should be given to implementing countries with regard to the elimination of 
legal obstacles for disclosure.
Although Azerbaijan has made it admissible to disclose information protected by
confidentiality clauses, the responses received from civil society mean that more should be 
done by the EITI rules to ensure that all those who commit to the initiative make all the 
necessary disclosures, including cases where information is protected by other contractual 
terms.
Questionnaire I, Respondent B 
'‘Communication No. 01-44/832 on 18 November 2004. The text o f this document is taken from E/77 
Ta/Wa/fon /Report o f  /?gpw6/fc o f available at http://eiti.or2/document/Azerbaiian2009Validation
(accessed 20 June 2013).
^^The communication states that "Disclosure of the information about the payments constitutes a part of 
implementation of EITI...and it does not contradict the confidentiality provisions of the agreements concluded 
between your Company or Joint Company and the Republic of Azerbaijan” .
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According to the Revenue Watch Institute/^ transparency in the extractive industries cannot
be fully achieved unless, in addition to the publication of revenues received and paid, full 
contractual disclosure is available. According to their report, contract transparency is 
essential for the responsible management of natural resources.Thus it is argued that the real
value of the contract cannot be captured in a single number and that contracts contain 
information about fiscal terms and the allocation of risk that are essential to understating the 
benefits and the risks of the deal.^ ** Systematic publication of the contracts can deter special 
provisions in contracts that are the product of corruption.^*
When asked whether inclusion of contract transparency into the EITI scheme would be 
welcomed, most of the civil society respondents answered in the affirmative. However, one 
of the NGO respondents, Respondent stated that this would not be achievable. The same 
respondent mentioned that some of the PSAs were available in Azerbaijan, something that 
other participants did not state. Following this, clarification was sought from one of the 
respondents,^  ^ who confirmed that contracts in Azerbaijan are not available to the public. 
This shows, once again, that there is lack of communication between the members of civil 
society. In addition, it seems that there is no clarity in relation to the public accessibility to 
the oil contracts in Azerbaijan. It could be that certain groups have access to the contract, 
while others do not. When trying to access the PSAs, it became apparent that they are not 
made easily available, and judging by the rest of the responses it seemed that the other 
participants did not have access to the contracts either. The government of Azerbaijan has 
promised that PSAs would be disclosed and publicly available through a website. However, 
until now this has not been done.'*'* Thus if contract transparency is included in the EITI 
scheme, then it must be ensured that they are openly available and easily accessible to anyone 
who is interested.
'‘T h e  Revenue Watch Institute is a non-profit policy institute and grant-making organisation that promotes, 
through capacity building, technical assistance, research and advocacy the effective, transparent and accountable
management of oil, gas and mineral resources for the public good. For more details about the Institute visit 
<http://www.revenuewatch.org/about > accessed 25 September 2013
'‘Teter Rosenblum & Susan Maples, ‘Contracts Confidential: Ending Secret Deals in the Extractive Industries’ 
(Revenue Watch Institute, 14 September 2009) < http://www.revenuewatch.org/publications/contracts- 
confidential-ending-secret-deals-extractive-industries > accessed 20 June 2012 
^°Ibid.
‘^ibid.
'’^ Questionnaire II, Respondent D 
^^Questionnaire II, Respondent A 
‘‘‘‘statem ent by the Azerbaijan Coalition of NGOs (n 41)
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As it currently stands, none of the companies that responded found any obstacles in 
implementing the EITI disclosure requirements; however this is so, provided that the 
reporting was done on an aggregated basis.
As for the responses received from the companies in relation to their willingness to disclose, 
one of the responding companies stated that they would have no problem in disclosing full 
contracts. A company that was operating in Azerbaijan as part of a consortium^  ^ stated that 
their decision would depend on the consortium's joint decision. One of the European 
companies. Respondent stated that it would not be able to publish contracts, as this 
would eliminate competitiveness and reveal sensitive information incorporated into the 
confidentiality clauses. According to the aforementioned publication by the Revenue Watch 
Institute, within the industry, supposedly confidential contracts are bought and sold, analysed 
and even ranked.^  ^ Moreover, for larger projects, competitors are often co-parties to the 
contract, giving them de facto access.
In relation to this, it must be mentioned that the government of Mozambique, as part of their 
participation in the EITI, has recently demonstrated their support for contract disclosure. A 
recent article by the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP)^  ^ demonstrates that this is not 
difficult.^^ According to Article 7 of the Draft Mining Law, the mining titles and the mining 
contracts are required to be published in the National Gazette.^ This suggests that arguments 
based on competition and commercially sensitive information are weak, and even more so 
when the public interest factor in transparency is weighted against them.^* In any event, the 
government can require contract disclosure by law without violating the confidentiality 
clause of an existing agreement. Contracts almost always permit disclosure in compliance 
with the law, thus if a country were to pass a law requiring disclosure of all contracts, it 
would affect all the agreem ents.As a consequence, the EITI requirements must be clear in 
instructing all those governments participating in the initiative to pass the law that would 
oblige the parties to the disclosure of contracts.
‘“’Questionnaire I, Respondent B 
“^ Questionnaire I, Respondent C
“ Peter Rosenblum & Susan Maples ( n49)
“T h e  Centre for Public Integrity, formed to promote human rights and democracy in Mozambique. For more
details visit < http://www.cip.org.mz/index.asp > accessed 25 October 2013
“^ 'Full Disclosure o f  Extractive Industries Contracts: A Next Step for Good Governance o f  Mozambique’s
Natural Resources’ (Good Governance, Transparency and Integrity, Edition No 01/2013, July 2013) 
< http://www.cip.org.mz/article.asp?lang=&sub=dadv&docno=253 > accessed 30 August 2013 
'‘‘'ibid 3.
^Tbid.
'“'ibid.
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6.3.6 Types of data disclosed
As for the data disclosed, responses received from the companies show that most of those that 
responded were not disclosing disaggregated data only because the EITI requirements did not 
specifically ask for them. In fact, one of the companies stated that it uses disaggregated
reporting that is published independently of the EITI. At this stage, it must be mentioned that 
the recently updated version of the EITI requirements includes disaggregated payments.^  ^
However, according to this requirement, it is the responsibility of the MSG to agree on the 
level of disaggregation. This means that although the EITI makes an attempt to ensure that 
the data disclosed arc disaggregated, it does not specify the level of disaggregation required. 
This means that the extent of disaggregated data will vary from country to country. Thus, the 
EITI does not create a global standard which is met by all the participants of the Initiative.
As for the responses of civil society on the same matter, they demonstrate that there is a gap 
in communication between the companies and civil society, since the two sides have different 
information with regard to the intentions of the other. Moreover, this once again shows that 
the EITI rules must be made more clear and specific, especially with regards to the reporting 
templates. Only one company of those that responded stated that contractual clauses may 
pose an obstacle in disclosing disaggregated data. In this case the EITI rules must direct all 
those participating in the Initiative in relation to exclusion of such clauses which create 
obstacles in disclosing payments on disaggregated basis. It was also interesting to find out 
that the obligation to disclose automatically extends to subsidiary companies of those 
companies that have signed up to the EITI voluntarily, and which also disclose their 
payments to the government.
The survey also revealed that some of the international companies have local companies that 
are involved in the supply chain. Most of the companies involved in the supply chain are 
mainly local private companies. When asked whether the companies were also obliged to 
disclose payments to these local companies, it was stated that these payments were not 
disclosed since they were not part of the EITI scheme. Having looked at the corruption 
activities in the extractive industries in chapter three, it became apparent that most of these 
activities involve local companies, whose directors have direct relations with public officials 
and through which money received is then embezzled. It is therefore imperative that these 
payments are also included into the EITI disclosure scheme.
EITI International Secretariat, The EITI Standard (n 29), Section 5.2(e)
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6.3.7 Reporting templates
The EITI needs to provide clearer guidelines as to the reporting templates. As one of the main 
aims of the Initiative is to establish greater revenue transparency so that citizens can track 
revenues into their national budgets, and through this initiate an informed public debate about 
the use of public money, it is thus imperative to ensure that reports which are published for 
public enquiry are structured in a way which makes them comprehensible to everyone. 
Moreover, the lack of clear guidance in the EITI rules regarding reporting templates seems to 
pose one of the biggest problems of the Initiative. When asked about the main weakness of 
the EITI, a large number of respondents indicated the lack of clear reporting mechanisms. In 
an initiative that has reporting at its main scope, such results from the data are far from 
optimistic.
6.3.8 Accessibility and comprehensibility of the reports
The main idea behind the EITI is that disclosed information will allow a dialogue between 
the citizens and the country. Unfortunately the results of data from the NGOs showed that the 
information disclosed is not well accessible and is not easily comprehensible.
Table 6.2 Levels of comprehensibility of the EITI reports64
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Table 6.3 Levels of accessibility of the EITI reports65
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As it can be seen from the charts above, most of the responses scored 3 or 2 on the scale of 1 
to 5, where 1 stands for not accessible/comprehensible and 5 stands for very 
accessible/comprehensible.
Taking into account that Azerbaijan was one of the first countries to implement the initiative, 
one would have expected that there would be no problems in making the reports easily 
accessible. Moreover, taking into account that according to the recent statistics only around 
44 per cent of the Azeri people have internet access, making reports available only through a 
website is perhaps insufficient.^^ It can be recommended that reports are distributed through 
local newspapers and are thus made available to everyone. In addition, the EITTs main 
website should contain reports from every country and make them easily accessible. For 
example, recently checked link^^ to the Azerbaijani reports on the EITI website, redirecting 
the user to the State Oil Fund’s web page, was invalid. Moreover, the level of awareness of 
the EITI and its operation within the country should be raised. This includes ensuring that all 
civil society representatives, be they members of the EITI committee or not, are actively
'’“Based on the data collected from the questionnaires
'’'’Internet World Statistics: Azerbaijan < http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia/az.htm > accessed 20 June
2013
67Last attempt to access the link was made on 12 January 2014
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involved in increasing EITI awareness and dissemination of the EITI-related information, 
including the published reports.
As for comprehension, reports must be made easier, so they are understood by anyone who is
reading them, regardless of the reader’s level of education and knowledge. Most of the 
information provided is just figures in terms of how much was paid and the quantities of oil 
extracted. For someone who does not follow the trends in the oil sector, such figures may 
mean nothing. To that end, the most recent report published by Azerbaijan revealed that the 
country received a substantial amount of in-kind payments.^  ^Not everyone, apart from those 
following the developments of the prices of oil and gas, can calculate an estimate of these 
payments in their actual value.
In addition, EITI requirements must specifically indicate that reporting is done on a 
disaggregated and not aggregated basis. In Azerbaijan it is impossible to match specific 
company payments with government revenue, which is supposed to be the core idea of the 
EITI. Being aggregated, information regarding the payments made by the companies
operating within the country and the money received by the state are not broken down. This 
inevitably makes it impossible to trace any particular manipulations in revenues and 
payments.^^ According to the civil society responses, companies remain adamantly opposed 
to switching to disaggregated reporting, a statement that contradicts the data received from 
the companies.
When talking about effective transparency mechanisms, Fung, Graham and Weil state that 
effective transparency policies must be sustainable to be effective. This means that policies 
need to gain in use, accuracy, and scope over time, because markets and public priorities 
change.^ ** Therefore, the authors suggest that transparency policies and initiatives must be
carefully drafted with a clear understanding of the needs and limitations of the audiences they 
target.^* Some of the important principles that need to be taken into account with respect to 
transparency initiatives are, but not exclusive of:
''^Azerbaijan EITI Report 2011, (SOFAZ, June 2012)
<http://www.oilfund.az/en US/hesabatlar-ve-statistika/hesabat-arxivi.asp > accessed 20 June 2013
"^ In government reporting, for example, when only the aggregated amount of revenue received from all
companies operating in the country is shown, it is difficult to trace how much each participating company paid 
and for what. For the purposes of fighting corruption, it is important to identify whether an extra, unaccountable 
sum of money was paid by a company, for instance, to secure a certain contract.
^"Archon Fung, Mary Graham & David Weil (n 32)
^'ibid 177.
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f  zf gojy zzccgjjz6/g 6y orz^ma/y czfzzgzzj fo zzjg/  ^ The most
important condition for transparency effectiveness is that new information becomes embedded in 
the decision routines of information users. Thus taking into account the culture and education of 
the audiences is crucial when tailoring the system of fact provision in the format that will be 
convenient.
Po/zcfgf mzz.;/ z/gfzgngz/ ybr comp/-g/zg/z.yfOAZ. Policies are most effective when they match 
information content and format to users’ level of comprehension.^  ^Therefore, simple distinctions, 
grades, stars, bar or pie charts, or other relatively straightforward metrics, with back up facts
available, usually work well.
If using the above theory in relation to outcomes of this research, one can see that the EITI 
must strengthen many of its aspects in terms of its mechanism and operation before it can be 
considered a good transparency initiative.
6.3.9 Nature of the Initiative
Kirton and Trebilcock state that it must be accepted that a system of voluntary self-regulation
designed and implemented unilaterally cannot adequately resolve the conflicts between 
private and public actors.^ "* Similarly, reinvigorating a model that locates the responsibility of 
setting and enforcing standards exclusively or primarily with governments or civil society 
having neither regulatory authority nor formal powers is not a promising alternative.^^ Thus 
it becomes apparent that in order for voluntary initiatives to be effective, principles of hard 
law must also be incorporated, so soft law could be complemented when and as required.^  ^
Additionally, the earlier mentioned work by Fung, Graham and Weil states that in order to be 
effective, transparency initiatives must include clear imposition of sanctions, since 
corporations and other organisations usually have many reasons to minimise or distort the 
information required for disclosure. As a result, it is important that transparency policies 
include mechanisms for imposition of substantial fines or other penalties for non-reporting or 
misreporting.^  ^ Moreover, sanctions are not always sufficient and it is important that legal 
penalties are accompanied by rigorous enforcement to raise the costs of not disclosing or 
disclosing inaccurately. This means that appropriate monitoring processes need to be put in
"Ibid.
“^ibid.
'’Tohn J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock, Hard Choices, Soft Law  (Ashgate 2004) 44 
“^ibid.
'^ïbid.
"ibid.
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place to oversee the reporting. The monitoring mechanism should also involve an imposition 
of sanctions for non-reporting.^^
When applying these instructions to the operation of the EITI, one can see from the EITI 
experience in Azerbaijan that the EITI process is not robust. Interestingly, the data collected 
from the questionnaires revealed that despite common belief, participants did not find the 
EITTs voluntary nature as its main weakness. What most of them did find lacking is the 
clarity of instructions that the participants are required to follow, clearer reporting 
mechanisms and the need for the presence of a monitoring mechanism. Many NGOs as well 
as companies stated that a more proactive approach on behalf of the EITI Secretariat is 
necessary. Also, the responses indicated that both companies and civil society organisations 
wanted more visits by the representatives from the EITI headquarters, which they thought 
could act as a monitoring mechanism that was so much needed. In addition, some believed 
that the EITI had to provide more practical support such as on site assistance with the 
implementation process. Generally, the research revealed that the participants feel that there 
is a need for the EITI Secretariat to have more power of oversight over the implementations 
that take place in the country.
6.3.10 Overall impact of the EITI
So far, countries have used the EITI in various ways. For example, while the government in 
Sierra Leone uses it as part of a larger strategy to document the cost of corruption to 
governance, Peru uses it as a part of its larger efforts to improve public budgeting. Indeed, the 
EITI as a transparency initiative can be used to discover the major bottleneck in the revenue 
flow system. Yet, the initiative needs to eliminate quite a few discrepancies and uncertainties, 
along with the vagueness of implementation requirements, to maximise its impact and 
effectiveness. As it stands at the moment, some data from the survey suggest that since its 
implementation, the EITT has not contributed to a reduction in the levels of corruption in 
Azerbaijan. One company mentioned that it would be difficult to comment on any major 
effects on the levels of corruption, since no official study in relation to this topic has been 
conducted. This statement can also be supported by the fact that the EITI report also suggests 
that no documentation exists which could pinpoint any societal changes that the EITI 
implementation has brought to the Compliant countries.^^
*Ibid.
T ee  "Evaluation o f the EITI, 2011" (n 42)
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6.4 Overall evaluation of the implementation of the EITI
According to Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, traditional hard law encompasses precise and 
legally binding agreements, with delegated enforcement, while soft law consists of vague, 
aspirational goals.A ccording to the two authors, soft law does not require binding 
obligations, is not precisely worded and does not require any kind of delegation in its 
implementation. One can thus argue that the EITI represents a model of soft law. Despite the 
fact that the EITI goals are not vague and aspirational, since the initiative has a goal of 
promoting transparency in the extractive industries sector, and although the implementation 
of the initiative involves a certain degree of delegation, it is neither legally binding nor is it 
required to be ratified by countries in form of a law. That said, the rules and requirements of 
the EITI are rather vague, as has been established through this research. Nevertheless, the 
EITI has an established permanent Secretariat, as well as a review and reporting mechanism. 
Moreover, it has a method of imposing sanctions, thereby a country can be de-listed if it does 
not fulfil or comply with the EITI rules and requirements. However, these sanctions are not 
always seen as effective and must be made stricter. This means that the sanctions must 
prescribe penalties for defaulting companies, managers and public officials acting on behalf 
of the govemment-participant. Some countries, such as Nigeria, have implemented these 
regulations into their domestic legislation.^* However, since no research has been done in this 
area, it is unclear whether this measure made the Initiative more effective.
At this stage, having looked at the EITI implementation in detail, it can be argued that the 
Initiative has a strong potential of becoming an effective initiative for curbing corruption in 
the extractive industries sector, despite being of a voluntary nature. Provided that it eradicates 
its current weaknesses, the EITI can eventually gain more supporters due to its strength in the 
field of extractive industries, and eventually turn into an accepted norm within the sector. 
This means that with time, as theory itself suggests,^  ^the soft law form that the initiative has 
at the moment will, arguably, develop into hard law. The data received from the survey 
showed that Azerbaijan was persuaded to join the EITI through international pressure, but 
also as a move which would lead to positive publicity; something that the country has 
managed to attain after having joined the Initiative. As for the companies, according to the
*°Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Antto Vihma, Comparing the Legitimacy and Effectiveness o f Global
Hard and Soft Law: An Analytical Approach' (2009) 3 Regulation and Governance 400
‘"Dilan Olcer, Extracting the Maximum from the E iri' (2009) OECD Development Centre Working Paper
No.276, < www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/6Q/42342311 .pdf > accessed 20 June 2013
*Tylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Antto Vihma ( n 80)
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responses received, most of them joined the EITI scheme voluntarily, and those that did not, 
disclose information because they operate in a country that is a part of the EITI.
Regarding the EITI's voluntary nature referred to above, the initiative could be incorporated 
into one of the international conventions, for example the aforementioned UN Convention. 
However, there is no evidence that this would give the EITI a stronger ground. It would 
simply become mandatory for all those countries that are signatories to a convention to 
implement the initiative. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that countries that are highly 
corrupt, do not also have a very good record of committing to international laws. This means 
that by incorporating the EITI into one of such international laws does not necessarily mean 
that the initiative will become more effective. In fact, many countries are signatories to 
various regional and international conventions against bribery and other types of corruption, 
but their levels of corruption do not appear to have fallen.
Besides, the EITI is not only a country-addressed initiative. The Initiative also extends to 
extractive companies, which cannot become signatories to a convention. In any event, even if 
the E m  is incorporated into one of the international conventions, it will not become more 
effective unless the current structure of the initiative is improved as suggested above.
Legally binding obligations can be seen as an alternative option of giving the E m  a stronger 
base regardless of whether it is joined on voluntary or legal grounds. Specifically, instead of 
signing a Memorandum of Understanding as is currently required, an agreement can be 
signed between the government and the E m  Secretariat, whereby the government would 
commit to follow the rules and regulations of the E m  and where the E m  Secretariat would 
monitor the implementation and apply sanctions if and as necessary. Under this agreement, 
the E m  would have the power to bring civil or criminal action against the companies or the 
administration if the rules and regulations are not complied with. The agreement would also 
include civil society, which would fulfil its share of obligations, by raising the awareness and 
disseminating all the necessary information at the country level. In this way the EITI will also 
have the power to promote not only the disclosure of revenue, but also accountability that is 
so much needed.
For those companies that wish to join the E m  scheme, they can sign separate agreements 
with the Em, to demonstrate their support and follow the Initiative and its rules, regardless
of whether the country in which they operate is involved in the EITI or not. The information
“international anti-corruption conventions were discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.6
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disclosed would then be published on each company's website, as well as on the website of
the EITI itself.
This model, particularly if the EITI becomes a mandatory option through its incorporation 
into an international legal Convention, will provide great external assistance to civil society 
and the people of each state in improving disclosure and bringing about accountability.
6.5 Final comments
This case study was conducted to seek to determine how effective the EITI, with its structure 
and rules, is in relation to increasing transparency in the extractive industries sector. The 
main purpose was to use Azerbaijan’s experience as one of the Compliant countries and to 
establish any flaws that may lie at the heart of the Initiative’s implementation, which 
undermine its effectiveness.
As mentioned earlier in this thesis. Validation is an essential stage of the EITI 
implementation process.^ "^  The procedure, which usually takes place every three years, is 
characterised by an investigation undertaken by the EITI-approved Validation team. The aim 
of this stage is to assess whether the country which had committed to the Initiative indeed 
pursues the main criteria to which it committed when it officially declared its intention to 
become a part to the EITI. In countries where Validation takes place for the first time, it is a 
chance to get their EITI status changed from Candidate to Compliant, and thus an 
opportunity to officially become approved as a country which complies with all the criteria 
with regards to transparency in the extractive industries, as demanded by the EITI criteria. A 
case study of Azerbaijan was chosen due to the fact that the particular country was one of the 
first to get its Compliant status.
The aforementioned examination was undertaken by means of doctrinal analysis of the EITI- 
produced rules and regulations with regard to the Validation process. This was done in 
pursuit of identifying the main criteria a Compliant country must satisfy. Having discussed 
the main measures involved in the Validation process, the discussion concentrated on 
Azerbaijan as a country rich in natural resources. The main aim behind this was to look into 
and demonstrate the country’s dependence on its natural resources within a historical and 
political context. The doctrinal analysis of various types of sources, such as academic 
literature and political and economic commentaries, has helped to create a picture of 
Azerbaijan as a country highly dependent on its natural resources, which in general terms can
^The importance o f Validation process was discussed in Section 5.2 in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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be considered as a country’s main source of revenue. In addition, an examination of 
Azerbaijan's historical background^  ^ affirmed the country’s status as currently developing. 
After the country received its independence from the Soviet Union and following serious 
political instability, it required external assistance in the extraction of its natural resources. 
Such assistance has come in the form of foreign extractive companies, which by signing 
contracts^^ with the government of Azerbaijan have the right to extract those natural 
resources, and share the profit from the extraction with the government based on the terms of 
the PSAs. The literature examined showed that such agreements contribute towards the 
creation of a relatively vulnerable environment, highly susceptible to corruption. It becomes 
evident that transparency, in relation to payments exchanged between the extracting 
companies and the government is absolutely necessary in Azerbaijan, to ensure low levels of 
corrupt activities linked to misappropriation of the extraction-related revenues.
Having looked at the history of Azerbaijan and its oil sector, the discussion moved on to the 
recent Validation process the country undertook back in February 2009.
The examination of the Validation process in Azerbaijan that followed was arranged 
according to the order of the Validation Grid indicators, thus making the analysis of the 
Validation follow the same steps as those undertaken by the Validators during their 
examination of Azerbaijan’s implementation progress. The evaluation of the Validation 
outcomes was undertaken by means of in-depth doctrinal analysis of the Validation Grid and 
the Validation Assessment Tools, as required by the EITI criteria. Those in turn, were 
analysed by means of empirical analysis gathered from the Azeri Validation report. The 
outcome of the testing of the EITI Validation process as instructed in the materials produced 
by the EITI in conjunction with their practical application based on the case study of 
Azerbaijan, has generated several disclosures related to the EITI’s effectiveness when tested 
in practice.
The first aspect of the EITI implementation that is striking is the fact that countries are given 
a great deal of autonomy when implementing the Initiative. The evaluation report mentioned 
earlier^  ^ indicates that this approach was preferred while taking into account variations in 
countries’ administrative and legal systems. Although the idea behind such an approach is 
understandable, as it attracts more participants to join the Initiative, as well as making it
Chapter 1, Section 1.2 
"'''For a range of contracts in the extractive sector see Chapter 3, Section 3.5 
*^See "Evaluation o f the EITI, 2011" (n 42)
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easier for those willing to participate to implement the EITI’s criteria, it weakens the 
Initiative overall. One of the examples is Azerbaijan’s decision not to have a clearly 
structured Work Plan, but instead to substitute it with a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU). At the time this seemed a sufficient document, which had incorporated most of the 
terms which are normally expected from a Work Plan. This allowance was made to 
Azerbaijan under the pretext that it was one of the first countries to implement the EITI, 
when the directions to the implementing countries were still not completely set up. Now, 
however, when Azerbaijan has been accredited the status of the Compliant country, the 
government is reluctant to change its tactic and create a proper Work Plan, insisting that the 
MOU which had been signed at the beginning proved to satisfy all the criteria and is thus a 
competent substitute for a Work Plan.^  ^Such acclamations are made notwithstanding the fact 
that the current MOU tends to lack important terms which are expected to be incorporated 
into a Work Plan, one of them being a timetable for implementation with a proper constructed 
schedule and capacity restraints. All these elements are not present in the current MOU, yet 
the Validator still approved it and stated that the Indicator which requires the presence of a 
clearly structured Work Plan was in fact met. When approached for clarifications, the EITI 
clarified that the Initiative’s implementation is tailored according to the country’s structure, 
thus taking into consideration various factors which affect the implementation. Moreover, the 
EITI acknowledged that being too rigid towards the countries that implement the initiative 
would result in countries withdrawing their participation from the initiative. This approach, 
on the other hand gives countries too much power to act as they wish, basing it on the claim 
that such alteration works best for the country.
Another factor that came to light while studying Azerbaijan’s Validation was the fact that the 
EITI gave little support to the countries in their implementation phase and later. In 
Azerbaijan, for example, there were several occasions when the government and some 
companies were not willing to co-operate with civil society groups when the latter raised 
issues related to the proper implementation of the Initiative’s criteria. For example, as far as 
the Work Plan is concerned, even after the Validation process was complete and the country 
was requested by the Validator to work on the construction of the new Work Plan, it took
Work Plan and the MOU were discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
*^ S^ome of the problems arise in relation to the reporting mechanism, particularly in relation to the introduction 
of disaggregate reporting. In addition, it appears that there are many companies in Azerbaijan that have still not
produced their disclosures. See Fidan Bagirova, “September 26, 2013: 10‘*’ Anniversary o f  EITI in Azerbaijan” 
<httD://www.revenuewatch.org/news/bIog/seDtember-26-2013-1 Oth-anniversarv-eiti-azerbaiian > accessed 3 
November 2013
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civil society groups a substantial time to persuade the government to agree on a Work Plan. 
Similarly, the government keeps on ignoring civil society’s requests to include disaggregated 
payments by companies into the reporting templates.^^ Although disaggregated payments 
have now been included in the new EITI requirements, the wording of the relevant provision 
is vague.^' The particular requirement states that it is the requirement of the MSG “to agree 
the level of disaggregation for the publication of data”.^  ^ Again, the EITI leaves it to the 
MSG to agree on the level of disaggregation, rather than giving clear instructions. Perhaps 
this is the reason why the data collected through the questionnaire shows that the civil society 
representatives prefer more visits from the EITI Secretariat and its assistance.
Table 6.4 Overall views on levels of corruption in Azerbaijan following the
implementation of the EITI93
I U n a b le  to  c o m m e n t
I No Im p ro v e m e n t In le v ie s  o f 
c o r ru p tio n
Civil S o c ie ty
^"ibid
91
92
EITI International Secretariat, The EITI Standard  (n 28), Requirement 5.2(e). 
Ibid.
^Based on the data collected from the questionnaires
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Table 6.5 Main weaknesses of the EITI94
I V o l u n t a r y  N a t u r e
I L ack  o f  m o n i t o r i n g  m e c h a
I L ack  o f  c l e a r  r e p o r t i n g  
i n s t r u c t i o n s
I N /A
C o m p a n i e s  C iv il S o c i e ty
* Examples of Other are Lack of practical support in relation to implementation; Lack of individual accountability
Moreover, in the case of Azerbaijan, when reading the reports, it becomes apparent that 
reports are made in a format which would make it difficult for someone who is not highly 
educated and does not have a particular interest in the extractive industries sector, to evaluate 
the revenue inflow. Thus, in order to make the Initiative adhere to its ideals, the EITI must 
work on and prepare a clear template structure, following which the countries can ensure that 
the produced reports are acceptable for every citizen. Particularly, this should be related to 
the in-kind revenue publication. Even the most recent instructions from the EITI in relation to 
the report templates, still include the in-kind payments.^^ This type of payment may be 
difficult to understand for someone who is not involved in a particular sector, and is thus 
unable to convert the in-kind payments to their equivalent in cash.
In addition, the EITI is open to company participation. As has been stated earlier, several 
companies have so far signed up to the Initiative. Although the EITI rules set directions for 
countries that are willing to implement it, the rules do not specify the responsibilities of the 
companies that wish to support the initiative. For example, what happens when a company 
that has showed its support of the Initiative operates in a country that has not? There is no
^%ased on the data collected from the questionnaires
^^EITI International Secretariat, The EITI Standard  (n 29), Requirement 3.7(a)
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provision in the EITI rules that covers such situations. So far, from the survey conducted of 
companies that operate in Azerbaijan, it seems that all of those that responded were 
disclosing payments because the country in which they operate is EITI-compliant. However, 
two of the responding companies stated that they had been reporting payments even prior to 
the country’s accession to the Initiative as it was the company’s corporate practice to do so 
regardless of whether the country they operate in is an EITI-implementing country or not.
In light of this, the scope of the EITI being open to a company’s participation is unclear. If, in 
relation to companies, the EITI intends to be applicable not only to those companies that 
operate on territories of the EITI participating countries, but also to companies that operate in 
countries which have not joined the Initiative, then the specific requirements must be made in 
relation to such companies. This might mean that companies may also need to undergo a 
Validation to ensure that they comply with the EITI standards, regardless of their country of 
operation, but based purely on their membership of the Initiative.
6.6 Conclusion
To conclude, the Validation process in Azerbaijan has brought to light various pitfalls within 
the EITI as an initiative responsible for promoting transparency in the extractive industries 
sector. It has provided us with a clear picture as to what aspects of the implementation need 
to be changed, and others that need to be given more thought and attention. Indeed, it is not 
easy to create a guide for implementation, which can be easily followed by any country, 
regardless of its level of development. Nevertheless, the experience gained from Azerbaijan’s 
implementation of the EITI can be used as an assistant tool in the search for the right 
constitution of the Initiative. Evidently, the fact that the Initiative is of a voluntary nature 
does not make it easy to implement and impose various conditions on the implementing 
countries, as it raises fears that many countries will simply refuse to participate. Even so, a 
clearly structured initiative, which is capable of providing those interested in its 
implementation with clear rules and regulations can attract, rather than drive away countries 
involved in extractive industries. The Civil Society Coalition, which is a group of the NGOs 
that take part in the implementation of the initiative, has proved to be strong enough to insist 
on their countries joining the EITI. Although it is a positive condition that the civil society 
plays an active role in the implementation, too much responsibility is bestowed upon its 
members. The initiative must provide clear and fairly structured rules, even if those may 
seem stringent to the governments of the implementing countries. A stringent attitude on
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behalf of the EITI may indeed deter participation, yet this approach may appeal to many
through the productive results that those rules bear.
Consequently, from the practical experiences of Azerbaijan, it can be said that only through a 
clearer structure of the EITI rules, in addition to more active participation and support from 
the EITI headquarters, can a transparent system in the extractive sector be created. In the 
world of corruption, relaxed approaches, allowing a waiver of rules does not solve the 
problem of corruption.
The next chapter makes a final overview of the evaluations in relation to the EITI, and 
addresses issues which could not be covered by this thesis. It also makes recommendations 
for further research in relation to some areas which were briefly identified as part of this 
thesis, but due to the scope of this research, were not covered in detail.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
This thesis examined the effectiveness of the EITI in improving transparency in the extractive 
industries sector. In particular, the conducted research looked into the EITI's application in 
practice, based on a case study of Azerbaijan, which was one of the first countries to receive 
the status of a Compliant country. No other academic research had been done in relation to 
the methods and structure employed by this particular initiative, which aims at improving 
disclosure of payments and revenues received from country’s extractive industries sector. 
Based on the research conducted as part of this thesis the current chapter provides a final 
overview of the thesis, and also provides suggestions for future research in the area of 
corruption in the extractive industries and the EITI.
7.2 Thesis overview
Apart from conducting an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of corruption, with reference 
to corruption in the oil industry, this thesis also looked at academic writings that suggest that 
increased levels of transparency can contribute towards reduction in the levels of corruption. 
Chapter four, whilst examining the principle of transparency, identified that increased 
transparency can lead to accountability of those who commit corrupt acts.
The background doctrinal study of the above-mentioned issues allowed for the formulation of 
the qualitative research methodology by means of a questionnaire. The step-by-step study of 
the Initiative’s principles and the application of the EITI rules in chapter four provided the 
basis for questions that were included in the questionnaire. The process of application of the 
chosen methodology also raised issues of an ethical nature that needed to be taken into 
consideration to comply with the University's Ethics Committee requirements. One of such 
matters was the issue of confidentiality, the method of distribution of the questionnaires and 
the handling of the collected material.
The particular thesis commenced by examining the phenomenon of corruption based on 
views of various academic writings in the area. The study of the existing academic literature 
provided a vast amount of valuable information on the nature of corruption, its relation to low 
levels of progression towards prosperity as well as what considered to be possible causes for
corruption. It looked into historic order of development of various anti-corruption strategies.
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Thus, it was identified that corruption is a phenomenon very diverse in terms of the forms in 
which it exists in society, and appears as bribery, embezzlement, patronage and others.
The work looked at chronological advances in the field of legislative developments at the 
international level. Thus international conventions such as the UN Convention and the OECD 
Convention were analysed. Moreover, voluntary corporate practices such as those promoted 
by the ICC in its Rules of Conduct and Recommendations, as well as OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises were also discussed. One of the findings during this part of the 
research was the types of definitions that each of the examined instruments uses when 
referring to the subject of corruption. At this stage it was noted that definition of corruption 
varies in each instrument. For example when some legal instruments cover facilitating 
payments as part of the offence, others do not.
As for the definition of corruption, the most commonly used definition, and the one that was 
adopted for the purposes of this thesis, is the one provided by the TI. TI defines corruption as 
any abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Having also examined other definitions, 
provided by various instruments, it was possible to identify a common aspect of each 
definition, that being an abuse of an official position for one's personal gain.
Once corruption was identified and a common aspect of various definitions found, the thesis 
examined literature in relation to possible causes of corruption. Here, it was distinguished 
that currently, no clear cause for corruption has been identified. The literature covering this 
area discusses various thoughts on possible causes of corruption. Some literature refers to 
corruption as an occurrence of cultural nature and where favouritism is pervasive, while some 
academic writings see it as a by-product of colonialist rule. Apart from this, there are also 
arguments that relate corruption to poor governance. One theory states that lack of 
administrative efficiency is a main cause for corruption. Another theory suggests that 
corruption is linked to poverty, where people demand bribes as a method to earn some 
money. However, taking into account the fact that many countries with relatively high 
salaries are still prone to incidents of corruption, one may wish to support the theory that 
states that corruption is merely a product of human greed. '
The thesis also looked at current legislative approaches as a method for penalising corrupt 
activities. It mainly examined regional and international conventions, but also looked and 
analysed the current anti-corruption legislation in Azerbaijan. In addition, various non-
’it must be noted that the notion o f  greed as a cause for corruption is not examined in detail in this research and 
does not represent one o f the main arguments raised throughout the thesis.
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legislative methods which aim at reducing corruption were also studied. These included rules 
and guidelines that had been established by business organisations and commercial bodies, 
such as the ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations.
Having discussed existing legislative approaches, the thesis moved on to discussion on the 
nature of extractive industries sector, particularly that of oil. Chapter three covered the 
examination of the oil industry with references to Azerbaijan. In light of this, incidents of 
corruption in the course of oil exploration and production were outlined, using examples from 
Azerbaijan. This chapter also demonstrated why incidents of corruption tend to be so high in 
this type of business. Its lucrative nature, high exploration risks, and scarcity of this good, in 
conjunction with high profits make it highly sought after. Examples of international 
companies bribing officials of the host state, as well as the existence of local companies 
involved in the production and supply chain that are owned by local politicians or their 
friends and relatives were also examined as current methods of embezzling and 
misappropriating money gained from extraction and sale of natural resources. Examples of 
corruption cases related to the oil sector in Azerbaijan were given.
Having studied various academic theories, it was established that transparency constitutes an 
invaluable benefit in the fight against corruption, as it eliminates secret deals and creates an 
open society where people are able to trace the actions of public authorities, where dialogue 
can increase accountability of those in charge and allow everyone within the State to 
participate in the decision-making process. This way an open society is created, where acts of 
corruption are difficult to conceal in comparison with a society dominated by secrecy and 
where only a chosen few get access to the information. In course of the discussion on 
transparency and disclosure, various methods through which transparency can be achieved 
have been discussed based on records of observations conducted by researchers. It was at this 
stage that it was discovered that in order to be effective, transparency initiatives need to be 
based on clarity, easy comprehensibility and accessibility. The discussion then moved to the 
EITI, a voluntary initiative, open to participation by companies and governments, which 
applies transparency through the disclosure of payments and revenues. The evaluation of the 
EITI mechanism was based on the EITI rules that are published for the use by companies, 
governments and civil society. The process of becoming a Candidate country was discussed. 
The discussion most importantly addressed the process of Validation, which, if successful, 
renders the country Compliant for the next five years, until the next Validation process will
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have to take place. Although the EITI is open to company participation, in addition to country 
participation, the lack of clear rules specifically designed for companies to follow was noted
during the study. Moreover, although the Validation process exists to ensure compliance with 
the EITI standards on behalf of countries, no such mechanism is in place to assess whether 
companies that have publicly shown their support of the Initiative are fulfilling the 
requirements. This would be especially important in situations where a company operating in 
a non-EITI-implementing country and could be the only link through which incidents of 
corrupt activities in the extractive sector of that country may be exposed.
While conducting the doctrinal research of the Validation process in Azerbaijan, flaws in 
relation to the initiative's implementation were beginning to show. In chapter five, it was 
noticed that the Validation process is not as vigorous as would be expected. For example, 
Azerbaijan’s Validation process was successful and resulted in the country being given its 
Compliant status notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the Validation the country had 
not complied with several EITI requirements. Furthermore, at the time of the Validation, the 
country had not established a permanent MSG; neither had it provided the validator with a 
reasonably structured Work Plan, which according to the EITI signifies one of the important 
provisions for being made Compliant.
The discoveries regarding the flaws of the EITI seen in chapter five, were supported by the
data collected through qualitative research conducted through distribution of questionnaires. 
Two types of questionnaires, similar in structure but slightly different in some content were 
distributed to the companies that operate in Azerbaijan as well as civil society groups, which 
included mainly NGOs that operate in Azerbaijan. The questionnaire that was distributed to 
the civil society organisations was also sent to a public organisation which works in the area 
of combating corruption. It should be noted that no m^or difficulties were noticed at this 
stage of the research. Initially it had been thought that a need for translating the 
questionnaire, which was originally written in English, would arise. However, in the course 
of distribution, it became apparent that most of the participants either knew English, or had 
translators available.
Overall the data collection went well. Although some organisations did not respond to the 
questionnaire, this did not pose a major obstacle. The data collected were diverse enough to 
make the necessary analysis. In fact, the lack of response in some instances was taken as 
evidence in support of the assumption that the criteria for the selection of EITI participants in 
the implementing country needs to be clearer and must be regulated by the EITI Secretariat.
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In course of the distribution of the questionnaire, it became clear that some of the 
organisations, although listed as participants, do not take active role in the initiative’s 
implementation in the country. Thus when non-responding organisations were contacted on 
several occasions, it became apparent that members of the staff were not present in the office
for prolonged periods of time, did not check email correspondence of the organisation and 
never answered phone calls.
The data revealed interesting insights into the EITI application by providing information from 
those who have been taking part and closely following Azerbaijan’s EITI experience. This 
part of research showed that the EITI Secretariat should have more control over the choice of 
the participants within the country and particularly on the members of the civil society. The 
fact that no clear guidelines based on which MSG participants are chosen are provided by the 
EITI earlier, was also confirmed during the research covered in chapter five. It was not clear 
on what grounds some of the NGOs were chosen to be a part of the Memorandum of 
Understanding, provided that many of those listed in the MOU do not seem to have registered 
contact details. For some, details that were provided on their websites were not up to date and 
therefore invalid. It thus became clear that EITI Secretariat needs to have more control over 
the MSG participants, as well as set clear rules that contact details must be made available to 
the public and easily accessible.
In addition, the survey also revealed that some of the major anti-corruption NGOs and public 
organisations are not in any way involved in the EITI implementation in the country. The 
EITI needs to ensure that all NGOs and other local organisations that have anti-corruption 
objective as their common goal have better communication among themselves and that they 
actively participate in the promotion of the Initiative and the revenue reports that are 
published as a result of its implementation. This is especially important since the data 
collected revealed that the EITI reports in Azerbaijan are not easily accessible, a factor that 
undermines the Initiative considering that the objective is to disseminate the information that 
is found in the reports. In addition, the respondents also noted that reports should be made 
more comprehensible. As prior research suggested, easy comprehensibility of the reports is 
imperative for a successful transparency initiative.
The research also revealed that the training provided to participants was not consistent, as it
was provided by different organisations. According to the information received through the
177
questionnaire it is apparent that most of the training was conducted in form of workshops.^ 
This demonstrates that the EITI Secretariat should be more proactive in its approach to
training.
The survey also showed that reporting mechanisms were not clear to many participants, both 
NGOs and the companies, and that the EITI needs to provide implementing countries with
clearer reporting templates. Since disclosure of revenues is the main objective of the 
Initiative, it should not be acceptable that decisions with regard to the reporting mechanism 
are left upon the MSG within each country. Moreover, as the responses indicated, the EITI 
must make clear templates for disaggregate data reporting.
In addition to this, data received from the questionnaires indicated that all the participants 
wished for more monitoring on behalf of the EITI Secretariat, particularly during the period 
after the Validation. This shows that EITI needs to be re-evaluated and alter its means of 
operation in order for it to become more successful. Following the research it was thus 
suggested that firstly, EITI needs to re-examine its rules and requirements, as well as 
Secretariat’s position in terms of becoming more proactive with clearly monitoring 
mechanism. Secondly, it was suggested that the EITI, as part of its requirements, should upon 
countries’ or companies’ accession to the Initiative make them operate based on a legally 
binding agreement, based on which, the EITI Secretariat would be able to monitor the 
implementation of the Initiative and once discrepancies are detected, have a recourse to take 
legal action against parties as necessary.
While conducting the literature review at the initial stages of the research, it was discovered
that the EITI's voluntary nature is believed to be its main weakness. Interestingly, the data 
gathered from the questionnaires revealed that none of the participants thought that this was 
the factor that made the EITI less effective.
Information in chapter four provided academic views on what would constitute an effective 
initiative. While analysing the data received for the questionnaires in chapter six, this thesis 
established that EITI as an initiative still lacks certain important conditions as described in 
chapter four, in order to be qualify as an effective transparency initiative. For examples, the 
EITI does not specifically require contract disclosure. Doctrinal research revealed that 
contract disclosure is essential in tackling corruption in extractive industries. Although some
^Unfortunately, the materials used during the workshops are not available as part o f documentations made 
accessible by the EITI.
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of the EITI countries, such as Mozambique, have incorporated contract disclosure, this 
important element should be incorporated as part of the EITI mandatory requirements.
7.3 The EITI: Moving forward
The aim of this research was to make a practical examination of the EITI and its effectiveness 
as an initiative, by identifying practical weaknesses of the EITI based on Azerbaijan's 
experience. In the course of this research, particularly when soft and hard law features were 
compared, some academic suggestions stated that certain initiatives that came in form of soft 
law could be given more power by being turned into hard law. The idea behind the EITI is 
simple and is based on the voluntary participation of governments of resource-rich countries 
to publish information about the revenues received from the extractive industries. Therefore, 
deducing from the discussion on types of law, it was assumed that the EITI operates in the 
form of soft law.
The discussion also showed that the Initiative as it currently stands is a form of self- 
regulation, which guided by ethics codes has emerged as an option for regulating the actions 
of governments and MNCs, particularly in areas where their activities are increasingly 
significant for people.^ Such codes focus in some cases on specific countries, in some cases 
on an industrial sector or a specific area of concern. However, in order to ensure that the 
goals are achieved, firstly, a reliable articulation of consensus or decision procedures for 
resolving disagreements about what is required and justified by way of regulation of 
individual and collective conduct is required. Secondly, it must be ensured that mechanisms 
for determining whether regulatory standards that have been put in place are respected. 
Along the hard law and soft law spectrum examined earlier in the thesis, voluntary standards 
and commitments by companies are at the extremely soft end.  ^Although they may be precise 
in the outline of their conduct, their obligation is more moral and normative than legal, and 
the authority to monitor companies’ compliance with their own commitments is not delegated 
to others. Soft law can further political debate, and although monitoring authority is often not 
delegated, activist groups can perform this task and publicise actors’ violations of their 
conunitments.^ Due to its soft law nature, the EITI tends to be more appealing to 
governments and companies that do not feel pressurised by becoming a part of this initiative.
^John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, (Cambridge University Press 2000)
' I^bid.
^John J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock (eds), //artf la w  ( Ashgate 2004)
^Ibid.
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The soft law nature of the EITI makes the initiative more flexible, which allows for a wider 
range of participants.
According to academic writings, it is believed that the long-term soft law measures such as 
voluntary standards are insufficient, and that hard law instruments are also necessary.^ By 
making the EITI a compulsory norm for all those involved in the extractive industries sector 
would give the initiative stronger grounds by creating a relevant enforcement mechanism. 
However, it must be said that if the structure of the initiative remains weak, it is not 
guaranteed that the presence of a legally enforceable mechanism will necessarily make it 
more effective.
This theory of enhancing soft law regulation through hard law was adopted by Nigeria, a
country compliant of the EITI, which turned the EITI requirements into hard law through 
enactment of the EITI Act.  ^ To give legal backing to the work of the EITI in Nigeria, a bill 
was introduced to the National Assembly in December 2004. The NEITI Bill was eventually 
passed and harmonised by the two chambers of the National Assembly and subsequently 
signed into law by the President of the country in 2007. With this, Nigeria became the first 
EITI-implementing country with a statutory backing for the initiative's operations.^
The Act provides for the establishment of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Initiative, which 
is allocated the responsibility for the development of a framework for transparency and 
accountability in the reporting and disclosure of revenues paid by the extractive industries 
com panies.S ince the NEITI is established as an organisation, according to s. 1(2) of the 
Act it may sue and can be sued. This means that it is given more powers than the MSG in 
Azerbaqan. The Act also sets out the tenure of the members of the National Stakeholders 
Working Group, which is the governing body of the NEITI. ’ *
Since it was not the scope of this research to look into the NEITI, it is seen as a possible idea 
for further research in the area. It would be interesting to see how by incorporating the 
principles of the EITI into a domestic law, affected the initiative’s effectiveness. It would be 
interesting to see whether this approach contributed to higher levels of accountability in 
comparison with those countries which left EITI implementation in the form of soft law.
^See John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (n 1); Burkart Holzner and Leslie Holzner, TraMjpare/zcy m 
CAange (Lfniversity o f  Pittsburgh Press 2006); Ann Florini (ed), TraMjpare/icyTbr a/% (2pe/%
JForM (Columbia University Press 2007)
^Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act 2007 (NEITI Act)
< httD://www.neiti.orG.n2/documents/neiti-act-2007 > accessed 25 July 2013 
httpV/www.neiti.oru.nG/nages/about-neiti > accessed 3 October 2012 
"WEITI Act 2007 (n 8)
"s.7 NEITI A ct(n 8 )
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Moreover, the research could demonstrate whether implementing the EITI in the form of hard 
law has a better effect on the reduction of corruption in the extractive industries sector.
To conclude, it must be stated that in principle, an initiative that promotes transparency such 
as the EITI has a good potential to reduce levels of corruption in the extractive industries by 
promoting openness and encouraging dialogue. However, in order to become effective, the 
EITI needs to undergo several structural and methodological adjustments.
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Invitation Letter
Address
jK  UNIVERSITY OFm SURREY
Date
Dear xxx
Impact of EITI on Extractive Industries Sector
I am currently engaged in a PhD research , the aim of which is to analyse the effectiveness of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in reducing corruption in relation to extractive industries sector.
As part of my research I am conducting a survey designed to investigate the experience of all those involved
or otherwise affected by the implementation of this initiative in Azerbaijan.
I enclose a copy of the questionnaire which sets out full details on the Participant Information Sheet on pages 
1-3.  I understand, of course, that the time which you have available will be limited. However, as you will 
be aware, the issue of combating corruption, particularly in the extractive industries sector is gaining 
prominence in both the private and public sector agendas. By obtaining a high rate of response to this 
questionnaire I will be able to achieve a greater understanding of the strengths and limitations of existing 
instruments, particularly the EITI, and the extent to which they currently satisfy the needs of all those 
affected.
If you would like to discuss this survey or the research project in more detail, please do not hesitate to 
contact me or my PhD supervisor Professor Indira Carr (E-Mail: I.Carr(msurrev.ac.uk ).
Elina Konstantinidou 
University of Surrey
Faculty of Business, Economics and Law
Guildford, GU2 7XH
E-Mail: E.Konstantinidou(h).surrev.ac.uk
Please let me know if you prefer to receive and complete the questionnaire by email 
Your help in this matter will be greatly appreciated. I look forward to hearing from you
Yours Sincerely,
Elina Konstantinidou LL.M
This Study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the University o f Surrey Ethics Committee.
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UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
UniS
Consent Form
1. I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study on the effectiveness of the Extractive 
Industries Sector
2. I have been given a full explanation by the investigators of the nature and purpose of the stud y, and 
of what I will be expected to do. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of 
the study and have understood the advice and inform ation given as a result.
3. I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this study.
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS)...............................................................................................................
Signed ...............................................................
Date ..........................................
Name of researcher/person taking consent (BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
195
Summary of the project
The issue of poverty has been gaining attention of politicians and civil society for many years now.
Various academic works have covered the matter and it is often said that corruption is an important 
contributor to underdevelopment and poverty. The link between corruption and poverty occurs 
when money that could be used for areas such as infrastructural developments, education, social 
care, tend to be used for personal enrichment of a small group of people. Such small groups usually
belong to higher echelons of country’s administration.
1 he thesis examines the problem of corruption, with particular attention given to its existence in the 
extractive industries sector, and where the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) may
be perceived as a viable approach to its eradication. It is believed that levels of corruption can be 
reduced through greater transparency, a principle which EITI has as its main objective. On the other 
hand, it is believed that EITI with its voluntary nature typifies the criticised type of voluntary 
initiatives. Particularly, EITI is said to be ineffective due to the fact that its voluntary nature 
inadvertently permits its members to comply with the procedure proximately, thus weakening 
EITFs adequacy. This research therefore intends to study this hypothesis through a case study of 
Azerbaijan’s oil industry.
The case study will be conducted through doctrinal research of the relevant materials, as well as
empirical study of major stakeholders in Azerbaijan’s oil industry, to gain their views on EITI’s 
effectiveness and flows.
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Protocol for the project
Several reasons have prompted the decision to use a case study of Azerbaijan in accomplishing the 
aim of this research. As new sources of hydrocarbons become increasingly important to the world, 
the Caspian Sea region has the potential to become one of the major oil and gas producing areas \  
Although most of the Caspian discoveries are in Kazakhstan, by 2010 a significant amount of oil 
has began to come from Azerbaijan^.
In general, Azerbaijan’s reserves of natural resources have been a major factor in attracting foreign 
investment. Azerbaijan has the third highest cumulative inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
value terms amongst CIS countries (after the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan)^.
Amongst others, one of the challenges facing Azerbaijan is the tackling of corruption'*. The 
government recognises that this area needs urgent attention and has initiated various measures in an 
attempt to address this concern^. Although there are positive developments in government’s 
challenge to curb corruption, corruption nevertheless remains entrenched throughout Azeri society^.
' Julia Naray, “The Industry’s Race for Caspian Oil Reserves’’ in Caspian Energy Resources -  Implications for the Arab
Gulf, first edition, (2000) (UAE: The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research) 111 -  126,111
^Maureen S. Crandall, Energy, Economics and Politics in the Caspian Region, (2006) (London: Fraeger Security Int.),
56
^Azerbaijan in depth review o f  the investment climate and market structure in the energy sector. Energy Charter 
Secretariat, (2005), pg 11 (FDI flow in 2003 was 3060.3 million USD, o f which 2810.2 million USD was directed to the 
oil and gas sector. Compared against its population and the GDP, Azerbaijan is by far the most attractive EDI destination 
among many countries o f  the region. In 2003 FDI in Azerbaijan accounted to 44.6% o f GDP).
"*Ibid (Currently Azerbaijan needs to work on upgrading its laws, implement regulations to standards that are generally 
acceptable internationally and to make those laws and regulations fully effective, particularly through completion o f the 
court system reform, and other measures to strengthen the rule o f  law.)
^On 17th November 2009 Transparency International Azerbaijan held a press conference to present the 2009 Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) and announce Azerbaijan’s score and ranking for that year. The CPI measures the perceived 
levels o f public sector corruption in a given country and is a composite index, drawing on 13 different expert and 
business surveys. (CPI scale ranges from 0 -  perceived to be highly corrupt, to 10 -  perceived to have low levels o f 
corruption). According to the 2009 statistics
fhttp://www.transnarencv.oru/policv research/survevs indices/cni/2009/cpi 2009 table accessed 2 September 2010), 
Azerbaijan has improved its score from 1.9 in 2008 to 2.3 in 2009. According to the analysis o f  the country’s result, the
outcome o f the surveys is most likely “a result o f the government’s commitment to improve the business environment 
and increased general awareness about the importance o f  curbing corruption”. It also mentions the fact that “in the past 
five years 5 Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres -  offices that help citizens to claim their rights in cases o f  corruption -  
opened across the country and the government has entered into an open dialogue with civil society through a network o f  
local anti -  corruption NGOs and TI Azerbaijan. ( see http://www.transparencv.az/news.php )
^According to business anti -  corruption portal, Azerbaijan is a challenging market for doing business, not least o f  all 
because o f the systemic level o f  corruption which has deterred many potential investors from entering the market. 
Citizens as well as companies frequently face bureaucrats who are not subject to oversight during the course o f  their 
duties, which offers significant leverage for bureaucrats to demand bribes, for instance, offer undue advantages to 
fnends. The Azerbaijani system has few institutional checks on graft and the rapid growth in the energy sector has 
offered considerable opportunities for the institutionalisation o f corruption.
h t t p : / / w w w . b u s i n e s s - a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n . c o m / c o u n t r v - p r o f i l e s / c u r o p e - c e n t r a l - a s i a / a z e r b a i i a n / s n a p s h o t /
Moreover, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are not carried out in 
a uniform and even-handed manner. Usually inspectors and businesspeople negotiate monthly or quarterly bribes for 
favourable treatment. The Azeri Committee o f Oil Industry Workers' Rights Protection (COIW RP) has illustrated how
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And since Azerbaijan’s most lucrative sector is that of natural resources, it is understandable that 
this area is precisely the one that needs particular attention. It is therefore not surprising that 
Azerbaijan was one of the first countries to express its willingness to participate in the E IT f. 
Further to Azerbaijan’s commitment to EITI, the country has been disclosing audited reports from 
the extractive industries sector and has been made a compliant country in 2009. According to Azeri 
schedule and in compliance with EITI guidelines, the next validation should take place in February 
2014*.
top managers from oil companies, such as o f  the state-owned SOCAR, systematically extract money by forming private
companies to which they submit orders at prices much higher than the market price. Subsequently, the companies 
typically pay 50% back to the managers, such as those o f  SOCAR, and keep the other 50%, sometimes even without! 97 
carrying out any work. In 2003, The Azeri Committee o f  Oil Industry Workers' Rights Protection submitted a complaint 
to the IFC and EBRD concerning corrupt practices at SOCAR. The complaint states: Corruption in SOCAR increases 
every year and this money can be seen as Western backing for criminal practices which deny benefits for the wider 
population o f  Azerbaijan'. NGOs claim that the State Oil Fund is basically controlled by the Presidential Bureau and 
that massive fraud and misappropriation o f  the fund's money by top politicians and officials take place systematically. 
In 2003, the Ministry o f Taxes began an investigation o f  suspected corruption in the state oil company SOCAR. The 
investigation revealed 800 private companies involved in a corruption scheme. A few low-ranking officials were 
arrested, but the investigation was halted when it reached governmental levels. (11% o f  companies state that bribery is 
frequent when dealing with environmental inspections.) see httn://www.business-anti-corruntion.com/countrv- 
profiles/eurone-central-asia/azerbaiian/corruntion-levels/cnvironment-natural-resourccs-and-extractive-industry/) 
^http://eiti.oru/Azerbaijan (On 17 June 2003, Azerbaijan made a formal commitment to support the Initiative. On 16 
February 2009 the EITI Board designated Azerbaijan as EITI compliant. In accordance with previously agreed 
Validation guidelines, Azerbaijan must be revalidated within 5 years (i.e., by 15 February 2014). In reaching the 
decision, the Board acknowledged the prompt corrective measures that the Azerbaijan Government has adopted in 
relation to the formalisation o f  a multi stakeholder group (MSG) and the establishment o f  a work plan. The Board 
confirmed Azerbaijan's achievement o f these conditions at its meeting in Oslo on 9 February 2010.)
\ttn://eiti.onz/Azerbaijan last accessed 2 November 2010
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The hypothesis of this thesis aims to infer whether the country’s current compliant status presents 
an example of EITTs progress in reducing corruption. The research aim is therefore to use the 
country as a case study for the purposes of determining efficacy and flows of the Initiative in its aim
of promoting transparency in extractive industries sector.
The above hypothesis will be challenged through doctrinal research of academic and scholarly 
works in the field of corruption and transparency. In addition, empirical methodology will be 
applied through questions asked via questionnaires, where range of stakeholders will be asked to 
provide their views on the EITFs current successes and shortcomings. For this purpose a range of 
participants has been selected, t hese include representatives from the oil extractive companies that 
operate in Azerbaijan and have signed up to the EITI, and various representatives of the civil 
society, such as the NGOs and members of the public. It has therefore been planned to distribute the 
questionnaire to 20 participants in total.
Overall the thesis will be divided into six chapters.
Abstract
To /ayowr -
Chapter 1 -  Introduction
G eM g ra / üff z/z ex^ m c^ zvg  z/z(/zzj^rne.y a /z (/ E x^ rac^ zve
Thz/zzjrngj^ TFa/z.spa/'gzzcy T/zftza^zve -y fz /zz  j^ nzcfzzre (zzzaf zzze^A oz/o/ogy
Chapter 2 -  Extractive Industries: Sector operational peculiarities
Exfmcrzve T/z^ /zz.yfz'zej^ . 6zzc/^ozzzz(/ -  Forezg/z Dzrec  ^Tzzvej^ /zze/z^  -  y f / ? o j ^ . y z 6 / g
comz;?^zozz.' o z /  ex p /o z fa fz o /z
Chapter 3 -  Transparency as an antidote to corruption: EITI
IFAar z.y /zzga/zr ^ ra /zj^ a rg /zcy  -  F /o w  ^ ra /z jp a rg /zc y  -  IKzy.y z/z w/zzc/z ^rG/zj/)a/"g/zcy ca /z
rezJz/ce corn zq ^ zo /z  -  E /7 7 ,  rggzz/a^oz^  j ^ c f z z z ' e  a/zz/ qperzz^zozz
Chapter 4 -  EITI Validation process: A case study of Azerbaijan
CozzTz^ry 6zzcAgmzzzzz/ -  If2zyj^ E / 7 7  vzz/zz/zzrzozz -  v4/zzz^.yzj^ q /'f /z e  KzWzzrzozz
Chapter 5 -  Evaluation
EvzzZzzzz^zo/z q/^fAg E/77/zzzzc^zozzj^ zzzzz/ vzz/zz/zzfzozz -  Eq/7gc^zo/z o/z gq p .y  zzJgzzfz/zez/
Chapter 6 -  Conclusion
Cozzc/zzj^zozzj^ fo  E /7 7 ^ /z c ^ z o /z  zzzzzf qqerzz^zozz -  Ezzgggj^^zo/zjybr z/zz;9mvg/zzg/z^ -  Evzz/zzzz^zozz q/^
poj^.yz6/g gqp.y  z/z rgjgzzrcA  -  Ezzgggj^^zozzybryzzfzzrg rgygzzrcA
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11 January 2012
Dear Members of the Ethics Committee
Investigation into effectiveness of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): a 
case study of Azerbaijan EC/2011/140/FBEL
Further to your letter of 08 December 2011, my response to the questions raised is as follows:
4. The nature of the sample: The participants to whom the questionnaire will be sent include 
representatives from the oil extractive companies that operate in Azerbaijan. The list of the 
participating companies is publically available on the EITI website
fhttp://eiti.org/Azerbaiian) and includes BP, Chevron Corp, ExxonMobil, Hess Corp, Statoil, 
and TOTAL. The questioimaire will be sent out to the companies’ Chief Executive Officers.
As for the civil society, the questionnaire will be sent to NGOs that operate in Azerbaijan,
and which are involved in work on corruption and corruption related matters. The NGOs 
selection is confirmed through the United Nations list of NGOs
fhttp : //www. u node. org/n go/1 i st. i sp#T). The questionnaire will also be sent to individuals
living in Azerbaijan, who are aware of my research through professional encounters, and 
may wish to participate in the survey.
The questionnaires will be distributed via secured delivery international post (Royal Mail 
International Signed For), and where applicable by email.
5. With regard to this point, I must admit that there was a mistake and reference to impact on 
participants’ health and wellbeing should not have appeared on the consent form. The 
research does not have any impact on health and wellbeing. I have removed the reference to 
this, as well as to the location and the duration of the study from the Consent Sheet, as all of
these are not applicable, (both the amended form as well as the Consent Form are enclosed)
6. A copy of the invitation letter that will be sent along with the questionnaires is enclosed. 
Yours Sincerely,
Elina Konstantinidou LL.M 
School of Law
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